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Despite steady and substantial decreases in residential racial/ethnic segregation 
since the 1960s, public school segregation is increasing steadily. As a result of these 
trends, schools, which have historically been less segregated than their surrounding 
neighborhoods, are now becoming more segregated than neighborhoods, underscoring 
the need for research on the ways in which educational institutions are facilitating 
segregation. Adopting a “student exchange” framework from the literature on electoral 
gerrymandering, this study provides initial empirical evidence examining how 
gerrymandered educational boundaries exacerbate or ameliorate patterns of residential 
segregation by “zoning in” certain students and “zoning out” others.  
Using a large, nationally-representative sample of 9,717 school attendance zones 
and 9,796 school districts, this study employs geospatial analytic techniques to 
investigate the effects of school attendance zone and school district gerrymandering on 
the racial/ethnic diversity of schools and districts. The effect of gerrymandering on 
diversity is assessed by comparing the characteristics of students residing in current 
boundaries to those residing in the “natural”, compact zone or district that would be 
v 
expected in the absence of gerrymandering, operationalized as the equal land area circle 
of Angel and Parent (2011) and convex Voronoi polygons.  
Analyses reveal that, on average, both school attendance zones and school 
districts are gerrymandered to “zone out” more racially/ethnically dissimilar students in 
favor of more racially/ethnically similar students. As a result, schools and districts are 
significantly more racially and ethnically homogeneous than they would be in the 
absence of gerrymandering. While gerrymandering serves to segregate students of all 
races and ethnicities, it particularly serves to exclude blacks and Hispanics from 
predominantly white schools and districts, reinforcing the historical divisions between 
these groups. Indeed, estimates suggest that, on average, school attendance zones and 
school districts are 15% and 14% less black-white diverse, respectively, than would be 
expected if their boundaries were not gerrymandered. Findings suggest that the 
gerrymandering of boundaries adds another pernicious layer of segregation to public 
education institutions, which are already highly segregated by residency.  
The finding that the gerrymandering of school attendance zones and school 
districts serves to segregate underscores the importance of educational boundaries as a 
contemporary mechanism of segregation. However, findings also warrant some 
optimism. Because attendance zone and district boundaries are modifiable and subject to 
policy intervention, state standards for boundary compactness and rezoning efforts 
designed to create more equitable boundaries present cost-effective opportunities to 
achieve meaningful gains in integration. While changing school district boundaries is less 
politically feasible than changing school attendance zones, when such windows of 
opportunity arise, they have the potential to reduce school finance inequities and equalize 
educational opportunity while also increasing racial/ethnic equity.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Shifting Educational-Residential Segregation Gap 
The landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) decision and 
subsequent legal victories dealt a severe blow to the structures of institutionalized 
segregation in American schools, culminating in the rapid integration of public schools 
along racial and ethnic lines over the 1960s and 1970s, especially for blacks and in the 
formerly de jure segregated South (Coleman, Kelly & Moore, 1975; Farley, 1975; Logan 
& Oakley, 2004; Orfield 1983; Smock & Wilson, 1991). The promise of Brown proved 
somewhat ephemeral, however, as segregation reached its nadir in the 1980s, giving way 
to a period of resegregation (Frankenberg, Lee & Orfield, 2003; Orfield, Bachmeier, 
James & Eitle, 1997; Orfield & Monfort, 1992; Orfield, Schley, Glass & Reardon, 1993; 
Orfield & Yun, 1999; Reardon, Yun & Eitle, 2000). Indeed, Orfield and colleagues have 
argued that schools were more segregated in 2005 than in 1970 (Frankenberg, Lee & 
Orfield, 2003; Orfield & Lee, 2007), with resegregation generally occurring across 
district lines, rather than between schools (Clotfelter, 2004; Stroub & Richards, 2011). 
While more recent evidence suggests that the trend towards resegregation may have 
plateaued, and perhaps even reversed, in recent years; at best, rates of segregation have 
remained relatively stable over the past decades (Stroub & Richards, 2011), underscoring 
the intractability of the problem of segregation in American schools.  
Contrastively, trends for residential segregation by race and ethnicity have been 
promising, with rates of segregation continuing to decline steadily and substantially since 
the Civil Rights era. Accelerated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and fair housing laws 
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banning racial discrimination (Clark, 2002), the past half-century witnessed substantial 
improvements across most dimensions of segregation, especially for blacks and whites 
(Charles, 2003; Clark, 2002; Iceland, 2004b; Iceland, Weinberg & Steinmetz, 2002; 
Logan, Stults & Farley, 2004; Timberlake & Iceland, 2007). Indeed, between 1960 and 
2000, overall metropolitan residential segregation declined by 32% for blacks and 31% 
for whites, while remaining stable for Hispanics, despite their rapidly increasing 
populations (Fischer, Stockmayer, Stiles & Hout, 2004). While the problem of residential 
segregation remains acute, preliminary evidence from the 2010 Census suggests that the 
trend towards residential integration has continued into the 21st century (University of 
Michigan Population Studies Center, 2011).   
That residential segregation has continued to improve while educational 
segregation is worsening or, at the very least, stabilizing, is a troubling sign that the hard-
fought gains of the Brown era are being eroded (Logan, 2002). Most accounts of this 
growth in school segregation over the past decades have focused on the effects of eroding 
legal support for desegregation (Frankenberg et al., 2003; Logan, 2002; Orfield et al., 
1997; Orfield & Monfort, 1992; Orfield et al., 1993; Orfield & Yun, 1999; Reardon & 
Yun, 2001b; Reardon et al., 2000). Orfield and colleagues have persuasively linked 
increases in segregation to the escalation in legal retrenchment on issues of segregation 
over the 1990s, exemplified by cases such as Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell (1991), Freeman v. Pitts (1992), and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995), which facilitated 
the massive release of districts from court-ordered desegregation remedies. Moreover, the 
finding that segregation is an increasingly concentrated at the district level has been 
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attributed to the legacy of Milliken v. Bradley (1974), in which the Supreme Court ruled 
that desegregation across district boundaries was impermissible in the absence of 
evidence that multiple districts had committed deliberate segregation. By rendering 
district boundaries sacrosanct and limiting inter-district desegregation remedies, 
researchers have implicated the Milliken ruling in the shift in segregation from a 
between-school to a between-district phenomenon (Bischoff, 2008; Clotfelter, 1998; 
Frankenberg et al., 2003; Orfield & Monfort, 1992; Reardon et al., 2000). Logan and 
colleagues have offered a slightly different interpretation of these trends, holding that the 
growth in segregation, while partially driven by the enervation of desegregation efforts, 
may be more accurately ascribed to the increasing racial/ethnic diversity driven by the 
rapid growth in the U.S. non-white population (Logan, 2004; Logan & Oakley, 2004; 
Logan, Oakley & Stowell, 2006, 2008; Logan, Stowell & Oakley, 2002). 
While accounts espoused by Orfield, Logan and their colleagues linking the 
increase in school segregation to the demise of desegregation and the increasing diversity 
of the student population are compelling, they are insufficient to explain an even more 
troubling finding – that  schools are now, in many cases, more segregated than their 
surrounding neighborhoods and metropolitan areas (Orfield, 2002; Reardon & Yun, 
2001b; Saporito & Sohoni, 2006, 2007; Sohoni & Saporito, 2009) or approaching that 
point (Ong & Rickles, 2004). In the decades following Brown, rates of educational 
segregation were consistently lower than those of residential segregation, suggesting that 
schools served to increase equity by mitigating the association between patterns of 
residence and school attendance that characterizes the American educational system. 
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Although this disparity may be attributed to several factors it is likely that this may be 
attributed to the effectiveness of desegregation policies. By weakening the link between 
where students lived and where they went to school, desegregation policies served to 
keep schools less segregated than the neighborhoods in which they were situated 
(Reardon & Yun, 2001b). The historical tendency for schools to be less segregated than 
their neighborhoods highlights the important role schools have played in ameliorating 
existing social inequities. 
In the absence of such desegregation policies, it would be expected that rates of 
school and residential segregation would converge, as the link between residence and 
school of attendance is tightened and educational patterns more closely mirror 
neighborhood patterns. However, the available evidence suggests that rates of school and 
residential segregation are not just converging, but widening, as schools fail to realize the 
gains in residential segregation. Accounts premised on the increasing diversity of the 
student population cannot explain the gap because it would also be reflected in residential 
segregation. As such, this suggests that schools, formerly champions of equity in the 
post-Brown era, are not only failing to desegregate and reproducing existing patterns of 
residential segregation; they are now playing an active role in segregating students 
beyond the existing residential patterns. 
Explaining the Educational-Residential Segregation Gap 
The finding that schools are now becoming more segregated than their residential 
patterns would suggest thus begs the question: What are schools doing to exacerbate 
segregation beyond existing residential segregation? One logically feasible explanation 
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for this finding, which has received extensive empirical attention, is the expanding role of 
school choice. By allowing parents to exercise their preferences in determining where 
their children attend school, school choice programs weaken the link between residential 
location and school of attendance. To the extent that these preferences tend towards more 
homogeneous educational environments, school choice options may therefore allow 
schools to become more segregated than would be expected under traditional 
neighborhood schools.  
Consistent with this perspective, a large corpus of research has documented 
associations between choice policies and racial/ethnic stratification, including: charter 
schools (e.g., Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Garcia, 2008a, 200b; Renzulli 
& Evans, 2005; Weiher & Tedin, 2002), magnet schools (Saporito, 2003), private schools 
(e.g., Saporito & Sohoni, 2006, 2007), voucher programs (e.g., Brunner, Imazeki & Ross, 
2010), intra-district choice/open enrollment (e.g., Carlson, Lavery & Witte, 2011; Holme 
& Wells, 2008), and inter-district choice programs (e.g., Holme & Richards, 2009). 
While there is considerable evidence that school choice is having adverse effects on 
racial/ethnic equity in schools, it seems unlikely that school choice is the primary driver 
behind the gap in educational and residential segregation. Indeed, the observed increases 
in segregation, which began in the 1980s, antedate the emergence of school choice in the 
1990s. Indeed, Milwaukee’s voucher program was not established until 1990, with 
Cleveland following in 1995, and the first charter school was not established in St. Paul 
until 1992 (Friedman Foundation, 2011). Likewise, inter-district choice laws were not 
enacted until the 1990s (Holme & Richards, 2009).  Moreover, although increases in 
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segregation were geographically distributed across the U.S., with the strongest effects in 
the South (Stroub & Richards, 2011), school choice programs have been more 
geographically limited in their implementation, at least until recently.  
In his exploration of the dynamics of residential and school segregation, Myron 
Orfield (2002) reverses the traditional causal structure which views residential 
segregation as the primary driver behind school segregation, positing an alternate 
mechanism by which school districts precipitate white flight and subsequent residential 
segregation. According to Orfield, non-white minorities tend to move into areas that are 
less “controversial” – generally lower-income suburban areas with aging populations and 
fewer families with children. As the proportion of non-white children in a 
neighborhood’s schools increases beyond a threshold of 10 to 20 percent, it precipitates 
white flight and rapid racial change that results until schools and neighborhoods are 
highly segregated. While this perspective provides an interesting account of how school 
segregation may be serving to increase residential segregation over time, it does not 
necessarily explain why rates of school segregation would be higher than residential 
segregation of students at a given point in time. Indeed, at any given point in time, the 
characteristics of students in schools would not be expected to differ from the 
characteristics of children enrolled in public schools in their neighborhoods.  
The Role of Educational Boundaries 
The inability of the existing narratives of segregation, including the end of the 
desegregation era, the rapid growth in the non-white student population, and the 
profusion of school choice options, to account for the rates of school segregation vis-à-vis 
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residential segregation highlights the need for alternative causal explanations. One 
explanation, which has received less empirical attention, focuses on the role of 
educational boundaries themselves. According to this perspective, schools may be more 
segregated than residential patterns would suggest because educational institutions have 
established inequitable boundaries that allow schools to maximize the inequities of their 
surrounding areas. Educational boundaries are the fundamental determinants of who 
attends which schools and districts, determining who is included and who is excluded 
from a certain educational opportunity. By carving up a geographic area in a manner that 
is non-neutral with respect to the race of the student population, educational boundaries 
may have lasting and profound consequences for equity in American schools.  
The bulk of empirical research on the effects of educational boundaries on 
segregation has focused on the indirect effects of boundaries on segregation. Drawing on 
Tiebout’s (1956) theory of public choice, these perspectives argue that educational 
boundaries facilitate segregation by serving as signals for more “efficient” residential 
sorting. Because individuals often choose to live near people more “similar” to them in 
terms of race/ethnicity, districts tend to become more homogeneous over time (Bischoff, 
2008; Ong & Rickles, 2004; Weiher, 1991). While the evidence on the indirect effects of 
educational boundaries provides a compelling account of how educational boundaries 
perpetuate segregation through residential sorting. Because they view the stratification of 
schools as the result of residential choices, these theories predict that school segregation 
reproduces and approximates neighborhood segregation. As such, they cannot adequately 
explain why schools are becoming more segregated than neighborhoods.  
8 
This study adopts an alternative perspective on the role of educational boundaries 
in perpetuating the problem of educational segregation and the residential-educational 
segregation gap. Rather than focusing on the indirect role that educational boundaries 
play in facilitating residential decisions, I examine the direct effect that the shape of 
educational boundaries plays in determining the equity of schools. According to this 
perspective, schools may be more inequitable than neighborhoods because they have non-
neutral boundaries that allow them to maintain district homogeneity in the face of 
neighborhood diversity. Indeed, presuming all students went to their assigned 
neighborhood schools, it is untenable that school segregation would be higher than 
residential segregation unless the attendance zones were drawn in such a way as to 
exclude certain students and include others. By determining which students attend which 
schools and districts, educational boundaries provide a pernicious mechanism of 
stratification that exacerbates existing patterns of residential segregation.  
Historical and anecdotal evidence regarding the inequities perpetrated by 
educational boundaries abound. Despite the absence of de jure segregation, Northern 
school districts often achieved de facto segregation by drawing their boundaries to 
maintain racial separation (Clark, 1987; Leigh, 1997). As Gunnar Myrdal observed, 
“school boundaries… are usually set at the boundary of the white and Negro 
neighborhoods” (Sugrue, 2009, p. 187). Although such efforts were deemed 
unconstitutional efforts to maintain “dual” school systems in Keyes v. Denver School 
District No. 1 (1973), they were only justiciable if it could be demonstrated that they 
resulted from discriminatory intent, often a difficult evidentiary burden (Douglas, 1995). 
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As a result, it was common practice for school districts in the post-Brown era to respond 
to desegregation pressures by locating schools and drawing their attendance boundaries 
to intensify segregation and undermine integration efforts (Clark, 1987; Orfield & Eaton, 
1997). Even more troubling, anecdotal evidence from current redistricting and rezoning 
proceedings suggests that inequitable educational boundaries that exclude certain groups 
of students at the expense of others have persisted, and continue to drive racial 
inequalities in education (League of Women Voters, 2008; Orfield & Luce, 2010; 
Shapiro, 2011; Siegel-Hawley, 2010, Vaznis, 2009). 
It should also be noted that the intent of race-conscious boundaries may not 
always be malevolent. Indeed, drawing race-conscious boundaries for the purposes of 
remedying past discrimination was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), a ruling which reinforced the 
irregular boundaries and busing strategies of the desegregation era. Proponents of 
integration have often decried the attempt to return to “neighborhood schools” 
(Frankenberg et al., 2003; Orfield & Eaton, 1997), arguing that the irregular boundaries 
and busing systems that are still employed by many districts as legacies of the 
desegregation era are necessary to promote racial diversity in highly-segregated areas. 
More recently, in his deciding opinion in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 
1 (2007), which rendered unconstitutional the use of student race in voluntary student 
assignment plans, Justice Kennedy endorsed the adoption of race-conscious districting 
plans as a means of achieving racially-balanced schools. Thus, while race-conscious 
educational boundaries may be responsible in part for the resegregation of schools 
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relative to neighborhoods, in other contexts, they may also have the positive effect of 
ameliorating severe patterns of residential segregation. 
Purpose of the Study 
Recent trends in educational segregation paint a disturbing picture: despite steady 
progress towards residential integration over the past decades, school segregation is 
worsening, suggesting that schools are serving to segregate students beyond existing 
residential patterns. Situating the inherently spatial problem of segregation in the context 
of its spatial antecedents, this study examines how educational boundaries has have been 
manipulated or “gerrymandered” to exacerbate or, in some cases, ameliorate, patterns of 
residential segregation. According to this perspective, as Fischel has noted, the 
gerrymandering of educational boundaries may be viewed not as an “accident of 
geography”, but as the manifestation of an intentional process engineered to exclude 
certain students at the expense of others. Towards that end, the study focuses on how 
both major types of educational boundaries – school attendance zones and school districts 
– have been gerrymandered and the consequences of gerrymandering for the equity of 
public schools and districts. Below, I outline the study’s research questions as they relate 
to each of these types of boundaries.  
School Attendance Zone Gerrymandering 
Because they determine which school students attend, school attendance zones 
play an extremely important role in structuring student’s educational opportunities, 
making them perhaps the most salient educational boundary. Indeed, as will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that attendance zone boundaries have 
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historically served as a critical battleground for undermining integration efforts. 
Moreover, to the extent that gerrymandered educational boundaries may have been used 
as an instrument of integration, it is expected that they would be evident at the level of 
the school attendance zone, reflecting the traditionally intra-district character of 
desegregation remedies. Towards that end, this study addresses the following specific 
research questions regarding the effects of school attendance zones: 
1) How gerrymandered are U.S. public school attendance zones? 
2) Does school attendance zone gerrymandering serve to segregate or integrate 
students by race/ethnicity? How much would school diversity be improved or 
worsened through rezoning designed to minimize gerrymandering? 
Owing to shifts in the geographic scale of segregation since Brown, the majority of 
segregation now lies between, rather than within districts. Indeed, by 2009, roughly 63% 
of all racial/ethnic segregation was between districts (Stroub & Richards, 2011). Because 
school attendance zones now account for a relatively small proportion of segregation now 
lies between districts, suggesting that the potential benefit of policies addressing 
inequities in school attendance zones is likely to be small relative to school districts. 
However, because attendance zones are more fluid than school districts, and are reviewed 
and modified frequently, they are somewhat more amenable to change than between-
district segregation and may constitute a more practical avenue for achieving integration 
objectives. Indeed, while it may be difficult to establish consensus and political will for 
boundary changes at a larger-scale, it may be possible to target inequities perpetuated 
within single districts. 
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Prior anecdotal evidence, as well as the student exchange theory underlying the 
study, suggests that school attendance zones may exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their 
level of gerrymandering and the effects of gerrymandering on racial/ethnic diversity in 
schools. For example, as will be discussed at length in Chapter 2, segregative 
gerrymandering may reflect a legacy of de facto segregation, especially in the North. 
Conversely, integrative gerrymandering may reflect the history of desegregation remedies 
in the South or in other areas subject to court-ordered desegregation. Indeed, it is 
conceivable that gerrymandering varies widely across a variety of geographic 
dimensions, including: metropolitan or micropolitan context, locality (i.e., urban, 
suburban or rural), history of de jure segregation, state. Analysis of variation in 
gerrymandering across geographic contexts provides into the causal mechanisms 
underlying gerrymandering. In addition, it helps to identify those contexts in which 
policy remedies targeting school boundaries to reduce racial/ethnic segregation would be 
more or less successful. In addition, to illuminate the racial dynamics that are driving the 
process of student exchange, it is particularly important to examine how gerrymandering 
varies as a function of the racial/ethnic composition of boundaries. Thus, to address 
geographic and demographic heterogeneity in school attendance zone gerrymandering 
across contexts, for Research Questions 1 and 2, the following sub-questions are 
addressed: 
1a)  How does school attendance zone gerrymandering vary across geographic and 
demographic contexts? 
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2a)  How does the effect of school attendance zone gerrymandering on school 
diversity vary across geographic and demographic contexts?  
School District Gerrymandering 
Because district boundaries are so strongly implicated in the perpetuation of the 
“new” segregation between districts, it is critically important to understand how district 
boundaries ipso facto have contributed to this segregation. Indeed, the finding that 
segregation would only be reduced by 37% if all students in each district were to be 
perfectly integrated across schools underscores the importance of continued attention to 
the role of district boundaries in perpetuating segregation and the potential for solutions 
that transcend district boundaries, even in the face of difficulties in implementing such 
policies. From a policy perspective, it is acknowledged that district boundaries are 
extremely difficult to change, requiring state intervention and the cooperation of multiple 
district entities that have generally been immunized against legal remedy by the legacy of 
Milliken. To the extent that new district boundaries are proposed and existing district 
boundaries are reviewed, it is particularly important to understand the equity effects of 
these boundaries. This is especially important given the role that districts play in 
determining the educational opportunities of relatively large numbers of students. 
Towards that end, this study addresses the following specific research questions 
regarding the effects of school districts: 
3) How gerrymandered are U.S. public school districts? How does school district 
gerrymandering relate to school attendance zone gerrymandering? 
14 
4) Does school district gerrymandering serve to segregate or integrate students by 
race/ethnicity? How much would school district diversity be improved or worsened 
through rezoning designed to minimize gerrymandering? 
As with school attendance zones, examining the extent to which school district 
gerrymandering varies across contexts is particularly important to help understand the 
dynamics of exclusion manifest in gerrymandered boundaries as well as the potential for 
policy remedies to enhance diversity in schools As such, to address geographic and 
demographic heterogeneity in school district gerrymandering across contexts, for 
Research Questions 3 and 4, the following sub-questions are addressed: 
3a)  How does school district gerrymandering vary across geographic and 
demographic contexts? 
4a)  How does the effect of school district gerrymandering on district diversity vary 
across geographic and demographic contexts? 
Conceptual Framework 
In considering the issue of educational gerrymandering, this study is guided by a 
framework of “student exchange” adapted from the political realm. Previous research on 
the educational boundaries has focused on the role that boundaries play in the residential 
choices of individuals; by contrast, the student exchange framework adopted in this study 
focuses on how schools choose students by manipulating their boundaries to include 
certain students at the expense of others. According to the student exchange framework, 
the distortion of attendance zone and district boundaries provides a mechanism for 
segregating or integrating schools beyond existing patterns of residential segregation. 
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This perspective offers a viable alternative to existing narratives of resegregation, which 
are generally inadequate to explain the current trends in segregation, providing a 
mechanism of stratification beyond existing residential segregation. In addition, the 
student exchange framework also acknowledges the potentially affirmative role that 
educational boundaries may play in increasing diversity and maintaining integration by 
weakening the link between residency and schools. In the sections that follow, I 
formalize this framework of student exchange, situating it in the literature on electoral 
gerrymandering and “voter exchange”.  
Electoral Gerrymandering 
In the political realm, gerrymandering may be conceived of as the process of 
drawing district boundaries to confer an electoral advantage on one group over another, 
generally on the basis of political affiliation (i.e., partisan gerrymandering) or unlawfully, 
on the basis of race or ethnicity (i.e., racial gerrymandering). As such, the general aim of 
gerrymandering is to dilute the effect of “one person, one vote” by minimizing the effect 
of opponents’ votes and maximizing the effect of supporters’ votes.  
Although the practice of electoral gerrymandering is a longstanding American 
tradition that may be traced to the election of the first Congress in 1789, when anti-
Federalists in Virginia engineered district boundaries to prevent Madison from being 
excluded from the House of Representatives (Labunski, 2006; Martis, 2008). The 
popularization of the term “gerrymandering”, however, may be traced to the famous 1812 
political cartoon in the Boston Gazette (see Figure 1), a satirical portmanteau associating 
then-governor Elbridge Gerry with the salamander shape taken by the districts in his 
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politically-biased redistricting schemes for Massachusetts (Labunski, 2006; Martis, 
2008). Nearly 200 years later, gerrymandering continues to spark colorful language, with 
justices of the court describing irregular districts as “a Rorschach inkblot test” (Shaw v. 
Barr, 1992) “a bug splattered on a windshield” (Shaw v. Reno, 1993), “a sacred Mayan 
bird” (Bush v. Vera, 1996), and “[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors 
open, you’d kill most of the people in the district” (Shaw v. Reno, 1993).  
 
Figure 1. Boston Gazette political cartoon picturing governor  
Gerry’s “gerrymandering” of Massachusetts. 
 
Gerrymandering is a general term encompassing three general strategies for 
distorting district boundaries to achieve political gain. First, districts may incorporate 
discontiguous areas that disconnected from the main part of the district to achieve a 
certain distribution of voters. Second, district populations may be allowed to vary, 
undermining the “one person, one vote” principle by giving more weight to voters in 
smaller districts than voters in larger districts. Third, districts boundaries may be 
manipulated to be “irregular” or “bizarre”, to exclude certain groups and include others, 
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thereby engineering a preferred voter composition for the district. Corresponding to these 
three strategies, political scientists have identified three principles for identifying 
gerrymandered political districts: 1) contiguity, 2) equinumerosity, or population 
equivalence, and 3) compactness, each of which is discussed at length in Chapter 2.  
The constitutional issues surrounding the legality of gerrymandering in the 
political context are complex and rapidly changing. At a basic level, while partisan 
gerrymandering, or manipulation of boundaries along party lines for the sole purpose of 
achieving political gain, has been deemed constitutional, the courts have generally 
concluded that racial gerrymandering runs counter to the intent of electoral democracy 
and have sought to limit its effects. Although affirmative racial gerrymandering, notably 
through the creation of majority-minority districts designed to redress historic 
discrimination, was employed after the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
However, gerrymandering solely on the basis of race, regardless of affirmative intent, 
was subsequently ruled unconstitutional in Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Miller v. Johnson 
(1995), although the use of race has been upheld when used in conjunction with partisan 
considerations (Hunt v. Cromartie, 1999). The courts have generally repudiated 
gerrymandering on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection principle of the 14th 
amendment, by excluding closer voters in favor of voters farther away, a gerrymandered 
district exhibits an impermissible preference for certain voters over others (Davis v. 
Bandemer, 1986).  
As a result, all 50 states prohibit “inequinumerous” redistricting strategies, which 
violate the spirit of “one person, one vote”, while 49 states have clear statutes prohibiting 
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“discontiguous” boundaries for either legislative or congressional districts (Levitt, 2011). 
While the practice of creating irregular or non-compact boundaries has been outlawed by 
37 states, concerns regarding the valid and reliable measurement of boundary 
“irregularity” have rendered it more difficult to prosecute successfully (Levitt, 2011).  
Electoral Gerrymandering as “Voter Exchange” 
Angel and Parent (2011) have conceptualized electoral gerrymandering as the 
spatial manifestation of a process of aggressive “voter exchange”, which creates irregular 
boundaries by including voters in certain geographic areas and excluding voters in others. 
Gerrymandering may be defined from a voter exchange perspective as follows: 
The distortion of an election district shape from a more compact to a less 
compact one by exchanging voters of one party (or minority group) living 
close by for voters of another party (or minority group) living further 
away. (Angel & Parent, p. 96).  
In a process of voter exchange through gerrymandering, the composition of voters in 
what would be a cohesive and efficient district is deemed unsatisfactory. As such, 
boundaries are manipulated to achieve a more advantageous composition of voters by 
excluding some nearby and replacing them with voters living farther away (LULAC v. 
Perry, 2006). Boundary distortion and irregularity is therefore the direct evidence of this 
process of “foraging” for desirable voters and “expelling” undesirable voters.  
 Consistent with this interpretation, in discussing cases political gerrymandering, 
justices of the Supreme Court have consistently depicted gerrymandering as an act of 
voter exchange, whether on the basis of voter party affiliation (i.e., political 
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gerrymandering) or race/ethnicity (i.e., racial gerrymandering). As Justice Kennedy wrote 
in the opinion of the Court in LULAC v. Perry (2006), “a district that reaches out to 
grab… isolated minority communities is not reasonably compact.”  Likewise, Souter 
argued in his dissent in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), districts with “specific protuberances on 
the draconian shape that reach out to include Democrats, or fissures in it that squirm 
away from Republicans” may be considered gerrymandered. In the opinion of the court in 
Bush v. Vera (2006), Justice O’Connor contended that Texas’ electoral districts used 
“narrow corridors, wings, or finders… [to] reach out to enclose black voters while 
excluding nearby Hispanic residents.”  
According to the voter exchange framework, irregularities in political boundaries 
may be viewed as the direct result of deliberate boundary manipulation designed to 
include and exclude certain voter populations. Indeed, as Justice Stevens argued in his 
dissenting opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), the shape of a district ipso facto is 
evidence of the process of gerrymandering, in that “a district’s peculiar shape might be a 
symptom of an illicit process in the line drawing purpose.” Of course, district shapes may 
diverge from optimality for a variety of non-exchange reasons, including congruence 
with geographic boundaries, such as irregular coastlines or islands, and coterminity with 
other jurisdictional boundaries. However, it is argued that the extent to which a district 
shape diverges from its “natural”, compact shape, after controlling for these effects, may 
be interpreted as evidence of a process of voter exchange. 
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Educational Gerrymandering as “Student Exchange” 
Mirroring the “voter exchange” perspective on electoral gerrymandering, I adopt 
a “student exchange” perspective to understanding school attendance zone and school 
district gerrymandering. According to this perspective, the irregularity of educational 
boundaries reflects a process of student exchange wherein “less desirable” students 
nearby are excluded in lieu of “more desirable” students residing farther away. As with 
political gerrymandering, which may be motivated to exchange voters on the basis of 
party affiliation or race, student “desirability” may be based on a number of factors, 
including student race/ethnicity, student socioeconomic status, or tax capacity. The 
construction of educational districts is therefore an exclusionary and inclusionary process 
that “zones in” certain students and “zones out” others. Figure 2 illustrates how the 
process of student exchange results in district boundary gerrymandering.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Student exchange as a function of educational district gerrymandering.  
Note: Figure adapted from Angel & Parent (2011). 
The conceptualization of gerrymandering as student exchange is premised on the 
notion that current educational boundaries may be compared to the boundaries of 
“natural” school attendance zones or districts that would be expected in the absence of 
STUDENTS “ZONED 
OUT” OF DISTRICT GERRYMANDERED DISTRICT 
STUDENTS “ZONED IN” TO DISTRICT 
NON‐GERRYMANDERED DISTRICT 
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gerrymandering to determine how irregularities to boundaries serves to exchange 
students. For the purposes of the current illustration, the “natural” district is considered a 
circle of equal land area to the original district having its center on the center of gravity 
of the original district (Angel & Parent, 2011). Generally, the larger the area exchanged 
by the district (i.e., the lower the ratio of the district’s area enclosed by the circle 
representing the ideal district to the area of the actual district), the more “aggressive” and 
egregious the gerrymander.  
As the figure above illustrates, the area of overlap between the “natural”, non-
gerrymandered district and the actual, gerrymandered district represents those students 
that are neither “zoned in” nor “zoned out” by the process of student exchange. These 
students, therefore, comprise the “core” student population for the district, while the area 
of overlap may be considered the “core” of each attendance zone or district. To the extent 
that school attendance zone and, to a lesser extent, district boundaries are created and 
modified in response to public demand, it may be inferred that the process of exchange is 
driven, at least in part, by the parents and stakeholders in the “core”. This suggests that 
the preferences and characteristics of parents and students in “core” zones and districts 
may drive the process of exclusion and inclusion manifested by gerrymandered 
boundaries. For example, the aggressiveness of a student exchange process and, 
therefore, the severity of gerrymandering, may be related to the homogeneity of the 
“core”, with more homogeneous cores seeking to consolidate their homogeneity by 
exchanging racially and ethnically dissimilar students for more similar students.  
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School attendance zone gerrymandering. At the school level, the construction 
of school boundaries “zones in” certain students who would reasonably expect to go to 
another school and “zones out” students who would reasonably expect to go to the focal 
school. Because school attendance zoning decisions are participatory in nature, and 
subject to parental and community involvement, gerrymandering at the attendance zone 
level may be guided by the preferences of parents in the “core” zone to maintain 
homogeneous schools in the face of district diversity. As Myron Orfield (2002) has 
argued, attendance zones may be manipulated to satisfy parental demands, which often 
intensify when districts experience significant racial change that threatens to change the 
racial composition of schools. However, as noted previously, the impetus for student 
exchange via school attendance zone gerrymandering may also be benign, reflecting the 
affirmative intent to integrate across segregated schools.  
School district gerrymandering. At the school district level, district boundaries 
“zone in” more desirable students who would reasonably expect to attend school in 
another district in exchange for less desirable students. Whereas the impetus for student 
exchange through attendance zone boundaries reflects a school district’s effort to 
manipulate the racial and ethnic distribution of students across schools, either in response 
to “core” parental preferences or in the interests of integration, the impetus of student 
exchange may be conceptualized as a school district’s effort to engineer the homogeneity, 
or heterogeneity, of its overall racial and ethnic composition.  
While school attendance zone and school district gerrymandering are independent 
exchange processes, they may in practice interact with each other. For example, if a 
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district’s boundaries result in a relatively homogeneous student population, districts may 
be less inclined to exchange students within their boundaries using attendance zones. 
However, a more diverse district may use gerrymandered attendance zones as a 
mechanism for segregating students in response to parental demands. Although it is 
theoretically possible that school districts, like attendance zones, could be designed to 
maximize heterogeneity, there is little anecdotal evidence to suggest that this is the case.  
Another important exchange process that may underlie educational boundary 
gerrymandering warrants consideration. At the school district level, gerrymandering may 
also reflect a process better characterized as “land exchange” than “student exchange”. 
This exchange, colloquially referred to as “tax grabbing”, is motivated by the financial 
goal of enhancing the district’s taxation capacity for property wealth. Because the issue 
of taxation is not relevant at the school level, this is not likely to be a motivating factor 
for the distortion of school attendance zone boundaries. Because the study is concerned 
with the consequences, rather than the intent, of educational gerrymandering, the issue of 
gerrymandering as “tax grabbing” is not peripheral to its objective.  
Affirmative vs. Discriminatory Intent of Gerrymandering 
While the term “gerrymandering” generally has a pejorative connotation, the 
impetus for student exchange via educational boundary gerrymandering, as with voter 
exchange, may theoretically be either discriminatory or affirmative in nature. Consider 
the case of gerrymandering perpetrated for the purpose of engineering the racial/ethnic 
composition of a school attendance zone or school district. As discussed previously, it is 
theoretically possible that such race-conscious boundary manipulation may be motivated 
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by a discriminatory intent, designed to preserve the racial/ethnic homogeneity of the 
student population and to segregate students across schools or districts in a post-Milliken 
context. As with electoral boundaries, the establishment of discriminatory educational 
boundaries is patently unconstitutional; as noted previously, however, efforts to prosecute 
such cases are plagued by difficulties inherent in establishing the discriminatory intent of 
boundaries (Douglas, 1995). However, as discussed previously, the distortion of 
educational boundaries may also be motivated by an affirmative intent, a vestige of the 
desegregation era designed to weaken the link between residential segregation and school 
segregation. While such affirmative gerrymandering has been outlawed in the context of 
electoral districts (Shaw v. Reno, 1993), it has been expressly endorsed in the educational 
context (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007).  
It is important to distinguish between the initial impetus for voter exchange and 
the consequences of boundary gerrymandering for equity. Indeed, even if the intent of 
gerrymandering was initially affirmative, boundaries may have the effect of segregating. 
By contrast, even if boundaries were originally intended to be discriminatory, they may 
have an integrative effect. For example, while a school district’s boundaries may have 
been manipulated for the purpose of increasing property tax revenue, the effect of the 
boundary manipulation may have been to segregate students by race/ethnicity, owing to 
the strong association between race/ethnicity and property tax wealth. By contrast, it is 
possible that a school’s attendance boundaries were originally designed to increase the 
diversity of the school; however, owing to residential migration patterns, they may 
currently have a segregative, rather than integrative, effect. Because of difficulties 
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inherent in assessing intent (discussed at length in the Limitations section below), the 
current study seeks to avoid conflating the intent of gerrymandering with its 
consequences, focusing exclusively on the effects of educational boundary 
gerrymandering on equity in schools.  
Gerrymandering Inefficiency 
One fundamental aspect of boundary gerrymandering that is of particular practical 
importance in the educational context is its inherent inefficiency. As is discussed at 
length in Chapter 2, district gerrymandering necessarily results in a less efficient district 
shape than would be expected in the absence of gerrymandering. Indeed, the “natural”, 
compact district that would be expected in the absence of gerrymandering would, by 
definition, minimize the travel time between each student in a school attendance zone and 
their school. To the extent that a district is gerrymandered, therefore, it also diverges 
from optimal efficiency, resulting in increases in travel time and costs. When 
gerrymandering promotes the objectives of integration, educational entities must weigh 
the costs may associated with these inefficiencies against the benefits to the district in 
terms of increased equity. However, when gerrymandering adversely impacts equity, the 
additional costs imposed by the district’s inefficiency merely provide an additional 
burden; as such, the objectives of equity and cost-savings may both be realized through 
more efficient districting schemes that minimize gerrymandering.  
Overview of Methodology 
In this study, I investigate the gerrymandering of educational boundaries using a 
variety of sources of spatial and aspatial data analyzed via complementary geospatial and 
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traditional regression analytic techniques. As discussed above, the study has two primary 
objectives: 1) to document the prevalence and severity of educational boundary 
gerrymandering, and 2) to analyze how the gerrymandering of educational boundaries 
serves to perpetuate, or ameliorate, racial and ethnic inequities in American schools. 
Mirroring these objectives, the study has two primary phases.  
In the first phase of analysis, I draw on the rich methodological literature on the 
measurement of electoral gerrymandering to quantify the irregularity of school 
attendance zone and school district boundaries. Two complementary measures of 
compactness were computed quantifying gerrymandering for a large sample of school 
attendance zones and the full population of school districts. Boundaries of 9,717 
elementary school attendance zones were obtained from the School Attendance Boundary 
Information System (SABINS), a novel repository for national school boundary data. 
Boundaries of all 9,621 school districts in U.S. metropolitan areas, which are reported 
biennially to the U.S. Census Bureau, were obtained from the Topologically Integrated 
Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER)/Line® system.  
To determine how gerrymandering varies across school and district contexts, 
measures of gerrymandering were regressed on a variety of geographic and demographic 
covariates, including core-based statistical area type (i.e., metropolitan or micropolitan), 
locality type (i.e., city, suburban, town, rural) , history of de jure segregation, history of 
desegregation order, etc.  
In the second phase of analysis, I examine the effects of educational boundary 
gerrymandering on the racial/ethnic diversity of schools and districts. Building on the 
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study’s student exchange framework, I estimate the “effect” of gerrymandering on 
diversity for each of the schools and districts in the sample by comparing the diversity of 
existing boundaries to the diversity of the “natural” boundaries would be expected in the 
absence of gerrymandering. These natural, non-gerrymandered school attendance zones 
and districts are operationalized through two different types of compact shapes: 1) the 
perfectly-compact equal land area circle of Angel and Parent (2011), and 2) an optimally-
efficient convex Voronoi polygon minimizing student distance to school. Each actual and 
“natural” attendance zones and school districts is spatially merged with Census 2010 
Summary File 1 block-level data via ArcGIS. Based on these demographic data, the 
racial/ethnic diversity of each current school attendance zone and district is compared to 
the racial/ethnic diversity of its “natural” attendance zone to estimate the effect of 
gerrymandering on diversity.  
As in the first phase of analysis, regression models were estimated to determine 
how the effects of gerrymandering on diversity vary across geographic and demographic 
contexts. Particular attention is paid to how the demographics of student in the “core” 
attendance zone or district are related to the segregative or integrative effect of 
gerrymandering on racial/ethnic diversity.  
Contribution of Study 
This study contributes to the emerging field of geographic research in education, 
testing the extent to which educational boundaries may be directly implicated in the 
segregation, or integration, of schools beyond their residential areas. Adapting a 
framework from the political science literature, the study develops a “student exchange” 
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perspective on segregation focusing on how educational entities promote or ameliorate 
segregation by choosing to include certain students and exclude others. Recent research 
on segregation has generally focused on the declining role of districts in matters of 
integration and the growing role of individual decisions in the context of permissive 
choice policies. This framework, however, refocuses attention to the direct effects that 
educational institutions play in the resegregation of American schools.  
Despite the logical association between educational boundaries and segregation 
and anecdotal evidence corroborating this link, no empirical research has examined how 
the configurations of educational boundaries have directly contributed to the equity and 
inequities of schools. Moreover, despite its implications for the equity of American 
schools, the concept of gerrymandering has been almost entirely neglected in the 
educational domain. Evidence on gerrymandering in education has remained entirely 
anecdotal, generally restricted to noting “irregularities” in districts undergoing legal 
scrutiny (e.g., Clark, 1987; Leigh, 1997). Using a large-scale national sample of 
attendance boundaries and the entire population of school district boundaries, this study 
provides the first empirical evidence of the prevalence and severity of educational 
gerrymandering and its impact on the equity of American schools. 
Even more importantly, to the extent that gerrymandering has been addressed in 
the education literature, discussions have lacked any theoretical or methodological 
clarity. While the term “gerrymandering” is often bandied about, authors have generally 
failed to provide an adequate definition of the term (or any definition) (e.g., Douglas, 
1995; Orfield & Eaton, 1997). By focusing on the definition of gerrymandering and 
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situating gerrymandering in the process of “student exchange”, this study attempts to 
provide a stronger theoretical basis for defining the phenomenon. Moreover, this study 
leverages the robust methodological literature in the political sciences addressing the 
definition and measurement of gerrymandering, offering a more nuanced 
multidimensional perspective on the different manifestations of gerrymandering.  
 In addition to its theoretical contribution, this study has significant implications 
for policy. Because attendance zone and district boundaries are mutable and subject to 
policy intervention, redistricting and rezoning presents a viable and cost-effective, if 
politically arduous, opportunity to achieve integration. Indeed, despite eroding judicial 
support for integration remedies, the establishment of affirmative race-conscious school 
district and attendance zone boundaries has been reaffirmed as an acceptable integration 
strategy (Parents Involved, 2007). By estimating how much segregation might be reduced 
through more equitable districts, this study provides actionable information for policy. 
Moreover, the study assesses the potential for redistricting designed to reduce the 
affirmative gerrymandering of the desegregation era, as exhorted by the “neighborhood 
schools” movement, to hinder the objectives of integration.  
Although the equity implications of district boundaries and redistricting policies 
are of paramount concern to this study, the study also has important financial 
implications for districts. Because gerrymandered boundaries are inherently inefficient, in 
that they increase student travel time and costs beyond what would be expected in a 
compact district, school districts could expect to achieve cost savings through 
redistricting designed to reduce gerrymandering. As such, where educational 
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gerrymandering serves to segregate, creating more regular districts will realize gains in 
equity as well as cost savings for districts. Where gerrymandering integrates, however, 
districts must weigh the benefits for equity against the additional travel costs imposed by 
inefficient districts. This study assists in this cost-benefit calculus by directly estimating 
the magnitude of the effect of gerrymandering on segregation as well as quantifying the 
increases in travel time associated with the district’s deviations from regularity.  
In addition to these theoretical and practical contributions, this study makes 
several methodological contributions to the literature. First, because this study constitutes 
the first empirical assessment of gerrymandering in education, it adapts measures of 
electoral gerrymandering to the educational context and develops an additional measure, 
embeddedness, which is unique to the educational context. Drawing on the student 
exchange framework of Angel and Parent (2011), I will develop geospatial measures 
assessing the effects of gerrymandering on the diversity and segregation of schools. 
Finally, to assess the potential effects of redistricting on segregation, I will use geospatial 
analytic software to develop alternative redistricting algorithms derived from Voronoi-
type polygons. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In this chapter, I review the literature on current trends in educational and 
residential segregation and the emergence of the educational-residential segregation gap. 
I review and weigh the evidence for the dominant explanations for segregation trends, 
including the retreat from desegregation and the growth in school choice, concluding that 
additional attention to the direct effects of educational boundaries is warranted. I present 
the scant anecdotal evidence on gerrymandering in education, highlighting the necessity 
of additional theoretical and methodological attention to the concept. Drawing on the 
literature on gerrymandering in political science and adapting it to the educational 
context, I then provide a comprehensive discussion of the definition and measurement of 
educational gerrymandering.   
Segregation Trends 
The Retreat from School Integration and Rising Educational Segregation 
In the decades following the Brown (1954), American schools experienced 
dramatic gains in racial and ethnic integration. Although progress was initially stalled by 
dilatory tactics on the part of Southern school districts, ultimately, continued legal 
victories resulted in the dismantling of the structures of de jure segregation. Accordingly, 
gains in integration were particularly pronounced in the South. Given the legal emphasis 
on redressing the historical discrimination against blacks, declines in the segregation of 
blacks were particularly pronounced. Gains were also achieved in the North, as the courts 
turned their attention to remedies for de facto segregation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Coleman, Kelly & Moore, 1975; Farley, 1975; Logan & Oakley, 2004; Orfield 
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1983; Smock & Wilson, 1991). It should be emphasized that trends in segregation were 
not universally positive; despite the Court’s ruling in Keyes (1973) affording Hispanic 
students the same desegregation rights as black students, the segregation of Hispanics 
continued to increase steadily over this period (Wells, 1989).   
By the 1970s, judicial activism for integration had waned, exemplified by the 
Milliken decision barring metropolitan-wide desegregation plans that crossed district 
boundaries, even when meaningful integration could not be achieved within existing 
boundaries. By limiting integration efforts to district boundaries, Milliken severely 
hamstrung integration efforts, especially for racially isolated urban districts. Subsequent 
rulings in the 1990s, including Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell (1991), 
Freeman v. Pitts (1992), and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995), cemented the courts’ legal 
retrenchment and resulted in the release of hundreds of districts from court-ordered 
desegregation (Holley-Walker, 2010, 2011). Indeed, between 2004 and 2009, 89 school 
districts were granted unitary status in the formerly de jure segregated states of Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina alone 
(Holley-Walker, 2010). Indeed, by 2010, only 200 of the nearly 16,000 districts in the 
U.S. remained under desegregation orders (Holley-Walker, 2011). In addition to the 
steady decline in mandatory desegregation orders over the past decade, the courts have 
recently handicapped districts’ ability to voluntarily integrate by prohibiting the use of 
individual student race/ethnicity when assigning students to schools (Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007). 
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Mirroring this legal trajectory, by the 1980s, the integration of public schools had 
stalled, giving way to a period of modest resegregation for blacks and whites, as well as 
continued increases in the segregation of Hispanics. Much of the evidence for the 
resegregation of public schools comes from a series of studies conducted by Orfield and 
colleagues (Frankenberg et al., 2003; Orfield et al., 1997; Orfield & Monfort, 1992; 
Orfield et al., 1993; Orfield & Yun, 1999; Reardon et al., 2000). This body of work 
generally finds that the segregation of black students reached its nadir in the late 1980s, 
and increased steadily thereafter. Indeed, Orfield and colleagues have argued that by the 
mid-1990s, black students were more segregated than they were in 1973. Orfield and 
colleagues have found that the level of Hispanic segregation has consistently increased 
since the late 1960s, surpassing that of blacks by the early 1990s. Moreover, Orfield and 
colleagues have found that the South, which experienced the largest declines in 
segregation in the post-Brown era, also experienced the largest increases in black 
segregation over the 1990s, while the largest increases in Hispanic segregation were 
found in the West. 
Subsequent research employing more nationally-representative samples and more 
sophisticated measures of segregation, which are less sensitive to overall racial/ethnic 
composition than exposure and isolation, has found somewhat more equivocal  effects 
than Orfield and colleagues. Using a multiracial entropy index of segregation (discussed 
at length below), Reardon, Yun and Eitle (2000) find that the total level of metropolitan 
school segregation remained stable over the first half of the decade. Decomposing total 
segregation into its unique racial/ethnic components, however, they find that whites have 
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become increasingly segregated from non-whites, while segregation among minority 
groups has declined. Although they use whites as their focal racial/ethnic group, unlike 
Orfield and colleagues, who focus on the segregation of minorities from whites, Reardon 
et al.’s dual-group findings are generally consistent with Orfield’s work.  
In addition, work by Logan and colleagues, employing a dissimilarity index of 
segregation on NCES CCD data, which avoids many of the problems of isolation and 
exposure used by previous research, generally corroborates the finding that the 
segregation of black and Hispanic students increased slightly over the 1990s. Contrary to 
the work of Orfield and colleagues, who have attributed growth in school segregation to 
the erosion of desegregation, Logan and colleagues conclude that growth in segregation 
was largely a function of the decline in the white population and the increase in minority 
populations, rather than an increase in the separation of students by race. As such, they 
argue that the slight increases in segregation over the 1990s do not constitute a process of 
resegregation precipitated by the legal retrenchment of desegregation orders, but rather 
are a natural result of an increasingly diverse student population. 
In addition to the overall increases in metropolitan racial/ethnic segregation, 
recent research has documented an important shift in the geographic scale of segregation. 
While the segregation of public schools in the Brown era was primarily within districts 
(i.e., between schools), the recent resegregation has been driven by dramatic increases in 
segregation between districts. Indeed, Clotfelter (2004) finds that, in the decades 
following the Brown decision, decreases in within-district segregation were outpaced by 
increases in between-district segregation, yielding net increases in metropolitan 
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segregation over time. Likewise, Reardon et al. (2000) find that the growth in segregation 
over the 1990s was attributable to growth in between-district segregation, and public 
school segregation continued to shift from a between-school phenomenon to a between-
district phenomenon. The finding that segregation is an increasingly concentrated at the 
district level has been attributed to the legacy of Milliken v. Bradley (1974), in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that desegregation across district boundaries was impermissible in 
the absence of evidence that multiple districts had committed deliberate segregation. By 
rendering district boundaries sacrosanct and limiting inter-district desegregation 
remedies, researchers have argued that the Milliken ruling has facilitated the 
resegregation of American schools across district boundaries (Bischoff, 2008; Clotfelter, 
1998; Frankenberg et al., 2003; Orfield & Monfort, 1992; Reardon et al., 2000). 
Contrary to the dominant narrative of resegregation, more recent evidence 
suggests that the trend towards increasing segregation in schools may have plateaued, and 
perhaps even reversed, in recent years. Indeed, in the only study of school segregation 
extending beyond the year 2000, Stroub and Richards (2011) found that the increases in 
segregation of the 1980s and 1990s have given way to a period of slight integration, 
especially for blacks, with rates of segregation slightly lower in 2009 than in 1992. While 
overall segregation decreased slightly over the study period, Hispanic segregation 
continued to increase. Although such trends are promising, and suggest that American 
schools may have made incremental progress towards integration over the past decade, 
counteracting some of the losses of the previous decade, they still fall far short of an 
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equitable realization of the goals of Brown.  As such, the problem of segregation in 
American schools remains. 
Steady Gains in Residential Integration 
While residential segregation certainly remains a serious problem, the past 
decades have witnessed steady and substantial growth in integration since the adoption of 
the landmark antidiscrimination legislation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 (Charles, 2003; Clark 2002). Indeed, data on residential segregation 
reveals that levels of multiracial, black, and white segregation all declined significantly 
over the past five decades across most dimensions of segregation (for a review see 
Massey & Denton, 1988), in most metropolitan areas (Charles, 2003; Clark, 2002; 
Iceland, Weinberg & Steinmetz, 2002; Logan, Stults & Farley, 2004; Timberlake & 
Iceland, 2007).  
Specifically, using Theil’s entropy index of segregation, Fischer et al. (2004) 
found that between 1960 and 2000, metropolitan residential segregation between Census 
tracts declined by 32% for blacks and 31% for whites. Using a smaller sample of the 21 
largest cities with over 50,000 blacks, Clark (2002) found that overall segregation 
decreased by 24% over the same period. Analyzing change in segregation between 1980 
and 2000 for the 50 largest metropolitan areas, Charles (2003) found that black 
segregation, as measured via dissimilarity and isolation, declined by 10 and 12 
percentage points, respectively, while exposure was relatively stable (increasing by 1 
percentage point). Computing entropy indices of segregation on all U.S. metropolitan 
areas over the same period, Iceland (2004b) found that multiracial segregation declined 
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by 26%, black segregation declined by 25%, and white segregation declined by 24%. 
These overall trends, however, mask considerable geographic heterogeneity in effects. 
While gains in residential integration were highest in the Midwest and South, they were 
lower in the Northeast and West. Moreover, gains in segregation were largest in the most 
populous metropolitan areas.   
It should be emphasized, however, that trends for Hispanics and Asians are much 
less promising than trends overall and for blacks, underscoring the increasingly complex 
and multiethnic nature of segregation. Fischer et al. (2004) found that Hispanic 
segregation was virtually unchanged between 1970 and 2000 (data were not available for 
the 1960 Census). In her analysis of the 50 largest metropolitan areas from 1980 to 2000, 
Charles (2003) found that Hispanic dissimilarity and isolation increased by 6 and 10 
percentage points, respectively. Hispanic exposure, however, decreased by 16 percentage 
points. Likewise, for Asians, dissimilarity and isolation increased by 3 and 6 percentage 
points, while exposure decreased by 16 percentage points. Using data on all U.S. 
metropolitan areas, Iceland (2004b), however, found that Hispanic segregation declined 
by 2% between 1980 and 2000, although Asian segregation increased by 14% over the 
same period. In addition, although a complete discussion falls outside the purview of this 
study, it should be noted that residential segregation by socioeconomic status has 
continued to increase steadily over time, suggesting that class is becoming an 
increasingly important mechanism of residential stratification (Fischer, 2003; Fischer et 
al., 2004).  
38 
Although evidence from the 2010 Census is still preliminary, early evidence 
provides equivocal support for the assertion that these residential trends towards 
improving black and white segregation and stable or worsening segregation of Asians and 
Hispanics have continued into the 21st century. Using dissimilarity indices of segregation 
on the 100 most populous metropolitan areas, Frey (calculations provided by University 
of Michigan Population Studies Center, 2011) found that the segregation of blacks has 
continued to decline, albeit slightly. At worst, black segregation has not increased since 
2000. During this period, however, the segregation of Asians and Hispanics seems to 
have increased substantially, highlighting the need for research extending segregation 
beyond traditional and black-white dichotomy.  
The Educational-Residential Segregation Gap  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the increases in educational segregation, while 
concerning ipso facto, are particularly troubling in light of evidence that residential 
segregation has continued to improve. Moreover, as a result of these trends, emerging 
evidence suggests that schools are becoming more segregated than the neighborhoods in 
which they are situated. (Orfield, 2002; Reardon & Yun, 2001b; Saporito & Sohoni, 
2006, 2007; Sohoni & Saporito, 2009) or approaching that point (Ong & Rickles, 2004). 
This represents a significant departure from the desegregation era, where rates of 
educational segregation were consistently lower than those of residential segregation. 
In a series of studies using school attendance zones boundaries for the 21 largest 
U.S. school districts, using Census 2000 data, Saporito and Sohoni (2006, 2007, 2009) 
compared the characteristics of students enrolled in public schools to the characteristics 
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of students living in their corresponding attendance zones. Saporito and Sohoni conclude 
that the schools are substantially more homogeneous than the characteristics of students 
living in their boundaries, a finding they attribute to school choice, especially private, 
charter and magnet school enrollments. Specifically, they find that, on average, black-
white segregation in schools is 3 percentage points higher than in their corresponding 
attendance zone, while Hispanic-white segregation is 6 percentage points higher in 
schools than in their attendance zone. The largest difference was Dade County, Florida, 
where schools were a staggering 21 percentage points higher than their attendance zones. 
Only one district, San Diego, had school racial/ethnic segregation values lower than 
residential segregation. Results were even more staggering for the segregation of students 
by socioeconomic status; on average, schools have a socioeconomic exposure rate 24 
percentage points lower than their attendance zones. Using interesting an innovative 
methodological techniques, Saporito and Sohoni provide strong evidence implicating 
schools in the exacerbation of patterns of residential segregation. 
In another study comparing school and residential segregation at the metropolitan 
level, Ong and Rickles found somewhat more equivocal results. Using data on all U.S. 
metropolitan areas from 1990 to 2000, Ong and Rickles found that, consistent with the 
historical enforcement of desegregation policies for blacks, school segregation remains 
slightly lower than residential segregation (a dissimilarity index of 0.54 vs. 0.58). For 
Asians and Hispanics, however, school segregation was consistently higher than 
residential segregation (ranging from roughly 2 to 6 percent). However, while growth in 
school segregation steadily outpaced growth in residential segregation for blacks, the 
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residential segregation outpaced school segregation for Asians and Hispanics. Unlike the 
work of Saporito and Sohoni, which directly compares the segregation of students in 
schools to the residential segregation of students in school attendance zone boundaries, 
Ong and Rickles approach is somewhat problematic, however, in that it uses different 
geographic scales of analysis for school segregation and residential segregation (i.e., the 
school and the Census tract). 
Explaining the Educational-Residential Segregation Gap 
Previous research has suggested that the retreat from school desegregation has 
played a role in resegregating schools by race and ethnicity; however, this research does 
not provide insight into why schools are becoming more segregated than their 
corresponding residential areas or how schools are serving to exacerbate segregation 
beyond the effects of individual residential decisions.  
One possible explanation that has been studied extensively in recent years 
concerns the expanding role of school choice as a unique educational mechanism of 
stratification. Although early proponents argued that school choice presented the 
opportunity to improve educational equity by attenuating the persistent links between 
residential segregation and school attendance (Kahlenberg, 2008). Consistent with 
evidence that parental preferences tend towards more homogeneous educational 
environments, others have argued that school choice has the potential to make schools 
even more segregated than would be expected under traditional neighborhood schools 
(Denessen, Driessena & Sleegers, 2005; Garcia, 2008b; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin & 
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Branch, 2006; Kahlenberg, 2008; Kleitz, Weiher, Tedin & Matland, 2000; Weiher & 
Tedin, 2002). 
Consistent with the latter perspective, on the whole, evidence suggests that school 
choice options have in practice served to stratify students by race and ethnicity. The 
preponderance of research attention has focused on the effects of charter schools. At the 
student level, research has found that students tend to transfer from more diverse schools 
to less diverse schools where their racial/ethnic group is more heavily represented 
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Booker et al., 2005; Weiher & Tedin, 2002). At the school level, 
evidence suggests that charter schools are less diverse than public schools (Frankenberg 
& Lee, 2003). Specifically, Cobb and Glass found that both urban and rural charter 
schools in Arizona tended to dramatically over-represent whites. Miron and Nelson 
(2002) found that the racial/ethnic composition of charter schools differed significantly 
from the population of nearby public schools, with charter schools alternately under-
representing and over-representing minorities.  
Empirical evidence on other forms of school choice also corroborates the 
segregative preferences and consequences of choice programs. In a study of the magnet 
program in Philadelphia, Saporito (2003) demonstrated that whites and more 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students exhibited “outgroup avoidance”, by 
transferring out of schools with higher rates of poverty and non-white children. In 
practice, Saporito (2003) found that the magnet program had the effect of increasing 
segregation between whites and nonwhites substantially, from 0.68 based on 
neighborhood schools to 0.76 with magnet schools. Likewise, in their examination of 
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private schools, Saporito and Sohoni found that the presence of private schools exerts a 
strong negative effect on the percentage of white students enrolled in public schools. In a 
survey analysis of perceptions of universal voucher programs in California designed to 
assess the potential effect of a charter initiative on segregation, Brunner and colleagues 
(2010) found that white households are more likely to support vouchers when their 
children attend schools with higher concentrations of nonwhite children.  
Studies of public school choice, including intra- and inter-district open 
enrollment, also generally support the conclusion that policies allowing students to 
transfer out of their neighborhood schools have a stratifying effect. In studying intra-
district open enrollment in North Carolina, Hastings and colleagues (2009) found that 
parents of all racial groups tended to prefer schools where their race is the clear majority. 
In their study of school-level inter-district open enrollment flows in Colorado, Holme and 
Richards (2008) found that inter-district choice contributed to stratification by race and 
ethnicity (albeit to a lesser extent than by socioeconomic status), with white students 
tending to transfer from more racially diverse districts into districts with higher 
proportions of White students. In a student-level study tracking open enrollment flows in 
Minnesota and Colorado, Carlson and colleagues (2011) found that while enrollment 
flows were driven primarily by student achievement and structural characteristics of 
districts, they  may also have the effect of segregating by race and ethnicity, particularly 
in Colorado.  
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the inconsistent temporal and spatial relationship 
between the emergence of school choice policies and the resegregation of schools 
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suggests that while school choice certainly holds the potential to greatly exacerbate 
school segregation, it is unlikely that choice is primarily to blame for the growth in 
segregation or the primary impetus for the educational-residential segregation gap. 
Indeed, while school segregation increased steadily from the mid-1980s through the 
1990s before beginning to decline slightly in the 2000s, school choice did not emerge in 
its modern incarnation until the establishment of Milwaukee’s voucher program in 1990 
and Minnesota’s charter program in 1992 (Friedman Foundation, 2011), with open 
enrollment policies emerging in various states throughout the 1990s (Holme & Richards, 
2009).  Moreover, school choice programs have been historically concentrated in certain 
metropolitan areas in certain states, such as Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin, and 
Washington, DC (although the number of states with some form of choice legislation has 
increased dramatically over the past decades). However, increases in segregation have 
been more evenly geographically distributed across the U.S., with the strongest effects in 
the South (Stroub & Richards, 2011).  
The Role of Educational Boundaries 
Another potential explanation for the resegregation of schools vis-à-vis 
neighborhoods, which has received less empirical attention than school choice, concerns 
the effects of educational boundaries on segregation. As discussed in Chapter 1, prior 
research on boundaries has almost exclusively focused on the effects of boundaries on 
residential sorting, addressing how the information contained in boundaries serves to 
inform individual decisions. According to this general perspective, because individuals 
tend to prefer to live near people more “similar” to them in terms of race/ethnicity, 
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boundaries facilitate segregation over time through private choices (Bischoff, 2008; Ong 
& Rickles, 2004; Weiher, 1991). Such accounts of the indirect effects of educational 
boundaries on segregation, however, cannot adequately explain why schools are 
becoming more segregated than neighborhoods, predicting instead that school 
segregation would reproduce and approximate neighborhood segregation. 
While empirical attention has been paid to the indirect effect of educational 
boundaries on residential decisions, no prior empirical evidence has examined the how 
the shape of boundaries themselves helps perpetuate inequities. Ample anecdotal and 
historical evidence on isolated districts suggests that the gerrymandering of school 
districts may have been a common practice for school districts to achieve greater 
homogeneity or for schools to respond to racial diversity or change. Sugrue describes 
how many Northern districts responded to the skyrocketing black population in the 1940s 
and 1950s by gerrymandering their attendance zone and district boundaries to maintain 
de facto segregation. Jacobs (1998) describes how Columbus, Ohio used school siting, as 
well as gerrymandered and non-contiguous district boundaries, to maintain a “dual 
system” in the 1970s. Douglas describes how the gerrymandering of school attendance 
zones in Charlotte, North Carolina, despite clearly demarcating black and white 
neighborhoods, failed to meet the standard of intent required by the federal district court 
judge. In the only direct examination of the effects of educational gerrymandering, Clark 
(1987) concluded that gerrymandering of attendance zone boundaries in Topeka in the 
1950s and 1960s were either neutral or desegregative in nature.  
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The anecdotal and historical nature of prior evidence on gerrymandering in 
education highlights the necessity of more recent empirical evidence examining the direct 
role of educational boundaries in perpetuating inequities. Equally important, however, is 
the necessity for theoretical and methodological advancement in the study of 
gerrymandering. While the previous literature has occasionally alluded to the concept of 
“gerrymandering” in general terms, it has failed to provide an adequate definition of the 
term or how it is measured. As such, it is important that the study of gerrymandering in 
education proceed from a stronger theoretical understanding of the concept and more 
sophisticated means of its assessment. Towards this end, the current study has posited a 
“student exchange” framework, outlined in Chapter 1, as a lens to focus the concept of 
gerrymandering. In addition, using principles of gerrymandering derived from the 
political sciences, the study provides a more specific and nuanced definition of the 
multidimensional concept of gerrymandering. Moreover, it identifies specific statistical 
and geospatial measures that may be used to measure each dimension of gerrymandering. 
Below, I outline each of the principles of gerrymandering, as well as its associated 
measures, in greater detail.  
Principles of Gerrymandering 
The literature on electoral gerrymandering has identified three central principles 
for identifying and quantifying gerrymanders: 1) contiguity, 2) equinumerosity, and 3) 
compactness (Fryer & Holden, 2007). In addition to these traditional principles of 
gerrymandering used in the political sciences, I posit a fourth principle, embeddedness, 
which is particularly relevant to the educational context. Below, I discuss each of these 
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four principles, outlining their definition, measurement, legal standards, and application 
to the educational context. A summary of each of measure, including definitions and 
computation procedures, is featured in Table 1. Chapter 3 contains more detailed 
information on each of the measures used in this study. Note that because both school 
attendance zones and school districts are types of “districts” to which the principles of 
gerrymandering may be applied, I hereafter use the general term “district” to collectively 
refer to both of these types of educational boundaries.   
Contiguity 
Contiguity is perhaps the most straightforward standard for assessing 
gerrymandering. According to the principle of contiguity, each district should be a single, 
unbroken shape (Azavea, 2006, 2010). As such, all parts of a district must be physically 
connected such that each district has no portion that is “completely separated from any 
other part of the same district” (Thompson, 2002, p.  103). In practical terms, “a 
contiguous district is one in which a person can go from any point within the district to 
any other point [within the district] without leaving the district” (Note, 1966, p. 1284, as 
cited in Engstrom, 2003). Although it is theoretically possible to imagine a continuous 
measure of contiguity (i.e., the number of disconnected parts of a district, the proportion 
of a district contained within a single polygon), contiguity is generally considered a 
dichotomous concept. As such, a district is classified as either contiguous or non-
contiguous.  
Because it may be measured fairly unambiguously, with violations readily 
apparent, contiguity is the most common and longstanding standard for protecting against 
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gerrymandering. Indeed, Congress enacted rules requiring contiguity in congressional 
districts as early as 1842 (Matter of Sherrill v. O’Brien, 1907), and courts have 
reaffirmed the principle as a de facto requirement for all electoral districts (Reynolds v. 
Sims, 1964; Shaw v. Reno, 1993). In practice, 49 states currently have statutes expressly 
requiring at least one chamber of their state legislative districts to be contiguous, while 23 
require contiguous congressional districts (Levitt, 2011). These numbers obfuscate the 
emphasis on contiguity in practice. Indeed, it is expected that for the current legislative 
redistricting cycle, all districts will be drawn to be contiguous (Levitt, 2011).  
While deviations from contiguity are generally considered detrimental to electoral 
fairness, it is conceivable that they may be either detrimental or instrumental to achieving 
the equity goals of educators. While non-contiguous districts or attendance zones may 
serve to segregate by annexing students in non-adjacent areas in an effort to maintain 
more homogeneous student bodies. However, non-contiguity may also be used to 
integrate by incorporating students that increase the diversity of the school’s student 
body. Thus, while an absolute standard of contiguity may not be necessary or even 
desirable for schools, it is important to understand how deviations from contiguity have 
affected the equity of schools. 
Accordingly, although states often give “consideration” to contiguity in school 
attendance zone and school district boundaries (e.g., California), in practice, many states 
have non-contiguous school districts, such as Fulton County School System in Georgia, 
the northern and southern portions of which are separated 17 miles by the Atlanta Public 
Schools (Fulton County Schools, 2011). Likewise, at the attendance zone level, while 
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contiguity is often considered in school districting deliberations, it is not usually 
mandatory. Moreover “satellite” districts have historically been used as a means of 
gerrymandering for desegregation, as in Greensboro, North Carolina and Natchez, 
Mississippi (Rossell, 2006).  
Despite the conceptual simplicity of the concept of contiguity, several 
considerations arise in the application of the absolute theoretical standard. First, the 
question of whether water may be used in the determination of contiguity presents several 
problems (Rush & Engstrom, 2001). On the grounds that the contiguity standard applies 
to both land and water, in some cases districts have used bodies of water, such as rivers, 
to connect two discrete land areas, even when it is not possible to traverse through the 
water from one part of the land area to another (Rush & Engstrom, 2001). While critics 
have expressed concern about the legitimacy of such districts, they have been legally 
upheld in some areas (e.g., Florida Supreme Court, SJR 2G 1992). In addition, on the 
assumption that the contiguity standard does not apply to water, many states, especially 
coastal states, have special exemptions for districts containing islands, on the grounds 
that land-area contiguity is not feasible. 
Second, under the technical definition of contiguity, two areas may be considered 
contiguous if they exhibit “point contiguity”, in that they are connected at a single point 
(Engstrom, 2003). See Figure 3 for an example of a district satisfying a criterion of point 
contiguity. However, in practice, such configurations are generally deemed suspect, as 
they violate the spirit of the standard of contiguity (Thompson, 2002). As such, while a 
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few states, such as North Carolina, permit point contiguity for legislative redistricting, the 
practice is rejected by most redistricting authorities (Engstrom, 2003). 
 
Similarly, districts often employ narrow corridors to connect two discrete parts of a 
district, a practice which, while satisfying the technical standard for contiguity, also 
violates the spirit of the principle (Engstrom, 2003). Indeed, such districts have been 
criticized by federal justices as “tokenism that mocks the traditional criterion of 
contiguity” (Hays v. State of Louisiana, 1993, p. 1200). However, while such districts 
may superficially meet the standard for contiguity, they often violate standards of 
compactness, which is discussed at length later, underscoring the importance of using 
multiple, complementary principles when assessing gerrymandering. However, it should 
also be noted that while contiguity is a conceptually distinct principle, it may also be 
captured by other measures of gerrymandering. Specifically, as is discussed at length 
below, measures of compactness may also capture the effects of violations of contiguity, 
inasmuch as non-contiguous districts are necessarily less compact than contiguous 
districts.  
   
Figure 3. District exhibiting point contiguity. 
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Equinumerosity 
Like contiguity, the principle of equinumerosity, or population equality, is 
conceptually straightforward. According to this principle, all districts in a set of districts 
(i.e., in a state) should have roughly equivalent populations. As such, while traditional 
principles of contiguity and compactness are measured at the level of a single district, 
with a few exceptions, equinumerosity is measured globally, assessing the evenness of 
the distribution of populations across districts. In electoral redistricting, the principle of 
equinumerosity is paramount to assuring the “one-person, one-vote” rule established by 
Article I, Section 2 of the constitution, as held by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims 
(1964) for legislative districts and reaffirmed in Karcher v. Daggett (1983) for 
congressional districts. All 50 states have laws designed to ensure that electoral districts 
have equivalent populations, “as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional 
election is to be worth as much as another's” (Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964).   
Despite the intuitive simplicity of the principle of equinumerosity, its 
operationalization is somewhat more complex. In applying the standard to electoral 
redistricting, the courts use a handful of measures which estimate the extent to which 
actual district populations deviate from the “ideal” district population. For any given area, 
the ideal population for each district is equal to the total area population divided by the 
number of districts. The extent to which each district differs from this ideal is then 
assessed via an absolute or relative deviation. To obtain the absolute deviation, the 
population of the ideal district is subtracted from the population of the actual district. To 
obtain a relative deviation, the district’s absolute deviation is divided by the ideal 
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population, yielding the proportion by which the district’s population deviates from the 
ideal population. Because it is less sensitive to population size, the relative deviation is 
generally preferred to the absolute deviation (Brickner, 2010).  
These district-level absolute or relative deviations are then aggregated at the 
district level in one of two ways. First, the absolute or relative deviations may be 
averaged across all districts in the area to obtain a mean absolute or mean relative 
deviation for the area. Second, the minimum and maximum may be used to establish an 
“overall range” of absolute or relative deviations. The courts have generally adopted 
range measures in assessing equinumerosity in legislative redistricting cases, which have 
generally deemed an absolute range of relative deviations of 10% to be acceptable 
(Brickner, 2010).  
It should be noted that, unlike contiguity, which has a clear dichotomous measure 
that may be easily applied by the courts to determine gerrymandering, equinumerosity is 
a continuous measure (i.e., the population equivalence of legislative districts in a state 
may range from high to low). As such, equinumerosity requires a more subjective legal 
standard than contiguity. In applying the principle of population equivalence to electoral 
cases, the Supreme Court requires that all districts in a state be as equinumerous “as 
practicable”, which it has operationalized through a 10% standard. According to this 
standard, legislative plans may be valid so long as the range of relative deviations is 
within 10%.   
In the educational context, it may be argued that no reasonable expectation of 
equinumerosity exists, especially for school districts, which vary considerably in terms of 
52 
the number of students they serve. The principle of equinumerosity may be more 
applicable to the case of school attendance zones, however, to the extent that schools of a 
given level within a district may be expected to serve roughly equivalent populations. 
Although radical differences in the number of students served by schools in a district may 
be indicative of real differences in school capacity, they may often reflect a process of 
gerrymandering, especially when the demographic profiles of schools differ significantly. 
Thus, while there may be no clear legal standard for objecting to population inequality 
among districts and, to a lesser extent schools, it may be a critical symptom of 
gerrymandering with strong theoretical and practical implications for segregation and 
which is not captured by other measures. 
For example, consider Figure 4A, which depicts a school district consisting of two 
schools and their corresponding attendance zones. Both school attendance zones are 
contiguous, both are compact (as will be discussed later), and neither are embedded 
(discussed later). Thus, both satisfy all other criteria for gerrymandering. However, the 
green school has a population that is a fifth of the population of the purple school. 
Moreover, the green school is 90% white, while the purple school is 40% white, 
suggesting that the district is relatively segregated. Now consider Figure 4B, which 
depicts the same district, but with an alternate school attendance zoning arrangement. 
Again, both school attendance zones are contiguous, compact, and non-embedded; 
however, the school populations are much more equivalent. Under the new zoning 
scheme, the green school is 48% white and the purple school is 49% white and is 
substantially less segregated than the original districting scheme. This scenario illustrates 
53 
how the lack of equinumerosity among schools constitutes an important form of 
gerrymandering that may serve to increase racial segregation.  
  
 
Figure 4.  Example of inequinumerosity using two zoning scenarios in a district 
with 500 students. 
The potential role of population inequality on segregation among districts is 
particularly important given the growing concern over the “fragmentation” or 
proliferation of school districts (e.g., Bischoff, 2008; Clotfelter, 2001; Frankenberg, 
2009). Indeed, many have argued that the trend towards school district consolidation that 
characterized the past century has begun to reverse, with the number of districts now 
increasing steadily. While fragmentation is often associated with the outward expansion 
of metropolitan areas, incorporating ever more remote suburban and exurban areas, it is 
also attributable to the subdivision or “splintering” of existing districts (e.g., 
Frankenberg, 2009). In their study of the effects of school district fragmentation on 
segregation, Richards & Stroub (2011) found that the fragmentation of districts within 
metropolitan areas were associated with increases in segregation. Because the study held 
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metropolitan boundaries constant for the study period and controlled for population 
growth, it captured the unique effect of fragmentation attributable to the subdivision of 
metropolitan areas into smaller, more homogeneous districts. Thus, I argue that the 
phenomenon of fragmentation constitutes a form of educational boundary 
gerrymandering which is not reflected in measures of contiguity, compactness, or 
embeddedness, but may be manifested in inequinumerosity.   
Compactness 
Compactness is perhaps the single most important and well-studied principle of 
gerrymandering in modern electoral politics, with 37 states requiring their legislative 
districts to be “reasonably compact” and another 18 states requiring compactness of their 
congressional districts. It is also the most controversial. Unlike contiguity and 
equinumerosity, which have clear definitions and, therefore, relatively clear measurement 
and legal standards, compactness is notoriously difficult to define. It has been likened to 
“political pornography” (Scheidegger, 2004; Windlow, 2011), applying a similar maxim 
to that famously applied to obscenity by Justice Stewart: “I know it when I see it” 
(Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 1964).  
Simply put, compactness refers to the extent to which a district’s boundaries are 
“bizarre” (e.g., Chambers & Miller, 2010; Pildes & Niemi, 1993) or, according to the 
seminal work of Polsby and Popper (1993), “ugly”. Mathematically, compactness 
quantifies how much a district differs from a perfectly compact shape. Geometrically, the 
circle is considered the most compact shape. Specifically, according to the isoperimetric 
theorem, a circle is optimally compact because it 1) maximizes the area contained within 
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a perimeter of given length and 2) minimizes the perimeter for an area of given size 
(Weisstein, 2011). Because the circle is the most compact geometric shape, the goal of 
most measures of compactness is to determine the extent to which the district’s shape 
differs from perfect circularity (although a few compare the district to a hexagon or 
square).  
A number of different measures of compactness have been culled from the fields 
of geography, law, mathematics, and political science. Because compactness measures 
how much a district deviates the shape of a circle, which minimizes the perimeter for its 
area and maximizes the area for its perimeter, measures of compactness generally fall 
into one of two complementary classes: 1) measures of indentation, or perimeter-based 
measures of the smoothness or efficiency of a district’s boundary, and 2) measures of 
dispersion, or areal-based measures of the extent to which a district’s polygon is spread 
out or elongated from its center. Below I discuss each of these measures and their 
subtypes in detail, addressing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Where relevant, 
Table 1 contains more detailed computation formulas. 
Indentation. Gerrymandering is most frequently assessed using measures of 
indentations. Two subtypes of measures of indentation have been developed to quantify 
how convoluted a district’s boundaries are: 1) perimeter-area ratios, and 2) convexity 
measures.  
Perimeter-area. The most common measures of indentation are perimeter-area 
ratios. The Schwartzberg (1966) index, originally outlined in Attneave and Arnoult 
(1956), compares the perimeter of the district to the perimeter of a circle with equal area 
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(See Figure 5.1). Conversely, the Polsby-Popper index, originally developed by Cox as a 
measure of the roundness of grains of sand, compares the area of the district to the area of 
a circle with equal perimeter (See Figure 5.2). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The Schwartzberg index has been criticized for being too sensitive to perimeter length 
and insufficiently sensitive to shape (Young, 1988). For example, using a Schwartzberg 
index, Figure 6B below is considered more gerrymandered than the L-shaped figure in 
6A, despite being much less spread out about its center.   
  
Figure 5.1. The Schwartzberg index compares perimeter of district A to 
perimeter of district B, which has area equal to that of circular district A.  
A B
Figure 5.2. The Polsby‐Popper index compares area of circular district A 
to area of district B, which has perimeter equal to that of district A.  
A B
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While the Polsby-Popper measure is less biased by perimeter length than the 
Schwartzberg index, critics have noted that Polsby-Popper is sensitive to shape 
irregularities that may not be attributable to gerrymandering, including adherence to 
geographic and other geopolitical boundaries. For example, districts that border bodies of 
water and have extremely indented coastlines often score very poorly on the Polsby-
Popper index, despite the lack of intent to gerrymander. Likewise, if a school district is 
contiguous with a county boundary, and the county itself is highly gerrymandered, the 
gerrymandering of the school district may not be intentional ipso facto. This problem 
may be mitigated, however, through a variety of techniques such as excluding non-
coastal perimeter length in calculations or adjusting the measure to account for 
compactness of larger boundaries, allowing the researcher to isolate the extent to which 
non-compactness is a result of intentional gerrymandering. 
Convexity. Another class of measures of indentation, which have received 
increased attention in recent years, are measures are measures of district convexity 
(Chambers & Miller, 2010). Geometrically, a polygon is convex if all of its angles are 
non-reflexive (i.e., less than 180 degrees), and are concave if they have one or more 
reflexive angles (i.e., more than 180 degrees, but less than 360 degrees). As a measure of 
Figure 6. Using the Schwartzberg index, district B is more 
gerrymandered than district A.  
A  B
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indentation, convexity is primarily a measure of exclusion. Because concavities or 
indentations in a district’s perimeter are viewed as evidence of boundaries changing 
direction to exclude certain areas, non-convex districts exhibit an exclusionary bias, 
while perfectly convex districts are non-exclusionary (although, as dicussed below, it 
may reflect an inclusionary bias through elongation). As a consequence, a perfectly 
convex district has the property that the shortest line distance between any two points lies 
within the district polygon. Convexity may be measured dichotomously, as whether a 
district polygon has any reflexive angles or not; however, because so few districts are 
actually convex, however, in practice it is better measured via a continuous variable 
measuring the degree of convexity.  
Two primary continuous measures of convexity have been adopted. The “simple 
convexity” index developed by Taylor (1973) measures the proportion of angles in a 
district that are convex. Specifically, Taylor’s measure computes ratio of the number of 
angles in a district polygon that are non-reflexive relative to the number of angles in the 
district polygon that are reflexive. While Taylor’s formula is an excellent measure of 
indentation, is is somewhat problematic in that it views all convex polygons as equally 
compact (e.g., hexagons, circles, squares, rectangles, and triangles are all perfectly 
compact) (Chambers & Miller, 2010; Young, 1988). Moreover, it fails to provide any 
safeguard against elongation. As such the two districts in Figure 7 below would receive 
identical scores on Taylor’s convexity measure, despite the fact that Figure 7B appears to 
be less compact than 7A.  
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In addition to Taylor’s measure of simple convexity, Chambers and Miller (2010) 
have recently proposed a new “path-based” measure of convexity, which estimates the 
probability that a district contains the shortest path between a randomly-selected pair of 
points lies within the district. As noted above, in a maximally-compact shape, such as a 
hexagon or circle, the shortest line distance between all pairs of points lies within the 
shape. As with Taylor’s simple convexity measure, however, Chambers and Miller’s 
path-based convexity index deems a wide variety of polygons as “perfectly compact” and 
is insensitive to differences in elongation, also failing to discriminate between shapes 
such as those in Figure 7 above.  
Dispersion. As noted previously, measures of indentation may be criticized 
failing to discriminate cases of gerrymandering via elongation (i.e., they are unable to 
discriminate between Figures 7A and 7B. The second class of compactness measures, 
dispersion measures, seeks to address that very phenomenon, by quantifying how tightly 
packed or spread out a district is (Niemi et al., 1990). Three basic subtypes of dispersion 
measures have been developed: 1) length-width displacement indices; 2) comparisons of 
district area to area of compact figure; and 3) moment of inertia measures.  
Figure 7. Using Taylor’s simple convexity measure, hexagon A and 
hexagon B are equally compact (i.e., perfectly convex).  
A  B
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 Length-width displacement. Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive measures of 
dispersion are those that compare the length of the district to the width of the district 
(Polsby & Popper, 1991). As Table 1 reveals, a variety of length-width comparisons are 
possible, I will discuss two in detail. Perhaps the most prevalent length-width 
displacement measure is Harris’ measure of the ratio of the length of the longest axis to 
the maximum length perpindicular to that axis (Harris, 1964). The closer the ratio is to 1, 
the more compact the figure (illustrated in Figure 8 below).  
 
 
 
 
A slightly different type of length-width displacement is the measure reported by Niemi 
et al. (1990), which compares the length and width of the minimum enclosing rectangle 
about the district polygon, as shown in Figure 9 below. As with Harris’ measure, the 
closer the ratio is to 1, the more compact the figure.  
 
 
 
Unfortunately, however, length-width displacement measures are problematic in that they 
are poor at discriminating among different shapes. For example, it gives equivalent scores 
Figure 9. Length‐width displacement comparing length (A) and 
width (B) of minimum enclosing rectangle about district polygon 
(hatched).  
A 
B 
Figure 8. Length‐width displacement comparing longest axis (A) 
to maximum perpendicular axis (B).  
A
B
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to a square and a cross in Figure 10A and 10B. Even more troubling, it may assign a near 
perfect score to “devious” shapes, such as the serpentine shape in Figure 10C.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Comparison of district area to area of compact figure. Another class of 
dispersion measures seek to compare the area of a given district polygon to the area of a 
compact shape. Most measures of this type compare the area of the district to the area of 
a minimum spanning figure that contains the entire district. In the earliest exemplar of 
this type of measure, the Reock index compares the area of a district to the area of the 
smallest circle that contains the entire district (i.e., the minimum circumscribing circle, 
see Figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Length‐width displacement measures consider both A 
and B perfectly compact, C extremely compact. Figure 10.C 
adapted from Young (1988). 
A  B C
Figure 11. The Reock index compares the area in the district (solid 
blue) to the area in the minimum circumscribing circle (hatched 
blue). 
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Another index comparable to Reock can be computed using a minimum 
circumscribing hexagon. Likewise, a “convex hull” measure can be computed using the 
minimum convex bounding polygon. Perhaps the simplest way of conceptualizing a 
convex hull is imagining the polygon that would result if one stretched a rubber band 
around the district shape (Azavea, 2006, 2010). A slight variation on the Reock index, 
proposed by Horton (1932) and Gibbs (1961), compares the area of a district to the area 
of the circle with diameter equal to the longest axis of the district. Taken together, each of 
these measures essentially captures the extent to which certain areas are excluded by a 
district, as such, the areas inside the compact figure but outside the district may be 
viewed as areas “zoned out” of a district.  
Despite their intuitive appeal, such measures based on minimum spanning figures 
exhibit several limitations. First, such shapes lack discriminatory power in that they often 
yield counterintuitive results. For example, as Figure 12 illustrates, according to the 
Reock measure, a star (Figure 12A), which has several concavities, is more compact than 
the convex triangle (Figure 12B). Moreover, because of its emphasis on the most extreme 
points of a district’s perimeter, a highly convoluted figure such as the serpent-shaped 
district (Figure 12C) may be deemed more compact than a perfectly convex square 
(Figure 12D).  
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In addition, as Figure 11 above illustrates, the Reock and circumscribing hexagon 
measure are highly sensitive to district elongation, which is especially problematic in 
coastal areas with long, narrow districts. Moreover, all circumscribing measures may be 
strongly biased by non-contiguity. For example, if the small square to the right of Figure 
11 above is an island that is part of the district, the area of the enclosing figure would be 
greatly magnified, thus dramatically skewing the estimate of compactness. This problem 
may be mitigated somewhat by computing separate enclosing figures for each non-
contiguous part of the district.  
Figure 12. Using the Reock index (minimum circumscribing circle in red), the concave 
star (A) is more compact than the convex triangle (B). In addition, the serpentine 
shape (C) is deemed more compact than a square (D). Figure 12C adapted from Young 
(1988).  
A  B
C  D
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In addition to measures using a minimum enclosing figure, dispersion may also be 
assessed using a maximum inscribed figure, by compare the area of the district to the area 
of the largest enclosed feature that may contained by the district. In a corollary to Reock, 
Ehrenberg (1892, as cited in Frolov, 1974), proposed a measure that compared the area of 
the maximum inscribed circle to the area of the district (See Figure 13 below). Whereas 
each of the measures using an enclosing figure outlined above essentially captures the 
extent to which certain areas are excluded by a district, the measure of inscription 
captures the extent to which certain areas are included by a district. As such, the areas 
outside the inscribing circle but inside the district may be viewed as areas “zoned into” a 
district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flaherty and Crumplin (1992) have proposed a unique measure incorporating both 
the minimum circumscribing circle used in Reock’s index and the maximum inscribed 
circle used in Ehrenberg’s index. Flaherty and Crumplin’s measure essentially measures 
the proportion of the area in a district’s minimum circumscribing circle that is inside the 
district’s maximum inscribed circle (see Figure 14). Although this measure is has not 
been widely used to assess gerrymandering, it is a promising measure that is intuitively 
Figure 13. Ehrenberg’s index compares the area in the district 
(solid blue) to the area in the maximum inscribed circle (hatched 
blue). 
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appealing. By comparing the size of the area “zoned into” a district to the size of the area 
“zoned out” of a district, it provides an elegant measure of the extent to which boundaries 
have been manipulated to include or exclude certain areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The equal land area circle of Angel and Parent (2011) upon which the student exchange 
framework for this study is premised may also be used as a measure of dispersion. In this 
method, an “equal land area circle” equivalent in size to the land area currently occupied 
by the district is created about the geographic center of the district (See Figure 15 below). 
This circle represents the natural, compact shape that the district would have taken in the 
absence of a process of student exchange, expelling certain students and replacing them 
with others. As a standard for assessing gerrymandering, Angel and Parent propose that 
districts should be required to have less than 50% of their land area outside the equal land 
area circle (noting that only 44 of the 435 U.S. congressional districts meet this standard). 
No states or courts have yet adopted this standard; more time is necessary to determine 
whether it will gain any traction.  
  
Figure 14. Flaherty and Crumplin’s maximum‐minimum circle 
index compares the district area of the maximum inscribed circle 
(hatched blue) to the area of the minimum circumscribing circle. 
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Angel and Parent’s measure is appealing for several reasons. First, because it 
situates the measurement of gerrymandering in terms of the underlying cause of 
gerrymandering – voter exchange – it serves not just as a measure of the appearance of 
bizarre shape, but as a proxy for the exchange process underlying the drawing of irregular 
boundaries. In addition, by quantifying gerrymandering in terms of who is “expelled” 
from a district, it conceives of gerrymandering, especially electoral gerrymandering, as a 
Constitutional “harm” because it excludes voters from districts that they should rightfully 
be included in.  
In addition, Angel and Parent’s measure exhibits several specific methodological 
advantages. First, unlike other measures of compactness, the equal land area circle 
excludes water area and area in neighboring states. As such, it is less sensitive to coastal 
geographies and state boundaries than other measures of contiguity and compactness. 
Second, Angel and Parent’s experimental findings suggest that the equal land area circle 
is highly correlated with people’s intuitive perceptions of gerrymandering (r = 0.91), 
which suggests a high degree of face validity. This stands in contrast to some of the other 
Figure 15. Angel and Parent’s (2011) index compares the area of 
the district enclosed by the equal land area circle to the total 
area of the district.  
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measures above, which often yield counterintuitive results, deeming figures perceived to 
be compact as non-compact and vice versa.  
While Angel and Parent’s measure exhibits a number of advantages over other 
measures of dispersion, like any other measure, it also has certain limitations. In 
particular, the equal area circle is relatively poor at identifying the gerrymandering of 
districts with narrow protuberances (i.e., “kite” districts) or districts with deep gauges, 
despite clear evidence of aggressive voter exchange (see Figure 16).  
  
 
 
 
 
Moment of Inertia. Moment of inertia measures offer a more sophisticated 
alternative to simple length-width displacement measures, by including a large number of 
points in a district rather than just extreme points (Boyce & Clark, 1964; Kaiser, 1966; 
Niemi et al., 1990). Indeed, as Polsby and Popper (1991) have noted, moment of inertia 
measures “renders literal what Reock’s measure only approximates”, compactness as the 
relationship between every point in a shape to the shape’s center (p. 345). Specifically, 
moment of inertia measures estimate the sum of squared distance between every point in 
the district and the center of gravity, or geographic center, of the district. Because the 
computational demands of such measures are often prohibitive, a somewhat simpler 
measure, originally proposed by Boyce and Clark (1964), may also be employed, 
Figure 16. Angel and Parent’s (2011) equal land area circle index 
fails to detect the aggressive gerrymandering in the districts above. 
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measuring the average distance from the district’s center of gravity to a set of points on 
the district perimeter reached by a set of equally spaced lines (Niemi et al., 1990). 
Moment of inertia measures have considerable conceptual advantages over other 
measures. As noted previously, the moment of inertia uses a large sample of points within 
a polygon or on the edge of a polygon, providing a more sensitive measure of dispersion 
than those based exclusively on extremes (Niemi et al., 1990). Moreover, although 
extreme points are considered, they are weighted by their frequency, meaning that 
measures are less biased by extreme points (Niemi et al, 1990).  
Despite these conceptual advantages, moment of inertia measures have several 
important limitations. First, moment of inertia measures may be insensitive to certain 
deviations from compactness, giving exceedingly high scores to non-compact, tortuous 
shapes such as the serpent district in Figure 12 above (Young, 1988). Second, basic 
moment of inertia measures lack size invariance (Young, 1988). Thus, a circle with a 
diameter of 15 is deemed “more compact” than a circle of diameter of 60. However, 
moment of inertia measures may be adjusted to provide a “relative” measure that is size 
invariant (Kaiser, 1966). As with other measures of compactness, a circle minimizes the 
moment of inertia for a given area, and is thus the most compact possible shape. Thus, 
the size variant moment of inertia may be adjusted to control for district size by 
comparing the moment of inertia to that of a circle of equal area (Kaiser, 1966).  
Embeddedness 
In addition to the three traditional principles of gerrymandering, I offer one 
additional dimension that is unique to the educational context. In educational settings, it 
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is common for a school district to be “embedded” in another district, such that it is 
bordered on all sides by another, larger district (See Figure 17 below, Census 2010 
TIGER/Line shapefiles). These “floating” or “island” districts are particularly common in 
the South, where smaller city-level districts are embedded in larger county-level districts. 
Such districts do not necessarily violate any of the traditional principles of 
gerrymandering. They are technically contiguous, in that one could travel from any point 
in each district to any other point in the district without leaving the district (although the 
most direct path may require you to leave the district). They may be equinumerous, so 
long as the area in district A, often the urban core, is more densely populated than the 
surrounding district B, often the surrounding suburb. Moreover, they may be relatively 
compact, exhibiting a relatively circular shape with low indentation and dispersion. 
While such pairs of districts satisfy the principles of contiguity, equinumerosity and 
compactness, by carving out a district within another district, they are decidedly 
gerrymandered. As such, assessment of educational gerrymandering requires attention to 
this unique type of boundary configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 17. School district A is embedded in school district B.  
A 
B
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Because embeddedness is a multi-district problem, as with equinumerosity, the 
embeddedness cannot be measured at the local, district level. Instead, the effect of 
embeddedness must be estimated at the level of the set of affected districts. As with 
contiguity, embeddedness is assessed as a categorical variable. As such, a set of districts 
are deemed embedded or non-embedded.  
Selecting the Appropriate Measure of Gerrymandering 
As the foregoing illustrates, the past half-century has witnessed a profusion of 
methodological work on the measurement of gerrymandering, resulting in a variety of 
measures of district “bizarreness.” Facilitated by the availability of sophisticated 
geographic information systems, recent scholarship has further refined these measures 
and rendered compactness even more tractable. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy prophesized 
“new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the 
precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose” (concurring, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
2004, 541 U.S. 8). Despite these advances, gerrymandering is still a complex 
phenomenon, and each principle of gerrymandering outlined above is merely a 
mathematical proxy that captures a unique aspect of district shape. As such, while each is 
useful for identifying potential gerrymanders; no one measure is sufficient to determine 
whether a district has been gerrymandered or to quantify the severity of the gerrymander. 
Because of the array of measures available to researchers in studying 
gerrymandering, it is important to select the measure of gerrymandering that captures the 
dimension of boundary irregularity that is most relevant to the context being studied. In 
addition, because each measure detects some aspects of gerrymandering, but is 
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insensitive to others, it is important that research acknowledge the strengths and 
limitations of the measures employed. Moreover, because there are multiple measures 
designed to capture each dimension, accurate diagnosis of gerrymandering should 
employ convergent evidence from multiple, complementary measures along each of these 
dimensions. 
It should be emphasized that while all dimensions of gerrymandering are 
important and unique, above all else, gerrymanders are characterized by violations of 
compactness. Indeed, research has demonstrated that compactness is the most “face 
valid” dimension of gerrymandering, in that it comports well with individual perceptions 
of gerrymandering (Angel & Parent, 2011). Even more importantly, compactness is a 
much more ecumenical and flexible concept than contiguity and embeddedness, 
capturing various forms of boundary irregularity. Non-contiguous and embedded shapes 
are necessarily non-compact; as such, measures of compactness are also sensitive to 
violations of these principles. However, the reverse is not true – non-compact shapes are 
not necessarily non-contiguous or embedded. Thus, it may be argued that compactness 
constitutes the single most important aspect of boundary irregularity. Of course, like the 
other spatial measures, compactness is insensitive to the aspatial dimension of 
inequinumerosity. However, this is less relevant in the school context, since there is no 
reasonable expectation of population equivalence in the case of school districts, and only 
a weak expectation of population equivalence in the case of schools. For these reasons, 
discussed at length in the methodology, the current study focuses on the compactness of 
educational boundaries. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This study employs complementary geospatial techniques and regression models 
to analyze how the process of student exchange manifested in the gerrymandering of 
educational boundaries serves to ameliorate or perpetuate racial and ethnic inequities in 
American schools. For both school attendance zones and school districts, a two-phase 
analytic approach is employed. The first phase of analysis addresses Research Questions 
1 and 3, which are reiterated below:  
1) How gerrymandered are U.S. public school attendance zones? 
3) How gerrymandered are U.S. public school districts? How does school district 
gerrymandering relate to school attendance zone gerrymandering? 
In addition to descriptive analyses documenting the prevalence and severity of 
gerrymandering, regression models are estimated to address subquestions 1a and 3a, 
regarding variation in the gerrymandering of educational boundaries across geographic 
and demographic contexts. The analytic technique for the first phase of analysis is 
discussed at length below, while results for school attendance zones and school districts 
are reported in the first part of Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
The second phase of analysis addresses Research Questions 2 and 4, which are 
reiterated below:  
2) Does school attendance zone gerrymandering serve to segregate or integrate 
students by race/ethnicity? How much would school diversity be improved or 
worsened through rezoning designed to minimize gerrymandering? 
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4) Does school district gerrymandering serve to segregate or integrate students by 
race/ethnicity? How much would school district diversity be improved or worsened 
through rezoning designed to minimize gerrymandering? 
In addition to these omnibus questions, regression models are estimated to address 
subquestions 2a and 4a, regarding variation in the segregative effects of gerrymandering 
of educational boundaries on school and district diversity across geographic and 
demographic contexts. In particular, the analyses attend to how the racial and ethnic 
characteristics of students residing in school attendance zones and school districts drive 
the process of student exchange. Results of the second phase of analysis for school 
attendance zones and school districts are reported in the second part of Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively.  
 In the following sections, I outline the analytic strategy for each phase of analysis, 
outline all sources of data, describe the sample of school attendance zones and school 
districts, identify and operationalize all dependent and independent variables, and discuss 
the specific analytic models used in the study.  
Analytic Technique 
Phase I: How Gerrymandered are U.S. Public School Attendance Zones and 
Districts? 
 Because this study constitutes the first empirical work on educational boundary 
gerrymandering, the first phase of analysis is descriptive, documenting the severity and 
prevalence of educational boundary gerrymandering in U.S. public schools and school 
districts. As noted previously, because schools and school districts do not have a clear 
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expectation of equinumerosity, like electoral districts, this study focuses exclusively on 
spatial aspects of gerrymandering manifested in boundary “bizarreness”. In addition, 
because of the singular importance of compactness as an indicator of gerrymandering, 
which is sensitive to violations of contiguity and embeddedness, this study focuses on the 
extent to which educational boundaries are gerrymandered into non-compact shapes. 
Moreover, as will be discussed at length below, the analysis in the second phase assesses 
the effect of gerrymandering on school and school district diversity by comparing actual 
boundaries to maximally-compact boundaries. Thus, using measures of compactness 
ensures alignment between the first and second phases of analysis. 
 Specifically, gerrymandering is quantified using two complementary measures of 
compactness. I employ a perimeter-based measure of compactness, the classic 
Schwartzberg index, which quantifies compactness in terms of the ratio of the perimeter 
of a district to the perimeter of a district with equal area. Because the Schwartzberg 
index, as a perimeter-based measure of compactness, is often overly sensitive to 
perimeter length and insufficiently sensitive to shape, I supplement the index with an 
areal measure of compactness. Specifically, I use the more recently-developed Polsby-
Popper index, which quantifies compactness in terms of the ratio of the area of a district 
to the area of a district with equal perimeter. Although the Polsby-Popper index, as an 
area-based measure of compactness, is often overly sensitive to shape irregularity, and 
insufficiently sensitive to perimeter, when coupled with the Schwartzberg index, the two 
measures provide a fairly comprehensive assessment of shape irregularity – in terms of 
both perimeter and area.  
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 To assess contextual variation in gerrymandering, measures of compactness are 
regressed on a variety of school and school district covariates to determine the extent to 
which gerrymandering varies across geographic and demographic contexts, including: 
core-based statistical area type (e.g., metropolitan or micropolitan), locality (i.e., urban, 
suburban, rural, town), history of de jure segregation, proportion of students that qualify 
for free- and reduced-price lunch, student race/ethnicity, and student population.  
Phase II: Effect of Gerrymandering on School Attendance Zone and District 
Diversity 
In the second phase of analysis, I examine the consequences of educational 
boundary gerrymandering for school and school district equity, investigating whether the 
gerrymandering of school attendance zone and school district boundaries serves to 
segregate or integrate students by race/ethnicity. This is accomplished by comparing the 
characteristics of students residing in existing school attendance zones and school 
districts to those residing in ideal, maximally-compact zones and districts representing 
the “natural” shape each zone and district would be expected to assume in the absence of 
gerrymandering. The racial/ethnic composition of all boundaries in the study was 
determined by spatially mapping the boundaries of each district to U.S. Census blocks 
and aggregating block-level demographic data on the racial/ethnic characteristics of 
children from the Census 2010 Summary File 1. 
For both school attendance zones and school districts, the effect of 
gerrymandering on diversity is estimated by comparing the diversity of students in actual 
school attendance zones and districts to students in the equal land area circle of Angel 
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and Parent (2011) corresponding to each zone and district. As discussed previously, 
because a circle is the most compact possible figure, the equal land area circle, which is 
equivalent in size to the land area currently occupied by the district, may be interpreted as 
the “natural” district that would exist if the district boundaries had not been intentionally 
manipulated into irregularity by expelling certain students in the original district and 
replacing them with students in outlying areas.  
Figure 18 provides an illustration of sample “natural” equal land area school 
attendance zones that would be expected in the absence of gerrymandering (red circles) 
for a given district, overlaid on the actual school attendance zones from the SABINS 
sample (blue). For school attendance zones, the equal land area circle zones were created 
around the geographic location of each school. Comparable equal land area circle 
districts were conducted for school districts. However, for school districts, equal land 
area circles were created around the geographic centroid of the district, rather than a 
specific school location.  
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As the figure above illustrates, while it is feasible for a single school attendance zone or 
district to be circular, in practice, it is not feasible to assume that all districts to be 
circular, as they would overlap and/or exclude certain areas. As such, an additional 
analysis was conducted comparing the diversity of students residing in actual attendance 
zones to those residing in the Voronoi polygonal attendance zone corresponding to each 
attendance zone. While Voronoi polygons do not maximize compactness to the extent of 
the circular district, these zones are ideal in that they are fully convex, with no perimeter 
concavities. Moreover, they are maximally efficient, in that they minimize student travel 
distance to school.  
Because the Voronoi algorithm presumes that schools attract roughly equivalent 
numbers of students―a presumption of equinumerosity that is not applicable to school 
Figure 18. Example of equal land area circle school attendance zoning in Pasadena 
ISD, Texas. School locations are indicated by black dots, school attendance zones are 
demarcated in blue, and “natural” equal land area zones are demarcated by red 
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districts―a parallel analysis was not conducted school districts. As such, the analysis of 
the effects of gerrymandering on school district diversity was limited to models using 
equal land area circles as the districts’ “natural” zones. Figure 19 below provides an 
illustration of a sample district featuring actual school attendance zones as well as 
“natural” Voronoi districts that would be expected in the absence of gerrymandering.  
 
 
 
 
For both the equal land area circle analyses and the Voronoi analyses, the effect 
of gerrymandering on diversity is quantified as the percentage increase in diversity that 
would be expected if boundaries were not gerrymandered. To determine the extent to 
which gerrymandering varies across geographic and demographic contexts, the 
percentage change in diversity associated with elimination of gerrymandering is 
regressed on a variety of school and school district covariates, including: core-based 
Figure 19. Example of Voronoi school attendance zoning in Pasadena ISD, Texas. 
School locations are indicated by black dots, school attendance zones are 
demarcated in blue, and Voronoi polygonal zones are demarcated with red lines.  
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statistical area type (e.g., metropolitan or micropolitan), locality (i.e., urban, suburban, 
rural, town), history of de jure segregation, proportion of students that qualify for free- 
and reduced-price lunch, student race/ethnicity, and student population.  
Particular attention is paid to the relationship between the segregative effect of 
gerrymandering and the racial/ethnic characteristics of students residing in the “core” of 
each attendance zone and school district. The “core” zone or district refers to the portion 
of the natural, non-gerrymandered attendance zone or district that is also located in the 
gerrymandered, actual attendance zone or district. Because students in the “core” zone or 
district are neither “zoned in” nor “zoned out” in the student exchange process, they may 
be viewed as the drivers behind the student exchange process. As such, it is of particular 
importance to examine how the racial and ethnic characteristics of students in this core 
zone drive the process of student exchange. 
Effect vs. intent of gerrymandering. The methodology employed in this study 
provides direct evidence of the current effect of boundary gerrymandering on the 
racial/ethnic composition of school attendance zones and school districts. However, the 
cross-sectional methodology employed by the study does not provide a strong basis for 
inferring the intent of educational boundary gerrymandering, because it is possible that 
the racial/ethnic composition of students residing in an educational boundary has changed 
since the boundary was originally established, meaning that the segregative effect of 
gerrymandering may be the result of individual residential decisions since boundaries 
were established. Thus, while deviations from regularity suggest that boundaries were 
intentionally manipulated, and the current effect of that manipulation may be deemed 
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segregative or integrative, the study cannot definitively determine whether boundaries 
were originally manipulated with a discriminatory intent of segregating students or an 
affirmative intent of integrating students.   
While it is impossible to definitively establish intent using such a cross-sectional 
methodology, it should be noted that the basis for causal inference differs somewhat for 
school attendance zones and school districts, with a somewhat sounder basis for causal 
inference regarding the intent of school attendance zone gerrymandering than for school 
district gerrymandering. Because attendance zones are reviewed and modified regularly 
to accommodate changes in district population as well as changes in the supply of schools 
(e.g., facility openings and closures and expansions), it is likely that the characteristics of 
students in their current boundaries fairly accurately represent the characteristics of 
students in the boundaries at the time of boundary adoption. Thus, the analysis provides a 
fairly strong basis for inferences about the discriminatory or affirmative intent of school 
attendance zone boundaries to segregate or integrate.  
While school district boundaries certainly change over time, overall, they are 
much more stable than school attendance zone boundaries, reflecting their coterminity 
with other more permanent political boundaries (e.g., counties) as well as additional 
political and legal barriers to their modification. Given that district boundaries may have 
been established decades ago, the demographic characteristics of students residing in and 
around school districts may have changed substantially since the boundaries were 
adopted. In particular, given the important role that school districts play in residential 
decisions, individuals may have sorted across boundaries, making them more segregated 
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than they were when established. As a result, although the presence of irregular 
boundaries provides direct evidence that boundaries were originally gerrymandered to 
exchange students for some reason, it cannot be inferred from the characteristics of 
current residents whether the boundaries were intentionally manipulated to segregate 
students by race/ethnicity without comparing boundaries to the racial/ethnic 
characteristics of students contemporaneous to the establishment of the district boundary. 
Thus, there is a weaker basis for inferring the discriminatory or affirmative intent of 
school district boundaries on the basis of whether they currently segregate or integrate. 
Data Sources 
This study leverages multiple sources of publicly-available spatial data coupled 
with geographic and demographic data to examine the severity of educational 
gerrymandering and its effects on the diversity of schools and school districts. Below, I 
outline each data source and the information obtained from each source. Table 2 provides 
a crosswalk between each data source and each of the study variables.  
Spatial Boundary Data 
School attendance zone and school district boundaries were obtained from two 
different data sources. To facilitate spatial analysis in geographic information systems 
software, all educational boundaries were downloaded and analyzed as Esri “shapefiles”, 
a proprietary file format containing geospatial vector data for use in ArcGIS®. 
School attendance zone boundaries. School attendance zone boundary 
shapefiles for the 2009-10 school year were obtained from the School Attendance 
Boundary Information System (SABINS). The SABINS database is a novel, National 
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Science Foundation-funded repository for digital GIS national school attendance zone 
data. Because the SABINS project is still in its early stages, the database currently only 
contains shapefiles for the 2009-10 school year. SABINS shapefiles were obtained via 
the National Historical Geographic Information Systems (NHGIS) website. 
Elementary school attendance zones are the “building blocks” of middle and high 
school attendance zones, in that they generally feed into middle school and high-school 
attendance zones (with some exceptions). Thus, irregularities in middle school and high 
school boundaries are often just aggregations of the irregularities in multiple smaller 
elementary school boundaries. Thus, the analysis focused exclusively on elementary 
school attendance zone boundaries, operationalized as those school attendance zones in 
the SABINS sample which served students in first grade.  
In addition, only school attendance zones located in U.S. Census “core-based 
statistical areas” were selected for further analysis. Under U.S. Census definitions, urban 
areas, or “core-based statistical areas”, may be classified into two types: metropolitan 
statistical areas and micropolitan statistical areas. To be classified as a metropolitan 
statistical area, a core-based statistical area must have an urbanized area of more than 
50,000, while a micropolitan area must have an urbanized area with a population of more 
than 10,000 but less than 50,000.  
School district boundaries. School district boundary shapefiles were obtained 
from the U.S. Census Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 
(TIGER)/Line® system. Although the vast majority of U.S. school districts are “unified” 
districts, serving both elementary and secondary students, the TIGER/Line system also 
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contains spatial data on those districts serving only elementary students and secondary 
students. For temporal comparability with school attendance zones, school district 
shapefiles for 2010 were used in the study. As with school attendance zones, only school 
districts located in U.S. Census “core-based statistical areas” were selected for further 
analysis.  
Sources of Geographic and Demographic Data 
Census 2010 Summary File 1. Census 2010 block-level demographic estimates 
of the number of students enrolled in school by student race/ethnicity were obtained via 
the NHGIS site. These data were used to compute measures of racial/ethnic diversity for 
each attendance zone and district by spatially linking Census data on student 
race/ethnicity at the block level to the spatial boundaries discussed above. In addition, 
measures were used to provide demographic covariates for each school attendance zone 
and district.  
The Census block is the smallest unit of analysis at which the Census Bureau 
collects and tabulates decennial census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). Because of 
confidentiality concerns associated with reporting data at such a granular level, data 
available at this level is somewhat limited. As such, while data on resident race/ethnicity 
is available at the block level, data on poverty and socioeconomic status are not available 
at this level. While the geographic area of a Census block may vary widely, in urban 
areas it is typically the size of a single city block. In 2010, there were approximately 
11,078,297 blocks in the U.S. and 308.7 million residents, 74.2 million of whom were 
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under the age of 18. Thus, in terms of population, each block contains an average of 28 
residents, 7 of whom are children under the age of 18.  
Census data on the race/ethnicity of children residing in each block were spatially 
linked to attendance zone and district boundaries to determine the characteristics of 
students residing in each boundary. Because the Census does not directly report the 
number of children in each block disaggregated by race/ethnicity, the information was 
computed indirectly by comparing the total population of each block to the population of 
individuals over the age of 18. Subtracting the number of individuals above the age of 18 
from the total population for each racial/ethnic category yielded the number of children in 
each block by race/ethnicity. Although not all individuals under the age of 18 are enrolled 
in public schools (i.e., they may attend private school, be too young for school, have 
graduated, or have dropped out of school), it provides a proxy for the characteristics of 
students residing in each block.  
Student race/ethnicity data was obtained via the data field capturing “Hispanic or 
Latino, and not Hispanic or Latino by Race” (P9), which classifies students as either 
Hispanic or Latino or as a member of one of eight racial categories: American 
Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander, non-Hispanic White, Other, or two or more races. Although such a system 
conflates race and ethnicity (i.e., a student must be classified as either Hispanic or white, 
not both), it is desirable because it provides findings that are comparable to previous 
research on school segregation, which has almost exclusively relied on NCES CCD data. 
For analytical purposes, all calculations of diversity and segregation computed on Census 
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block data used a slightly more parsimonious seven-category system combining students 
of Other race with students of two or more races.  
NCES CCD 2009-10. School- and district-level geographic covariates were 
obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of 
Data (CCD). Schools and districts were classified according to the type of core-based 
statistical area in which they are located (i.e., metropolitan or micropolitan), which is 
available in the Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Data file. In 
addition, school attendance zone and school district locality type (e.g., city, suburb, town, 
rural) was obtained from the NCES CCD (data field: ULOCAL). Data on student 
race/ethnicity for each school and district in the samples (data fields: AM, ASIAN, 
BLACK, HISP, PACIFIC, TR, and WHITE) used in the first phase of analysis were also 
drawn from the NCES CCD. All data from the NCES CCD was linked to school 
attendance zone and school district boundaries via common geographic identifiers with 
SABINS and Census TIGER/Line. For temporal comparability with SABINS and 
Tiger/LINE shapefiles, NCES data for the 2009-10 school year were used for analysis.  
 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2008. Information on school district 
desegregation status was obtained from a comprehensive 2008 report issued by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, which classifies school districts as: 1) in unitary status, and 
no longer under federal court oversight, 2) currently under federal court order, or 3) never 
subject to federal school desegregation litigation. The report contains data on 90% of all 
school districts currently under federal desegregation order (238 of 266), including all 
districts in the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
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Carolina, and South Carolina, and Tennessee. This list does not include other 
desegregation orders to which the United States is not a legal party; however, there is no 
reliable or comprehensive on evidence on these cases (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
2008). 
Sample 
Below I describe the samples of school attendance zones and school districts used 
in the study analysis. It should be noted that these samples apply to the analysis as a 
whole; however, each of the regression models used in the analysis may use slightly 
different subsamples and levels of aggregation.  
Sample of School Attendance Zones 
The SABINS data set contains boundary data on nearly 21,000 school attendance 
zones in 47 states, excluding Hawaii, Louisiana, and Nevada, and the District of 
Columbia. Complete attendance zone data are available for the states of Delaware, 
Minnesota, and Oregon. It is somewhat unclear what proportion of the population of 
school attendance zones this sample constitutes. Although it is not known how many 
attendance zones exist in the U.S., Saporito and Warren (SABINS, 2011) have estimated 
that they number roughly 70,000 to 80,000. As such, it is estimated that the SABINS 
sample contains 26% to 30% of the total population of school attendance zones. 
Several filters were applied to the SABINS sample of school attendance zones to 
arrive at the final analytic sample. First, as discussed previously, only the 13,412 
elementary school attendance zones in the SABINS sample were selected for analysis. 
Map 1 shows the geographic distribution of all elementary school attendance zones in the 
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SABINS sample. This sample accounts for 25.1% of all 53,460 elementary schools in the 
U.S. Second, as discussed previously, the SABINS sample was filtered to include only 
those 11,013 school attendance zones located in core-based statistical areas as defined by 
the U.S. Census, including both metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. Map 2 
shows the geographic distribution of all school attendance zones in the SABINS sample 
located in metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. Finally, because school districts 
with only one attendance zone have attendance zone boundaries that are coterminous 
with district boundaries, these zones are do not permit any boundary manipulation 
independent of district boundaries and are therefore not of empirical concern. Thus, the 
4,704 school attendance zones located in districts with only one attendance zone were 
also excluded from analysis.  
Application of these filters yielded a final analytic sample of 9,717 school 
attendance zones in 3,139 school districts. Map 3 shows the geographic distribution of 
the school attendance zones in the final study sample. As the map illustrates, the 
attendance zones in the final sample are concentrated in the 19 states of Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Although the attendance zones in the sample 
do not cover a large proportion of the land area of the U.S., they account for 22.7% of the 
47,953 schools in the population of interest (i.e., elementary schools located in 
metropolitan and micropolitan districts with two or more schools). 
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As discussed above, separate analyses were conducted to assess the effects of 
gerrymandering on school attendance zone diversity, one comparing attendance zones to 
equal land area circle zones and another comparing attendance zones to Voronoi 
polygonal zones. Because the equal land area circle creates ideal attendance zones for 
each individual school attendance zone independent of other attendance zones, it employs 
the full SABINS sample of attendance zones described above. However, the creation of 
convex polygonal zones according to the Voronoi algorithm necessitates analysis of a set 
of attendance zones in a school district. By definition, a Voronoi attendance zone for a 
school is defined as the area within which all students are closer to that school than to any 
other school. Thus, the creation of Voronoi attendance zones must be computed on a set 
of attendance zones within a district. As such, it was only possible to construct Voronoi 
attendance zones on the sample of attendance zones in districts reporting all elementary 
school attendance zone data. This yielded a subsample for the Voronoi analysis of 3,204 
schools in 282 districts. Map 4 shows the geographic distribution of the school attendance 
zones in the Voronoi subsample. 
Table 3 summarizes the demographic and geographic characteristics of the full 
SABINS sample of school attendance zones and the Voronoi sample compared to 
population values. As Table 3 reveals, schools in the full SABINS sample are slightly 
larger, on average, than schools in the population (519 students vs. 464 students), while 
those in the Voronoi subsample are larger still (576). Demographically, both the full and 
Voronoi samples slightly underestimate the proportion of whites and blacks in 
comparable schools, and slightly overestimate the population of Asians and Hispanics. 
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While the full SABINS sample slightly overestimates the proportion of students eligible 
for free and reduced-price lunch status (50.4% vs. 49.8%), the Voronoi subsample 
slightly underestimates the population (44.4% vs. 49.8%).  
In terms of geography, the full SABINS sample was fairly equivalent to the 
population in terms of the proportion of schools located in metropolitan vs. micropolitan 
areas (86.0% metropolitan for sample vs. 86.3% for population). The Voronoi sample, 
however, was considerably more concentrated in metropolitan areas than the population, 
with only 3.3% of schools located in micropolitan areas. In terms of locality, the schools 
in the full sample are slightly less likely to be located in urban areas (27.3% vs. 31.5%) or 
towns (8.8% vs. 11.3%), and slightly more likely to be located in suburban (36.1% vs. 
33.2%) and rural areas (27.8% vs. 23.9%).  Likewise, schools in the Voronoi sample are 
less likely to be located in urban areas (25.1% vs. 31.5%), towns (5.7% vs. 11.3%), and 
rural areas (16.5% vs. 23.9%), and considerably more likely to be located in suburbs 
(52.7% vs. 33.2%).  Schools in both the full and Voronoi samples are also slightly more 
likely to be located in the formerly de jure segregated South than the population as a 
whole (42.2% for the full sample and 43.1% for the Voronoi sample vs. 35.5% for the 
population). On the whole, however, the full SABINS sample is fairly comparable to the 
population in terms of demographics and geography, while the Voronoi sample is slightly 
more affluent and more suburban, although less white, than the population.   
Sample of School Districts 
Unlike school attendance zones, for which there are no national reporting 
requirements, school districts are required to provide spatial boundary data to the U.S. 
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Census biennially. As such, the Census TIGER/Line data contains shapefiles for the 
entire population of U.S. regular public school districts with a defined spatial extent. 
While there are over 18,000 school districts in the U.S. according to the NCES CCD, 
there are roughly 13,760 spatial school districts in the Census TIGER/Line sample. This 
discrepancy is attributable to the fact that many districts, including charter-only districts 
(n = 2,236) and administrative or regional education agencies (n = 1,521), do not have 
clearly delineated boundaries and were thus not available for spatial analysis. Map 5 
shows all spatial U.S. public school districts. As with the sample of school attendance 
zones, the sample of school districts was restricted to those districts located in core-based 
statistical areas. Thus, the final sample contained 9,796 school districts, accounting for 
72.3% of all U.S. school districts and more than four-fifths of all students. Map 6 shows 
the geographic distribution of all public school districts located in core-based statistical 
areas.  
Table 4 summarizes the demographic and geographic characteristics of the school 
district sample. Because the sample comprises the full population of school districts 
located in core-based statistical areas, no population comparison is necessary.   
Sample of Census blocks. As discussed previously, the characteristics of school 
attendance zones and school districts are derived by spatially merging these boundaries 
with Census blocks to identify the blocks comprising each school attendance zone and 
district. The characteristics of each school attendance zone and district are then calculated 
by aggregating Census block characteristics at the appropriate geographic level. School 
attendance zones in the sample contained a total of 4,646,375 Census blocks (accounting 
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for 41.9% of all U.S. Census blocks), meaning that there are approximately 478 Census 
blocks per district in the sample. Districts in the sample contained a total of 9,590,066 
Census blocks (accounting for 86.6% of all U.S. Census blocks), meaning that there are 
approximately 982 Census blocks per district in the sample. These aggregate figures 
likely underestimate the number of block groups in non-rural districts, especially those in 
more densely populated metropolitan and micropolitan areas. 
Phase I: Study Variables 
Tables 2 and 3 outline each of the dependent and independent variables used in 
the first phase of the study, documenting the severity of school attendance zone and 
school district gerrymandering and the extent to which gerrymandering varies across 
geographic and demographic contexts. Below I discuss these variables in detail, 
addressing the computation method, level of analysis, and interpretation of each.  
Dependent Variable - School Attendance Zone and School District Compactness 
The gerrymandering of each school attendance zone and school district was 
quantified using two complementary measures of compactness: the Schwartzberg and 
Polsby-Popper indices. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Schwartzberg index is more 
sensitive to perimeter length, while the Polsby-Popper index is more sensitive to irregular 
shape. Thus, taken together, these indices provide convergent evidence of violations of 
compactness, accounting for irregularities in both the perimeter and shape of the district 
polygon. Moreover, because the second phase of the study assesses the effects of 
gerrymandering on school diversity by comparing actual attendance zones and districts to 
the equal land area circle (deemed the most compact possible shape according to both 
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Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper indices), these measures ensure alignment between the 
first and second phases of analysis. The computation procedure for each measure is 
discussed in detail below.  
   Schwartzberg. The Schwartzberg index measures the indentation of a polygon by 
comparing its perimeter to the perimeter of a circle with equal area. Mathematically, the 
Schwartzberg measure may be represented as follows:  
ܥ ൌ ݌2√ߨܽ 
where p is the perimeter of the polygon and a is the area of the polygon. The 
Schwartzberg index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a perfectly compact shape 
(i.e., a circle). Because any polygon must necessarily have a non-zero perimeter and area, 
it is impossible for the Schwartzberg index to reach 0; as such, it asymptotically 
approaches 0.  
Polsby-Popper. The Polsby-Popper index measures the indentation of a polygon 
by comparing its area to the area of a circle with equal perimeter. Mathematically, the 
Polsby-Popper measure may be represented as follows: 
ܥ ൌ 4ߨܽ݌ଶ  
where a is the area of the polygon and p is the perimeter of the polygon. As with the 
Schwartzberg index, the Polsby-Popper index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a 
perfectly compact shape (i.e., a circle). Again, because any polygon must necessarily 
have non-zero perimeter and area, it is impossible for the Polsby-Popper index to reach 0; 
as such, it asymptotically approaches 0. 
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Independent Variables 
An array of contextual covariates were added to the regression models predicting 
school attendance zone and school district gerrymandering to assess heterogeneity in the 
effects of gerrymandering across geographic and demographic contexts.  
Core-Based Statistical Area type. For both school attendance zones and school 
districts, regression models predicting gerrymandering contained a dichotomous variable 
capturing whether the school or district is located in a metropolitan statistical area or 
micropolitan statistical area, with micropolitan as the reference category. Core-based 
statistical area type was obtained via the NCES CCD Local Education Agency Universe 
data.  
Locality. School attendance zone and school district locality was obtained via the 
NCES CCD. The NCES CCD classifies localities according to four main locality types: 
city, suburb, town, and rural. Each type of locality has three subtypes representing the 
size of the locality – large, midsize and small for city and suburb localities and fringe, 
distant, and remote for town and rural localities. For the purpose of this analysis, districts 
were be categorized according to their primary locality type, aggregating across locality 
subtype, with rural locality type as the reference category. 
Free- and reduced-price lunch. A measure of the proportion of students in a 
school that qualify for either free- or reduced-price lunch, computed from NCES CCD 
data, was added to models predicting both school attendance zone and school district 
gerrymandering.  
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Student race/ethnicity. Three measures of student race/ethnicity derived from 
NCES CCD data were incorporated into the models predicting school attendance zone 
and school district gerrymandering: percent white, percent black, and percent Hispanic.  
Student population. For both school attendance zones and school districts, a log-
transformed measure of student population, obtained via the NCES CCD, was added to 
regression models as a control variable.  
History of de jure segregation. For school attendance zones, a dichotomous 
variable capturing whether the state in which the metropolitan area is located was 
historically subject to de jure segregation is added to the regression models. School 
attendance zones located in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia were coded as located in the formerly de 
jure segregated South (and Border states). School attendance zones located in states not 
subject to de jure segregation were coded as the reference category for regression 
analyses.  
Whereas school attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South may be 
expected to differ from those in the rest of the U.S. owing to the legacy of desegregation 
efforts, which often utilized irregular boundaries and busing patterns to achieve 
integration, there is no theoretical reason to expect district boundaries in the formerly de 
jure segregated South to differ from those in the rest of the U.S. in terms of their 
gerrymandering, because district boundaries were generally left intact by desegregation 
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policies. As such, this variable was not included in models predicting school district 
gerrymandering.  
History of desegregation order. In addition, for the subsample of 1,286 school 
attendance zones located in districts for which data on federal desegregation orders are 
available in the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report, a dichotomous variable 
representing the status of court-ordered desegregation in the district was created. School 
attendance zones were coded as being in districts either 1) subject to desegregation 
orders, either granted unitary status or currently under federal court ordered 
desegregation, or 2) never subject to federal school desegregation litigation, with the 
latter coded as the reference category.  
Although desegregation orders are generally issued at the district level, this 
variable is only relevant to gerrymandering at the school attendance zone level, because 
district desegregation orders often necessitated the manipulation of school attendance 
zone boundaries, but did not dictate the boundaries of school districts themselves.   
District compactness. Because school attendance zone gerrymandering may 
reflect school district gerrymandering where school attendance zone boundaries are 
coterminous with school district boundaries, it is essential to disentangle the effects of 
gerrymandered attendance zones from gerrymandered districts. As such, the 
Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper indices for the districts containing each school 
attendance zone were added to regression models as a control variable.  
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Phase II: Study Variables 
Tables 2 and 3 outline each of the dependent and independent variables used in 
the second phase of the study, examining the effects of school attendance zone and 
school district gerrymandering on diversity and contextual variation in these effects 
across geographic and demographic contexts. Below I discuss these variables in detail, 
addressing the computation method, level of analysis, and interpretation of each. 
Dependent Variable – Effect of Gerrymandering on Diversity 
As discussed above, school attendance zones and school districts were compared 
to their “natural” districts to obtain the effect of gerrymandering on school attendance 
zone and district diversity. For school attendance zones, the diversity of each actual 
attendance zone was compared to the diversity of its corresponding equal land area circle 
zone, and its corresponding Voronoi polygon zone. For school districts, the diversity of 
each actual district was compared to the diversity of its corresponding equal land area 
circle zone. Indices capturing the effect of gerrymandering on each of these measures of 
diversity were used as the dependent variables in the ordinary least squares regression 
models estimating contextual variation in the effects of gerrymandering on school 
attendance zone and district racial/ethnic equity.  
Creation of the equal land area circle. As discussed previously, the equal area 
circle proposed by Angel and Parent (2011) represents the natural shape that a school 
attendance zone or school district would be expected to take in the absence of any 
“student exchange” through boundary gerrymandering. As such, this is used as the 
standard against which individual school attendance zones and districts are measured to 
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determine the extent to which the irregular manipulation of boundaries has affected the 
racial and ethnic diversity of schools and districts.  
For each school attendance zone and school district in the sample, the equal land 
area circle was created in ArcGIS using the following procedure. First, the land area of 
each polygon (i.e., school attendance zone or district boundary) was calculated. Second, 
for school districts, the geographic center or center of gravity of each district polygon 
was located and mapped. For school attendance zones, the latitude and longitude of the 
school were used as the “centroid” of the zone. Finally, the equal land area circle was 
created around each school district’s geographic center and each school attendance 
zone’s school location, by creating a “circular buffer” with the area equal to the polygon 
area computed in the first step. Because it is not feasible for attendance zones to cross 
current school district boundaries, the area outside each attendance zone’s school district 
boundary was excluded from the land area circle. An example of equal land area circle 
zones created according to this procedure is depicted in Figure 18.   
Once the equal area circle for each school attendance zone and school district 
were created, the boundaries of current zones and districts as well as the equal land area 
zones and districts were spatially merged to block-level Census data on student 
race/ethnicity. These data were then aggregated at the school attendance zone and district 
level and used to calculate measures of diversity. 
Creation of the Voronoi polygonal attendance zones. Computational geometric 
techniques were used to create alternative zoning schemes for the school attendance 
zones in the Voronoi sample. Specifically, the study uses a Voronoi algorithm to create 
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sets of school attendance zones within districts that are contiguous, non-embedded, 
relatively compact, and convex.  
Voronoi diagrams, alternately known as Dirichlet tessellations, have been 
frequently applied in a broad range of disciplines to assist in decisions regarding the 
location of retail stores (e.g., Boots & South, 1997), hospitals (e.g., Schuurman et al., 
2006), and transportation routes (Abellanas et al., 2003). Although they have not yet been 
widely applied to the realm of education, a handful of international studies have utilized 
Voronoi techniques. Notably, Pearce (2000) assessed the validity of Voronoi polygons as 
proxies for school catchment areas in the U.K., while Karimi, Delavar and Mostafavi 
(2009) used the technique to inform the location of educational centers in Israel. While 
the bulk of prior applied research has applied the Voronoi diagram technique to 
determine where facilities should be located, this study applies Voronoi diagrams to 
address the corollary problem: given the location of facilities (i.e., schools), where should 
boundaries be drawn?   
Before I describe the process for creating Voronoi-type educational districts, a 
brief discussion of the geometric properties of Voronoi polygons is warranted. At the 
most basic level, a Voronoi diagram partitions the space around a set of points, such that 
each point is contained in a single polygon. As shown in Figure 20, a Voronoi diagram 
consists of a set of polygons around a set of points, each having the property that all 
locations in the polygon are closer to their “central point” than to any other point 
(Aurenhammer, 1991; Miles & Maillardet, 1982; Okabe et al., 2000). The area of the 
polygon containing each point is defined by starting at the central point and expanding 
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outward at identical rates for all points in the set. This results in a set of tessellated 
polygons, which may be formally represented as follows: 
௜ܸ ൌ ൛ݔ	| ∥ ݔ െ ݔ௜ ∥ൌ∥ ݔ െ ݔ௝ ∥ൟ 
for i ≠ j, where xi and xj are location vectors and Vi is the Voronoi region for point i. As 
Figure 20 illustrates, all polygons in a Voronoi diagram have the property of being 
convex, contiguous, and non-embedded (Karimi et al, 2009). Because they are 
characterized by straight-line edges, and are thus necessarily non-circular, Voronoi 
polygons must necessarily diverge from perfect compactness according to the measures 
discussed in Chapter 2. While they may not be perfectly compact, Voronoi polygons are 
optimally compact, in that they maximize the compactness of the boundaries for the set 
of schools in a given district, given the predetermined location of schools.  
 
 
 
Applying the Voronoi algorithm to the realm of school attendance rezoning, each 
school may be viewed as a “central point” of the Voronoi polygon. As such, in a Voronoi 
Figure 20. Ordinary Voronoi diagram of polygons around random 
points in space.  
Note: Figure adapted from Karimi et al. (2009). 
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school attendance re-zoning algorithm, all attendance zones have the property that each 
student in each attendance zone lives closer to that school than to any other school in the 
district. An example of actual Voronoi polygonal attendance zones created according to 
this procedure is depicted in Figure 19. Once the Voronoi polygonal attendance zones 
have been created, they were spatially merged with block-level Census data on student 
race/ethnicity. These data were then aggregated at the school attendance zone level and 
used to calculate measures of diversity. 
Calculating diversity. Several measures of racial/ethnic diversity were calculated 
for each school attendance zone and school district and their corresponding equal land 
area circles and Voronoi polygons. For each of the school attendance zones and school 
districts in the study, three measures of racial/ethnic diversity were computed: 1) 
multiracial diversity, 2) black-white diversity, and 3) Hispanic-white diversity. 
Diversity is quantified using Simpson’s diversity index as a function of the 
number of different subgroups in a given area relative to the proportion of the population 
that belongs to each subgroup. Holding the number of subgroups constant, areas in which 
all groups are evenly represented have high rates of diversity, while areas where one 
group is significantly over- or under-represented have low diversity. Likewise, holding 
the proportion of the population in each group constant, areas with more groups have 
higher diversity while areas with fewer groups have lower diversity. Specifically, 
diversity was calculated as follows: 
ܦ ൌ 1 െ෍݌௜ଶ
௥
௜ୀଵ
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where r is the number of racial ethnic groups in a population and pi refers to a particular 
racial/ethnic group’s proportion of the school population. For measures of multiracial 
diversity, because students are classified according to seven racial/ethnic groups outlined 
above (i.e., American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic White, Other, or two or more races), r is seven. 
For dual-group measures of black-white and Hispanic-white diversity, r is two.  
Simpson’s diversity index may be interpreted as the probability that two students 
in a given school or district belong to different racial/ethnic categories. Values of the 
Simpson index range from 0 to 1, where 0 means that all students belong to the same 
racial/ethnic group (i.e., perfect homogeneity) and 1 means that all students belong to 
different racial/ethnic groups (i.e., perfect heterogeneity). In the context of this study, 
Simpson’s index may be interpreted as the probability that two students at a given school 
or district belong to different racial/ethnic categories. Although a number of alternative 
measures of diversity are available, such as the Shannon index, the Simpson index is 
particularly appealing because of its intuitive interpretation.   
Effect of gerrymandering on diversity. For each school attendance zone and 
school district in the sample, the effect of gerrymandering on diversity is quantified as the 
percent by which “natural” or ideal school attendance zones are more or less diverse than 
their corresponding actual attendance zones. This is equivalent to the amount by which 
school attendance zone or school district diversity would increase or decrease if 
gerrymandering were eliminated.  
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For example, if a school attendance zone’s has a multiracial diversity index of 0.6 
(i.e., a 60% chance that two randomly selected students belong to different racial/ethnic 
groups), but its equal land area circle zone (or Voronoi polygonal zone) has a multiracial 
diversity index of 0.7 (i.e., a 70% chance that two randomly selected students belong to 
different racial/ethnic groups), the effect of gerrymandering on the diversity of this 
school is calculated as follows:  
∆ܦ݅ݒ ൌ 	ܦ݅ݒே௔௧௨௥௔௟ െ ܦ݅ݒ஺௖௧௨௔௟ܦ݅ݒ஺௖௧௨௔௟ ൌ 	
0.7 െ 0.6
0.6 ൌ ൅16.667% 
In this example, the actual attendance zone of this school is 16.7% less multiracially 
diverse than its corresponding non-gerrymandered equal land area zone (or Voronoi 
polygonal zone) – meaning that two randomly selected students are 16.7% more likely to 
belong to different racial/ethnic groups in the natural attendance zone than in the actual 
attendance zone. Moreover, this school would be expected to achieve a 16.7% increase in 
diversity among students of all racial/ethnic groups if the gerrymandering of its 
attendance zone boundaries was eliminated. 
Positive values of the index indicate that the non-gerrymandered attendance zone 
is more diverse than its corresponding actual attendance zone and that diversity would be 
increased by eliminating gerrymandering. As such, a positive value indicates that 
gerrymandering serves to segregate. Negative values indicate that the non-gerrymandered 
attendance zone is less diverse than its corresponding actual attendance zone and that 
diversity would be decreased by eliminating gerrymandering. As such, a negative value 
indicates that gerrymandering serves to integrate. Thus, the index may be alternately 
interpreted as the percentage change in diversity associated with elimination of 
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gerrymandering, the amount by which a school attendance zone or district is 
gerrymandered to segregate or integrate or, more informally, the magnitude of the effect 
of gerrymandering on diversity.  
Independent Variables 
To assess heterogeneity in the effects of gerrymandering across geographic and 
demographic contexts, an array of contextual covariates were added to the regression 
models predicting the effects of school attendance zone and school district 
gerrymandering on diversity. Mirroring the analyses in the first phase, regression models 
for both school attendance zones and school districts included variables capturing core-
based statistical area type (i.e., metropolitan or micropolitan), locality (i.e., city, 
suburban, town, or rural), and school population. Likewise, models for school attendance 
zones contained variable capturing history of de jure segregation and history of federal 
desegregation order (i.e., unitary status, currently under desegregation order, or never 
subject to litigation).  
In addition, several demographic predictors were incorporated in the models 
predicting the effects of school attendance zone and school district gerrymandering on 
diversity. However, these predictors differ slightly from those used in the analyses above. 
Analyses in the first phase documented the association between school attendance zone 
and school district gerrymandering and actual school demographics as reported by the 
NCES CCD, in terms of the percent of students that are white, black, and Hispanic. The 
analysis in the second phase, however, was concerned with how students residing in the 
“core” of an attendance zone or school district (i.e., the area in a school’s “natural” zone 
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or district that is also inside a schools actual zone or district) drive the process of student 
exchange. As such, measures of core racial/ethnic composition were created using 
aggregated Census block data. This was accomplished by identifying the area of 
intersection between the natural and actual polygons in ArcGIS (i.e., the “core”) and 
spatially merging to shapefiles of all U.S. Census blocks. Once the blocks in each core 
were identified, the racial/ethnic characteristics of children under the age of 18 (used to 
operationalize students) for each block were aggregated to obtain the characteristics of 
each core.       
Paralleling the analysis above, for each core, the percentage of students that are 
white, black, and Hispanic were calculated and added to the regression models. In 
addition, measures of core student racial/ethnic diversity were included to provide insight 
into how the homogeneity of school attendance zone and school district cores drives the 
student exchange process, beyond the effects of a particular student race/ethnicity. 
 Three different measures of racial/ethnic diversity were computed using 
Simpson’s index, outlined in the preceding section: an index of multiracial diversity 
among all seven racial/ethnic groups employed by the study, an index of black-white 
diversity, and an index of Hispanic-white diversity.  
Analytic Models 
To answer each of the study research questions, 41 ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models were estimated. Below, I outline the models estimated for the first and 
second phases of analysis.   
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Phase I Regression Models 
To address contextual variation in gerrymandering of school attendance zones and 
districts, the first phase of analysis involved estimation of 14 separate regression models 
regressing measures of gerrymandering on geographic and demographic covariates. Eight 
models assessed variation in school attendance zone gerrymandering, while six assessed 
variation in school district gerrymandering.  
School attendance zone gerrymandering. Six models were estimated regressing 
school attendance zone gerrymandering on the school geographic and demographic 
characteristics described above. Three of these models used a Schwartzberg perimeter-
based measure of compactness as the dependent variable in the regression (Models 1, 2, 
and 3), while three used the Polsby-Popper area-based measure as the dependent variable 
(Models 4, 5, and 6). As is discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5, owing to 
multicollinearity among the racial/ethnic predictors, separate models were estimated to 
examine the independent association between gerrymandering and each racial/ethnic 
dimension. Thus, for both the Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper models, three separate 
models were estimated to capture the effects of each focal racial/ethnic dimension, 
including: percent white (Models 1 and 4), percent black (Models 2 and 5), and percent 
Hispanic (Models 3 and 6).  
In addition to these six models, two separate models comparable to those above 
were estimated to assess the relationship between history of desegregation order and 
school attendance zone gerrymandering. Separate analyses were required because Office 
of Civil Rights data on school desegregation status were only available for 1,286 school 
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attendance zones in the sample. Separate models were estimated with the Schwartzberg 
(Model 7) and Polsby-Popper (Model 8) indices of compactness as model dependent 
variables. Because these models were designed to isolate the effects of desegregation 
orders on gerrymandering, separate models were not estimated for each racial/ethnic 
dimension. Thus, only the percent white predictor was included in these models.  
School district gerrymandering. Paralleling the models for school attendance 
zones above, six models were estimated regressing school district 
gerrymandering/compactness on district geographic and demographic characteristics 
described above. As with the attendance zone analysis, the dependent variable in three of 
these models is the Schwartzberg perimeter-based measure of compactness (Models 1, 2, 
and 3), while the dependent variable in the other three is the Polsby-Popper area-based 
measure of compactness (Models 4, 5, and 6). Again, separate models were estimated to 
examine the independent association between gerrymandering and each racial/ethnic 
dimension. Thus, for both the Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper models, three separate 
models were estimated to capture the effects of each focal racial/ethnic dimension, 
including: percent white (Models 1 and 4), percent black (Models 2 and 5), and percent 
Hispanic (Models 3 and 6). 
Phase II Regression Models 
The second phase of analysis, assessing contextual variation in the effects of 
gerrymandering on school attendance zone and school district diversity, involved 
estimation of 27 separate OLS regression models. Fifteen models assessed variation in 
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the effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity, while twelve assessed 
variation in the effects of school district gerrymandering on diversity.  
Effect of school attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity. Twelve models 
were estimated on the full SABINS sample examining contextual variation in the effects 
of school attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity, as measured in terms of the 
percent difference in diversity between actual school attendance zones and their natural 
equal land area circle zones. It should be noted that comparable regression analyses were 
not conducted for the Voronoi polygonal attendance zones. As is discussed at length in 
Chapter 4, the rationale for this omission is two-fold: 1) the overall results for the 
Voronoi sample generally validate those of the equal land area circle analysis, but the 
latter analysis has a substantially larger sample size, and 2) the Voronoi sample is less 
representative of the population of school attendance zones than the full SABINS sample; 
as such, it is likely to yield more biased estimators.  
For each school attendance zone, the effect of gerrymandering on three different 
measures of diversity was calculated: 1) multiracial diversity, 2) black-white diversity, 
and 3) Hispanic-white diversity). For each of these dependent variables, four separate 
models were estimated. Each model contained a comparable array of geographic 
covariates as presented above. However, owing to multicollinearity between the 
demographic measures of core diversity, core percent white, core percent black, and core 
percent Hispanic, separate models were estimated to examine the unique effect of these 
four variables. For the models containing the diversity predictor, the core diversity 
measure corresponding with the dependent variable was included in each model. Thus, 
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the model predicting the effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on multiracial 
diversity included core multiracial diversity as a predictor (Model 1), while the models 
predicting the effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on black-white and 
Hispanic-white diversity included  black-white and Hispanic-white diversity as 
predictors, respectively (Models 4 and 8). Equivalent measures of core percent white, 
core percent black, and core percent Hispanic were added to the models predicting the 
effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on multiracial diversity (Models 2, 6, 
and 10), black-white diversity (Models 3, 7, and 11), and Hispanic-white diversity 
(Models 4, 8, and 12).   
In addition to these twelve models, three separate models comparable to those 
above were estimated to assess how the effect of school attendance zone gerrymandering 
on diversity varied between schools subject to desegregation orders and those never 
subject to litigation. As with Phase I, separate analyses were required because Office of 
Civil Rights data on school desegregation status were only available for 1,286 school 
attendance zones in the sample. Three separate models were estimated examining the 
effects of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity (Model 13), black-white diversity 
(Model 14), and Hispanic-white diversity (Model 15). Again, because these models were 
designed to isolate the effects of desegregation orders on gerrymandering, separate 
models were not estimated for each racial/ethnic dimension. Thus, only the core diversity 
measure corresponding with the dependent variable were included in each model (i.e., 
core multiracial diversity for Model 13, core black-white diversity for Model 14, and core 
Hispanic-white diversity for Model 15).  
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Effect of school district gerrymandering on diversity. Paralleling the models 
for school attendance zones above, twelve models were estimated to assess contextual 
variation in the effects of school district gerrymandering on diversity. For each of the 
three types of diversity in the analysis (i.e., multiracial diversity, black-white diversity, 
and Hispanic-white diversity), four separate models were estimated. Each model 
contained the array of geographic covariates presented above. However, owing to 
multicollinearity between the demographic measures of core diversity, core percent 
white, core percent black, and core percent Hispanic, separate models were estimated to 
examine the unique effect of these four variables. For the models containing the diversity 
predictor, the core diversity measure corresponding with the dependent variable was 
included in each model. Thus, the model predicting the effects of school district 
gerrymandering on multiracial diversity included core multiracial diversity as a predictor 
(Model 1), while the models predicting the effects of school district gerrymandering on 
black-white and Hispanic-white diversity included  black-white and Hispanic-white 
diversity as a predictor, respectively (Models 4 and 8).  Equivalent measures of core 
percent white, core percent black, and core percent Hispanic were added to the models 
predicting the effects of school district gerrymandering on multiracial diversity (Models 
2, 6, and 10), black-white diversity (Models 3, 7, and 11), and Hispanic-white diversity 
(Models 4, 8, and 12).   
Regression Assumptions 
Each of the regression models discussed above was fitted using ordinary least 
squares regression. All data were examined prior to regression analysis to ensure that 
110 
assumptions of OLS regression were met. To ensure that the OLS estimators are 
unbiased, the study samples were compared to the general population to ensure their 
representativeness. As Table 4 demonstrates, the SABINS sample and the sample of 
districts used in the regression analyses were quite representative of their population of 
interest. In addition, all independent variables were tested for violations of assumptions 
of normality and transformed if necessary to minimize skewness and kurtosis. Measures 
of student population were found to be strongly positively skewed and were transformed 
using a natural log transformation (Cleveland, 1984).  
To ensure that multicollinearity of predictors did not compromise the 
interpretation of regression coefficients, full regression models containing all predictors 
of interest were estimated and variance inflation factors (VIFs) were examined to ensure 
that models do not inflate the variance of the coefficient estimates for each predictors. 
Rules of thumb for interpreting VIF values vary; this study used a VIF standard of 5, 
according to the procedure of Rogerson (2001), to identify multicollinear predictors. 
When predictors were found to be multicollinear, as was the case with demographic 
predictors (e.g., percent white and percent black), separate models were estimated 
assessing the unique effects of each of the variables.  
Interpretation of Results 
As noted previously, all categorical variables were dummy coded, while all 
continuous variables were centered about their mean. As a result, the intercept of the 
regression model predicting school attendance zone gerrymandering in phase one may be 
interpreted as the mean level of gerrymandering for a school of average population, 
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located in a rural locality in a micropolitan area outside the formerly de jure segregated 
South, with an average proportion of students eligible for free- and reduced-price lunch, 
and an average proportion of students that are white, black, and/or Hispanic. Likewise, 
the intercept of the regression model predicting school district gerrymandering in phase 
one represent the mean level of gerrymandering for a district of average population, 
located in a rural locality in a micropolitan area, with an average proportion of students 
eligible for free- and reduced-price lunch, and an average proportion of students that are 
white, black, and/or Hispanic. 
In interpreting the results of the regression analyses, unstandardized regression 
coefficients were used to interpret the magnitude and direction of the relationship 
between each of the contextual predictors and dependent variables. Although the primary 
objective of the study is not to causally link predictors with the dependent variable, but 
merely to examine contextual variability in gerrymandering and the effect of 
gerrymandering on diversity, the model R2 is reported for each model. This value 
represents the extent to which the set of geographic and demographic predictors explain 
variability in gerrymandering or the segregative effect of gerrymandering.  
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CHAPTER 4: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE ZONE GERRYMANDERING 
In this chapter, I address the first and second research questions of the study, 
reporting the results of two phases of analysis on school attendance zone gerrymandering. 
In the first phase of analysis, I address the first research question, employing 
complementary measures of areal and perimeter compactness to document the severity 
and prevalence of the gerrymandering of U.S. public school attendance zones. In 
addition, I analyze how attendance zone boundary gerrymandering varies across school 
geographic and demographic contexts.  
In the second phase of analysis, I address the second research question, comparing 
the diversity of current school attendance zone boundaries to the diversity of “natural”, 
non-gerrymandered school attendance zones to estimate the segregative or integrative 
effect of attendance zone gerrymandering on the racial/ethnic diversity of public schools.  
Based on this analysis, I estimate how much school diversity would be enhanced or 
reduced via rezoning to minimize gerrymandering. In addition, I examine how the effect 
of gerrymandering on school diversity varies across school geographic and demographic 
contexts. In particular, I attend to how the racial and ethnic characteristics of students in a 
school attendance zone’s “core” (i.e., students residing in the portion of the actual school 
attendance zone that were not “zoned in” via gerrymandering) drive the process of 
student exchange. The results of both phases of analysis are presented below. 
Phase I: How Gerrymandered are Public School Attendance Zones? 
To address the first research question, regarding the severity and prevalence of 
public school attendance zone gerrymandering, measures of compactness were calculated 
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for all 9,717 school attendance zones in the analytic sample identified in Chapter 3. To 
ensure that examination of gerrymandering attended to irregularities in both perimeter 
and area, the analysis employed the complementary Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper 
indices, which quantify compactness in terms of irregularity of perimeter and area, 
respectively, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
The mean Schwartzberg index for school attendance zones 0.587 (SD = 0.136), 
meaning that on average the perimeter of a school attendance zone is 58.7% of the 
perimeter of a circular zone with equal area. The mean Polsby-Popper index for school 
attendance zones in the sample is 0.363 (SD = 0.165), meaning that on average the area 
of a school attendance zone is 36.3% of the area of a circular zone with equal perimeter. 
As expected, given that they are complementary measures of indentation, the Polsby-
Popper and Schwartzberg indices were highly correlated with each other (R = 0.989, p < 
.001).  
Because values of these spatial summary indices are not intuitive with regards to 
the severity of student exchange resulting from boundary irregularity, Figure 21 below 
provides a frame of reference for interpretation, with examples of school attendance 
zones with very low, low, average, high, and very high levels of compactness. Low and 
high compactness attendance zones were selected at approximately one standard 
deviation below and above the mean in terms of both areal and perimeter compactness, 
while very low and very high compactness attendance zones were selected at 
approximately two standard deviations below and above the mean. Because areal and 
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perimeter compactness were so highly correlated, only one attendance zone was selected 
to illustrate each level of compactness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The attendance zone of Winford Elementary in Bucyrus, Ohio (center) represents 
an “average” attendance zone, in terms of both its areal and perimeter compactness. As 
the Figure 21 reveals, Winford’s attendance zone is fairly regular, but is somewhat 
elongated, with some boundary indentations and protuberances. The Schwartzberg index 
for Winford Elementary is 0.581, slightly lower than the national average of 0.587, 
meaning that the perimeter of its attendance zone is 58.1% of the perimeter of a circular 
zone with equal area. Likewise, the Polsby-Popper index for Winford is 0.337, slightly 
lower than the national average of 0.363, meaning that the area of its attendance zone is 
33.7% of the area of a circular zone with equal perimeter.  
The attendance zone of Malvern Elementary in Malvern, Ohio (second from left) 
represents a “high compactness” attendance zone. While Malvern’s boundaries have a 
Figure 21. Examples of school attendance zones of very high, high, average, low, and very low 
compactness and their corresponding compactness values.  
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number of protuberances and concavities, they are relatively small, and the district shape 
is much less elongated than Winford’s. The Schwartzberg index for Malvern is 0.731, 
while its Polsby-Popper index is 0.534. Thus, Malvern Elementary is 15 percentage 
points more compact in terms of perimeter and 19.7 percentage points more compact in 
terms of area than an average school attendance zone, as represented by Winford 
Elementary.   
The attendance zone of Helen Keeling Elementary in Tucson, Arizona (left) 
represents a “very high compactness” attendance zone. Helen Keeling’s attendance zone 
is almost perfectly rectangular, with little elongation, no concavities, and only one small 
protuberance. The Schwartzberg index for Helen Keeling Elementary is 0.880, while its 
Polsby-Popper index is 0.775. Thus, Helen Keeling Elementary is 29.9 percentage points 
more compact in terms of perimeter and 43.8 percentage points more compact in terms of 
area than an average school attendance zone, as represented by Winford Elementary.  
The attendance zone of Wismer Elementary in Portland, Oregon (second from 
right) represents a “low compactness” attendance zone. Wismer’s attendance zone 
boundary, while regular on the north and east, has concavities and protuberances on the 
south and west. Moreover, Wismer’s attendance zone is highly discontiguous, comprised 
of two major disconnected areas and two smaller “islands” and one major void. The 
Schwartzberg index for Wismer is 0.382, while its Polsby-Popper index is 0.146. Thus, 
Wismer Elementary is 19.9 percentage points less compact in terms of perimeter and 19.1 
percentage points less compact in terms of area than an average school attendance zone, 
as represented by Winford Elementary.  
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The attendance zone of Cozad Elementary in Cozad, Nebraska (right) represents a 
“very low compactness” attendance zone. Cozad’s attendance zone boundary has a highly 
irregular shape, with numerous protuberances, concavities, voids, and discontiguous 
“island” areas. Accordingly, the Schwartzberg index for Cozad is 0.177, while its Polsby-
Popper index is 0.31. Thus, Cozad Elementary is 40.4 percentage points less compact in 
terms of perimeter and 30.6 percentage points less compact in terms of area than an 
average school attendance zone, as represented by Winford Elementary.  
Readers may find it helpful to refer to this figure and the percentage-point 
differences in compactness between each of the example school attendance zones to 
assist in visualization and interpretation of the magnitude of each of the contextual effects 
discussed below.  
How Does School Attendance Zone Gerrymandering Vary Across Geographic and 
Demographic Contexts? 
To assess how school attendance zone gerrymandering varies across school 
geographic and demographic contexts, compactness indices were regressed on a variety 
of school characteristics. Six ordinary least squares regression models were estimated 
regressing the Schwartzberg (Models 1 through 3) and Polsby-Popper (Models 4 through 
6) indices on a variety of explanatory variables capturing school geographic and 
demographic characteristics. A separate model, discussed at length below, was estimated 
to assess the effects of desegregation orders on gerrymandering for the subset of districts 
for which information on federal desegregation status was available from the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. 
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Each model contained several categorical geographic variables, including: core-
based statistical area type, locality, and de jure segregation status. In addition, each 
model contained demographic predictors capturing the proportion of students eligible for 
free- and reduced-price lunch and student race/ethnicity. Because the proportion of 
whites at a school is a strong predictor of the proportion of students that are Hispanic (R 
= -0.655) and, to a lesser extent, black (R = -0.549), demographic predictors were 
multicollinear when added to regression models simultaneously. Indeed, regression 
analysis yielded variance inflation factor (VIF) values greater than 7.0 for all racial/ethnic 
predictors, exceeding the recommended VIF value of 5.0 suggested by Rogerson (2001) 
and well above the suggested maximum of 4.0 suggested offered by Pan and Jackson 
(2008) (i.e., White VIF = 10.07, Black VIF = 7.68, Hispanic VIF = 9.05). As such, the 
effects of each racial/ethnic predictor were estimated via separate models to avoid 
statistical problems associated with multicollinearity. Models 1 and 4 included the 
proportion of students that are white, while Models 2 and 5 included the proportion of 
students that are black, and Models 3 and 6 included the proportion of students that are 
Hispanic.  
Each model also contained control variables, including a measure of school 
district boundary compactness corresponding with the dependent variable (i.e., 
Schwartzberg or Polsby-Popper), to ensure that estimates captured variation in school 
attendance zone gerrymandering independent of the gerrymandering of the school’s 
containing district, and a log-transformed measure of student population. Table 5 reports 
the results of the regression models for school attendance zone compactness. 
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As the penultimate row in each model reveals, the set of explanatory geographic 
and demographic variables explains 9.4% to 10.0% of the variance in the Schwartzberg 
index of perimeter compactness and 10.2% to 11.1% of the variance in the Polsby-Popper 
index of areal compactness. This means that, controlling for the compactness of a school 
attendance zone’s school district boundaries and student population, roughly one-tenth of 
the irregularity in a school attendance zone’s boundaries (i.e., the extent to which each 
attendance zone deviates from a circle) may be explained by the attendance zone’s core-
based statistical area type, locality, history of de jure segregation, and student 
racial/ethnic and socioeconomic characteristics. The unique relationship between school 
attendance zone gerrymandering and each of the explanatory geographic and 
demographic variables is discussed in detail below. Unless otherwise noted, interpretation 
of contextual effects below is based on coefficients from Models 1 and 4, which contain 
the student percent white demographic predictor. 
Core-Based Statistical Area type. School attendance zones in more populous 
metropolitan statistical areas are slightly more compact on average than school 
attendance zones in micropolitan statistical areas, even after controlling for school 
geographic and demographic characteristics. Thus, on average, attendance zones in 
smaller micropolitan areas are more gerrymandered, in terms of both perimeter and areal 
indentation, than school attendance zones in metropolitan areas, even after controlling for 
the size of the school population.  
Examination of the coefficients in the regression models reveals that the disparity 
in school attendance zone gerrymandering between metropolitan and micropolitan areas 
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is relatively small. Specifically, an average micropolitan school attendance zone has a 
Schwartzberg index of 0.590, while an average metropolitan school attendance zone has a 
Schwartzberg index of 0.622. Thus, school attendance zones in metropolitan areas are 3.2 
percentage points more compact in terms of perimeter than attendance zones in 
micropolitan areas.  Likewise, an average micropolitan school attendance zone has a 
Polsby-Popper index of 0.397, while the average metropolitan school attendance zone has 
a Polsby-Popper value of 0.435.  Thus, school attendance zones in metropolitan areas are 
3.8 percentage points more compact in terms of area than micropolitan school attendance 
zones.  
Locality. Table 5 demonstrates that school attendance zones in rural areas 
(reference category) are most compact, while school attendance zones in towns are most 
gerrymandered, after controlling for other school geographic and demographic 
characteristics. In terms of perimeter (i.e., Schwartzberg), school attendance zones in 
rural areas are 3.3 percentage points less gerrymandered than those in cities, 3.8 
percentage points less gerrymandered than those in suburbs, and 11.1 percentage points 
less gerrymandered than those in towns. Differences among localities are even more 
pronounced for measures of areal compactness. Indeed, in terms of the Polsby-Popper 
index, school attendance zones in rural areas are 6.2 percentage points less 
gerrymandered than those in cities, 7.0 percentage points less gerrymandered than those 
in suburbs, and 14.8 percentage points less gerrymandered than those in towns. School 
attendance zones in cities and suburbs did not differ significantly from each other in 
terms of their perimeter or areal compactness.  
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History of de jure segregation. Schools located in the formerly de jure 
segregated South have less compact attendance zone boundaries than schools in the rest 
of the U.S., after controlling for other school geographic and demographic characteristics. 
Specifically, school attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South are 6.3 
percentage points less compact in terms of perimeter and 7.4 percentage points less 
compact in terms of area than school attendance zones in the rest of the U.S. 
Free- and reduced-price lunch. After controlling for other school geographic 
and demographic characteristics, school attendance zone compactness is unrelated to the 
proportion of students in a school that qualify for free- and reduced-price lunch, after 
controlling for the proportion of students in a school that are white (Schwartzberg b = 
0.016, ns; Polsby-Popper b = 0.008, ns). However, school attendance zone compactness 
is positively related to the proportion of students in a school that qualify for free- and 
reduced-price lunch in models controlling for the proportion of students in a school that 
are black (Schwartzberg b = 0.060, p < .001; Polsby-Popper b = 0.072, p < .001) and 
Hispanic (Schwartzberg b = 0.044, p < .001; Polsby-Popper b = 0.046, p < .001).  
As such, after controlling for the proportion of students that are black and 
Hispanic, school attendance zones with higher proportions of economically 
disadvantaged students tend to be more compact than more affluent schools, while less 
disadvantaged schools are more gerrymandered. For example, a high-poverty school, 
defined as having a proportion of students eligible for free- and reduced-price lunch that 
is two standard deviations above the mean for the sample (50.1%), has an expected 
Polsby-Popper index of 0.411. A low-poverty school, defined as having a proportion of 
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student eligible for free- and reduced-price lunch that is two standard deviations below 
the mean, has an expected Polsby-Popper index of 0.325. Thus, high-poverty schools are, 
on average, 8.6 percentage points less gerrymandered, in terms of area, than low-poverty 
schools.  
Student race/ethnicity. Models 1 and 4 reveal that school attendance zone 
compactness is negatively related to the proportion of whites at a school, controlling for 
other school geographic and demographic characteristics (Schwartzberg b = -0.061, p < 
.001; Polsby-Popper b = -0.086, p < .001). As such, schools with higher proportions of 
whites tend to be more gerrymandered than schools with higher proportions of non-
whites. For example, a high-white school, defined as a school with a proportion of whites 
that is two standard deviations above the mean, would have an expected Schwartzberg 
index that is 8.2 percentage points less compact in terms of perimeter than a low-white 
school. Likewise, high-white schools are, on average, 11.6 percentage points less 
compact in terms of area than low-white schools.  
By contrast, Models 2 and 5 reveal that school attendance zone compactness has a 
weak positive association with the proportion of blacks at a school, controlling for other 
school geographic and demographic characteristics (Schwartzberg b = 0.015, p < .05; 
Polsby-Popper b = 0.017, p < .05).  Thus, on average, schools with fewer blacks tend to 
be more gerrymandered than schools with more blacks. For example, a high-black 
school, defined as a school with a proportion of blacks that is two standard deviations 
above the mean, would have an expected Schwartzberg index that is 1.5 percentage 
points less compact in terms of perimeter than a low-black school. Likewise, high-black 
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schools are, on average, 1.8 percentage points less compact in terms of area than low-
black schools. 
Likewise, Models 3 and 6 reveal that school attendance zone compactness is 
positively related to the proportion of Hispanics at a school, controlling for other school 
geographic and demographic characteristics (Schwartzberg b = 0.037, p < .001; Polsby-
Popper b = 0.054, p < .001).  Thus, schools with fewer Hispanics tend to be more 
gerrymandered than schools with more Hispanics. For example, a high-Hispanic school, 
defined as a school with a proportion of Hispanics that is two standard deviations above 
the mean, would have an expected Schwartzberg index that is 4.1 percentage points less 
compact in terms of perimeter than a low-Hispanic school. Likewise, high-Hispanic 
schools are, on average, 6.0 percentage points less compact in terms of area than low-
Hispanic schools. 
History of desegregation order. To examine the relationship between school 
attendance zone gerrymandering and school district desegregation status, a separate 
analysis was conducted on the subsample of school attendance zones for which federal 
district desegregation status information is available via the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights was selected for further analysis. The final sample for this analysis consisted of 
1,286 school attendance zones in 23 districts in the states of Florida, Georgia, and North 
Carolina. School districts were classified as: 1) never subject to federal desegregation 
litigation, or 2) subject to desegregation order. The latter category includes both school 
districts formerly under desegregation orders but now declared unitary as well as the 
handful of school districts in the SABINS sample that are still under federal supervision 
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for desegregation according to Office of Civil Rights data (n = 21). All districts in this 
analysis were located in states in the formerly de jure segregated South. Table 6 presents 
the results of the regression analyses examining the relationship between school 
attendance zone compactness and school district desegregation status, after controlling 
for the compactness of district boundaries and other school geographic and demographic 
characteristics. 
As Table 6 reveals, although school attendance zones in the formerly de jure 
South are more gerrymandered than those in the rest of the U.S., school attendance zones 
in districts that were subject to desegregation orders are significantly more compact than 
school attendance zones in districts that were never subject to federal desegregation 
litigation. Specifically, schools subject to desegregation orders have attendance zone 
boundaries that are 5.2 percentage points more compact in terms of perimeter (Model 7) 
and 5.8 percentage points more compact in terms of area (Model 8) than school 
attendance zones that were never litigated.  
Phase I Summary 
Descriptive analyses documenting the severity and prevalence of school 
attendance zone gerrymandering revealed a high degree of variability in the 
gerrymandering of school attendance zones. While some boundaries are remarkably 
compact, others are exceedingly gerrymandered, exhibiting severe violations of both 
areal and perimeter compactness.  
Analyses revealed systematic variation the gerrymandering of school attendance 
zones across geographic contexts, although the magnitude of these effects is fairly small. 
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Gerrymandering of school attendance zones is more severe in smaller, micropolitan areas 
than in more populous metropolitan areas. However, the gerrymandering of school 
attendance zones is negatively related to school population, such that more populous 
schools have more gerrymandered boundaries than less populous schools. In addition, 
while the gerrymandering of school attendance zones is most severe in towns, school 
attendance zones in rural areas are particularly compact. 
Findings regarding the relationship between gerrymandering and history of de 
jure segregation and federal desegregation oversight are particularly illuminating. School 
attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South are significantly more 
gerrymandered than attendance zones in the rest of the U.S. Although further analysis is 
necessary to investigate whether this gerrymandering serves to segregate or integrate, the 
finding that attendance zones are more gerrymandered in the South is consistent with the 
interpretation that attendance zones in the South may have been gerrymandered to 
maintain de facto segregation in response to integration pressures.  
Moreover, analysis revealed that school attendance zones in Southern school 
districts currently or formerly subject to federal desegregation orders are significantly 
less gerrymandered than those never subject to desegregation litigation. This stands in 
contrast to anecdotal and historical accounts suggesting that attendance zone 
gerrymandering may be an artifact of desegregation efforts in the South, with irregular, 
tortuous boundaries resulting from busing patterns intended to enhance integration.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that desegregation orders may have 
suppressed, and continue to suppress, the gerrymandering of school attendance zone 
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boundaries in the South. By contrast, districts not subject to federal oversight of 
desegregation order may have responded to pressures to dismantle formal de jure 
segregation by establishing gerrymandered attendance zones maintaining de facto 
segregation. However, more direct evidence of the segregative or integrative effects of 
gerrymandering, which will be provided in the subsequent section, is necessary to 
substantiate these propositions.  
The relationship between school attendance zone compactness and school 
demographic characteristics provides interesting insight into the racial and 
socioeconomic dynamics of gerrymandering. Findings suggest that school attendance 
zones with more whites tend to be more gerrymandered than school attendance zones 
with more non-white students. Moreover, schools with higher proportions of black and 
Hispanic students tended to be less gerrymandered than schools with fewer non-whites. . 
In addition, school attendance zones with more affluent students are more gerrymandered 
than school attendance zones with more economically disadvantaged students; 
underscoring the socioeconomic, as well as racial, dimension of gerrymandering.  
Inasmuch as irregular boundaries are a symptom of student exchange, the more 
gerrymandered boundaries of whiter and more affluent schools suggest that they are more 
likely to engage in an egregious process of student exchange than schools with more non-
white students. Although this analysis does not provide direct evidence of the effects of 
gerrymandering on school racial/ethnic equity, the finding that gerrymandering is 
particularly severe in high-white, high-socioeconomic status, low-black and low-Hispanic 
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schools is consistent with an exclusionary pattern of student exchange that serves to 
exclude non-white and poor students in favor or whiter and more affluent students. 
Evidence that gerrymandering is higher in areas of the formerly de jure 
segregated South that were never subject to desegregation orders and that 
gerrymandering is more severe in attendance zones with higher proportions of white and 
affluent students are consistent with the narrative of boundary gerrymandering as 
segregative. However, such correlational evidence does not provide evidence of a causal 
relationship. Indeed, it is possible that, unrelated to history of segregation or the racial 
dynamics of student exchange, attendance zone gerrymandering is simply more severe in 
the South and in areas with more whites, and that schools would be equally segregated or 
perhaps more segregated if their boundaries were less gerrymandered. As such, the 
following analysis was conducted to provide a more direct test of the effects of 
gerrymandering on the racial/ethnic composition of schools.  
Phase II: Does School Attendance Zone Gerrymandering Segregate or Integrate? 
To assess the segregative or integrative effects of school attendance zone 
gerrymandering, and to answer research question two, geospatial analyses were 
conducted estimate the extent to which racial/ethnic homogeneity of school attendance 
zones is directly attributable to gerrymandering of educational boundaries. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the effect of gerrymandering on diversity is captured by comparing the 
diversity of actual school attendance zones and school district boundaries to the diversity 
of the “natural” boundaries that would be expected in the absence of gerrymandering, as 
defined by the equal land area circle of Angel and Parent (2011). In addition, for the 
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subset of school attendance zones located in districts for which all school attendance zone 
boundaries were available, comparable analyses were conducted comparing the diversity 
of each current school attendance zone to the diversity of its Voronoi polygonal zone. 
The results of each analysis are presented in turn below.  
Actual School Attendance Zones vs. Equal Land Area Circle Zones 
Table 7 reveals that, on average, school attendance zones are less diverse than 
their corresponding equal land area circle zones across all measures of racial/ethnic 
diversity. As such, on average, the gerrymandering of school attendance zone boundaries 
serves to segregate students by race/ethnicity. The disparity between the diversity of the 
actual school attendance zone and the non-gerrymandered equal land area circle zone is 
particularly large for black-white diversity. Thus, although the gerrymandering of school 
attendance zone boundaries serves to segregate students of all races and ethnicities, 
irregular boundaries are a particularly strong mechanism of segregating blacks and 
whites. As such, school racial/ethnic diversity, particularly between blacks and whites, 
could be significantly improved through attendance re-zoning designed to minimize 
gerrymandering.  
Specifically, school attendance zones are, on average, 3.1% less diverse than their 
corresponding equal land area circle zones in terms of multiracial diversity and 5.3% less 
diverse than their corresponding equal land area circle zones in terms of Hispanic-white 
diversity. As such, school attendance zones would experience small increases in 
multiracial and Hispanic diversity of 3.1% and 5.3%, respectively, if school attendance 
zones were not gerrymandered. The effect for black-white diversity is even more 
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pronounced than the effects for multiracial and Hispanic-white diversity. Indeed, on 
average, school attendance zones are 15.4% less black-white diverse than their 
corresponding equal land area circle zones. As such, school attendance zones would be 
expected to experience substantial 15.4% increases in black-white diversity in the 
absence of gerrymandering. 
Example. Figure 22 below provides an example to illustrate how gerrymandering 
serves to decrease the diversity of a school attendance zone. In the figure, the focal 
school (Fountain Lake Elementary in Hot Springs, Arkansas) is indicated by a black star, 
while the actual school attendance zone is outlined in blue. The “natural”, equal land area 
circle attendance zone circle is outlined in red. In the left panel of the figure, the Census 
blocks in each area are shaded by the percentage of students that are white. In the right 
panel, the Census blocks are shaded by the percentage of students that are black.  
The actual attendance zone (blue region) is extremely homogeneous: its students 
are overwhelmingly white (91%) and a trivial proportion are black (1%). Accordingly, 
the attendance zone has an extremely low black-white diversity value of 0.02, meaning 
that there is only a 2.0% chance that two randomly selected black or white students in 
this district are of different racial-ethnic groups. The “natural” district (red circle), 
however, is much more heterogeneous. While it is still majority-white, it is only 65% 
white and 17% black. Accordingly, the natural district has a much higher diversity index 
of 0.33, meaning that there is a one-third chance that two randomly selected black or 
white students are of different racial-ethnic groups.  
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The maps below illustrate how the gerrymandering of the attendance zone 
boundary facilitates this racial/ethnic disparity. The left panel reveals that the areas 
“zoned into” the actual attendance zone have a high proportion of whites, while the areas 
“zoned out” have a much lower proportion of whites, especially in the smaller, more 
densely-populated blocks. The exclusionary pattern of the gerrymandering is even more 
evident in the right panel, which reveals that blacks are concentrated in the southern areas 
“zoned out” of the attendance zone.  
 
 
 
Variability in Effects. While the results above suggest that, on average, school 
attendance zone gerrymandering has a segregative effect, it should be emphasized that 
these are average effects, and do not apply to all school attendance zones. Indeed, 
gerrymandering actually increases diversity for a slight majority of schools. Although 
gerrymandering reduces the multiracial diversity of 49.6% of school attendance zones 
Figure 22. Example of school attendance zone gerrymandered to reduce diversity (Fountain 
Lake Elementary, Arkansas). School location indicated by black star. Actual school attendance 
zone outlined in blue, “natural” school attendance zone outlined in red circle. Census blocks 
shaded by percentage of students in block that are white (left) and black (left).  
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(4,822 of 9,717), it is associated with increases diversity for 50.4% of school attendance 
zones (4,895). Likewise, while gerrymandering is associated with reductions in black-
white diversity for 49.0% of school attendance zones (4,766), it facilitates increases in 
diversity for 51.0% of school attendance zones. Gerrymandering serves to increase the 
Hispanic-white diversity of a slightly larger proportion of school attendance zones 
(51.2%), it is still associated with decreases in Hispanic-white diversity for 48.8% of 
school attendance zones. While more school attendance zones are gerrymandered to 
integrate than are gerrymandered to segregate, the magnitude of the decreases in diversity 
attributable to gerrymandering are, on average, larger than the increases in diversity 
attributable to gerrymandering. As such, on average, gerrymandering is associated with 
decreases in diversity beyond schools’ equal land area circle zones. 
Although school attendance zone gerrymandering is associated with increases in 
diversity for a small majority of attendance zones in the sample, examination of 
geographic variation reveals that, on average, gerrymandering is associated with 
reductions in diversity for the vast majority of states. As Table 8 and Maps 7 through 9 
demonstrate, on average, school attendance zone gerrymandering serves to reduce 
diversity in all states except Alabama, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Utah, 
and Vermont, where gerrymandering is associated with increases in diversity on average. 
Moreover, only in the District of Columbia and Delaware is school attendance zone 
gerrymandering associated with increases in all three measures in diversity. In Alabama, 
Florida, Utah, and Vermont, school attendance zone gerrymandering has mixed effects – 
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reducing diversity on one dimension (e.g., multiracial), but increasing it on another (e.g., 
black-white).  
Table 8 reveals that school attendance zone gerrymandering has the largest effect 
on school multiracial diversity in Indiana. Indeed, school attendance zones in the Indiana 
sample would be 27% more diverse on average if they were not gerrymandered. 
Gerrymandering has the largest impact on black-white diversity in Arkansas, where many 
attendance zones look similar to that of Fountain Lake Elementary in Hot Springs. 
Indeed, on average, school attendance zones in the Arkansas sample would be 195% 
more diverse, in terms of black-white diversity, if attendance zones were not 
gerrymandered. The effect of gerrymandering on Hispanic-white diversity is strongest in 
the sample of school attendance zones in South Carolina, where Hispanic-white diversity 
would be 51% higher in the absence of gerrymandering.  
Actual School Attendance Zones vs. Voronoi Polygonal Zones 
Table 9 presents results of the analysis assessing the effects of school attendance 
zone gerrymandering on diversity by comparing actual attendance zones to their 
corresponding Voronoi polygonal attendance zones. The Voronoi analysis reveals that 
school attendance zone gerrymandering is, on average, associated with decreases in 
black-white and Hispanic-white diversity and small increases in multiracial diversity. As 
such, on average, school attendance zones would expect to achieve moderate increases in 
black-white diversity, small increases in Hispanic-white diversity, and very small 
decreases in diversity under a more efficient Voronoi rezoning scheme. 
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Specifically, Voronoi school attendance zones are on average 18.3% more black-
white diverse than their corresponding attendance zones. Thus, on average, school 
attendance zones in the sample would experience an 18.3% increase in black-white 
diversity if their districts adopted an optimally-efficient Voronoi polygonal attendance 
rezoning scheme. In addition, Voronoi school attendance zones are on average 7.3% 
more Hispanic-white diverse than their corresponding attendance zones. As such, on 
average, school attendance zones in the sample would experience a 7.3% increase in 
Hispanic-white diversity if their districts adopted an optimally-efficient Voronoi 
polygonal attendance rezoning scheme. However, on average, Voronoi school attendance 
zones are slightly (0.5%) less diverse than their corresponding attendance zones, meaning 
that school attendance zones would experience trivial decreases in multiracial diversity if 
their districts adopted an optimally-efficient Voronoi polygonal attendance rezoning 
scheme.  
Comparison of the results of the Voronoi analysis and the results of the equal land 
area circle analysis from the same sample of districts suggests that the equal land area 
circle analysis may slightly underestimate the segregative effects of gerrymandering on 
black-white and Hispanic-white diversity, but overestimate the integrative effects of 
gerrymandering on multiracial diversity. Indeed, the estimated 18.3% gain in black-white 
diversity under the Voronoi polygonal zoning scheme reflects is higher than the 15.4% 
gain in black-white diversity projected under the equal land area circle analysis. 
Likewise, the estimated 7.3% gain in Hispanic-white diversity under the Voronoi 
polygonal zoning scheme is higher than the 5.3% gain in Hispanic-white diversity 
133 
projected by the equal land area circle analysis. Thus, the Voronoi analysis may 
systematically underestimate the potential benefits of attendance re-zoning on school 
racial/ethnic equity.  
By contrast, the Voronoi analysis suggests that the equal land area circle analysis 
may overestimate the effects of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity and, by 
extension, the potential benefits of re-zoning in terms of multiracial diversity. Indeed, 
whereas the equal land area circle analysis suggests that rezoning would be associated 
with a modest 3.1% increase in diversity, the Voronoi analysis estimates that school 
attendance zones would, on average, experience a small 0.5% decrease in multiracial 
diversity under a Voronoi polygonal rezoning scheme.  
The findings from the Voronoi analysis generally corroborate the findings from 
the analyses above, suggesting that the gerrymandering of school attendance zones serves 
to segregate students by race/ethnicity, particularly segregating whites from blacks and 
Hispanics. Moreover, because they use a more feasible attendance re-zoning scheme than 
the circles in the previous analysis, they provide an even more sound basis to infer that 
re-zoning schools to increase efficiency would also reap benefits in terms of improving 
the diversity of schools.   
Because the Voronoi analysis was conducted on a subsample of schools in the 
SABINS sample located in districts which reported attendance zone data for all schools, 
the results of the Voronoi analysis are not directly comparable to the results of the equal 
land area circle analysis. Thus, to provide a more direct comparison of the magnitude of 
the segregative effect of gerrymandering, the results of the Voronoi sample were 
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compared to the results of the equal land area circle analysis for the subset of schools in 
the Voronoi sample.  
As Table 10 demonstrates, when comparing the results of the Voronoi analysis to 
the results of the equal land area circle for the same sample of schools, the estimates of 
the segregative effect of gerrymandering on black-white diversity from the Voronoi 
analysis are nearly three times as high as the estimates from the equal land area circle 
analysis (18.34% vs. 6.30%). Likewise, the estimates of the segregative effect of 
gerrymandering on Hispanic-white diversity from the Voronoi analysis are more than 
twice as high as the estimates from the equal land area circle analysis (7.30% vs. 2.99%). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that estimates obtained from the equal land area 
circle analysis may underestimate the true segregative effect of gerrymandered 
boundaries on black-white and Hispanic-white diversity. As such, the equal land area 
circle results may also underestimate the potential for re-zoning to improve black-white 
and Hispanic white diversity. 
Findings were somewhat more equivocal for multiracial diversity. Although the 
Voronoi analysis suggests that gerrymandering may have a very small integrative effect 
on diversity, the equal land area circle analysis found a very small segregative effect for 
the same school attendance zones (-0.5% vs. 0.69%). This suggests that the equal land 
area circle analysis may slightly overestimate the segregative effect of gerrymandered 
boundaries on multiracial segregation, as well as the potential for rezoning to improve 
multiracial diversity. 
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Overall, results from the Voronoi analysis corroborate the finding from the equal 
land area circle that, on average, school attendance zone gerrymandering serves to 
segregate students by race/ethnicity. However, it should again be emphasized that these 
are average effects and do not apply to all school attendance zones. As with the equal 
land area circle analysis, gerrymandering actually increases diversity for a slight majority 
of schools in the Voronoi sample across all measures of diversity. Indeed, while 
gerrymandering reduces the multiracial diversity of 45.7% of school attendance zones 
(1,465 of 3,204), it is associated with increases diversity for 54.3% of school attendance 
zones (4,895). Likewise, while gerrymandering is associated with reductions in black-
white diversity for 44.5% of school attendance zones (1,425), it facilitates increases in 
diversity for 55.5% of school attendance zones. However, as with the equal land area 
circle analysis, gerrymandering serves to increase the Hispanic-white diversity of a 
slightly larger proportion of school attendance zones (47.5%), it is still associated with 
decreases in Hispanic-white diversity for 52.5% of school attendance zones. Thus, 
although more school attendance zones are gerrymandered to integrate than are 
gerrymandered to segregate, the magnitude of the decreases in diversity attributable to 
gerrymandering are, on average, larger than the increases in diversity attributable to 
gerrymandering. As such, on average, gerrymandering is associated with decreases in 
diversity beyond schools’ Voronoi polygonal attendance zones.  
Because the Voronoi analysis generally validates the results of the equal land area 
circle analysis, and because the findings from the equal land area circle are generally 
more conservative than those achieved in the Voronoi sample, the measures of the effect 
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of gerrymandering on diversity obtained via the equal land area technique are used for the 
analyses assessing geographic and demographic variation below. In addition, use of the 
equal land area circle measures, which were conducted on the full sample of school 
attendance zones, permits a larger sample size for the regression models assessing 
contextual effects.  
How Does the Effect of School Attendance Zone Gerrymandering on Segregation 
Vary across Geographic and Demographic Contexts?  
To address the third research question, regarding contextual variation in the 
effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on school diversity, three ordinary least 
squares regression models were estimated. In these models, measures of the effect of 
gerrymandering on diversity (i.e., the percentage increase in diversity that would be 
expected in the absence of gerrymandering), were regressed on a variety of school 
geographic and demographic characteristics.  
Three different measures of the effect of gerrymandering on diversity, 
corresponding with the three measures of diversity computed and analyzed above were 
used as the dependent variables for the analysis: 1) the effect of gerrymandering on 
multiracial diversity (Model 1), 2) the effect of gerrymandering on black-white diversity 
(Model 2), and 3) the effect of gerrymandering on Hispanic-white diversity (Model 3). 
As noted previously, because the result of the equal land area circle analysis were 
generally validated by the Voronoi analysis, but provide a much larger sample size and, 
therefore more power to detect a significant effect, the effect of gerrymandering on each 
measure of diversity was computed by comparing the diversity of actual attendance zones 
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to the diversity of their corresponding equal land area circle zones. Each model included 
a variety of categorical geographic variables, including: core-based statistical area type, 
locality, and de jure segregation status.  
To examine whether the pattern of segregative gerrymandering documented in the 
preceding section is being driven by the racial/ethnic characteristics of students in the 
“core zone” (i.e., the area of overlap between the actual attendance zone and the equal 
land area zone), a measure of student race/ethnicity in the core zone was also included in 
the model. For the model predicting the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity, 
a measure of the multiracial diversity of students in the core zone was added to the 
model. For the models predicting the effect of gerrymandering on black-white and 
Hispanic-white diversity, measures of black-white and Hispanic-white diversity were 
included in the models. In addition, for each dependent variable, separate models were 
estimated to examine the relationship between the effect of gerrymandering and the 
proportion of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the core zone. Again, because of 
multicollinearity between these racial/ethnic predictors, coefficients were obtained by 
running separate models. The results of each regression model are shown in Table 11.  
As the penultimate row in each model reveals, the set of explanatory geographic 
and demographic variables explains a small proportion of the variance in the effect of 
school attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity. Indeed, the models explain less than 
3% of the variance in the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity, 1.8% of the 
variance in the effect of school attendance zone gerrymandering on black-white diversity, 
and 1.9% of the variance in the effect of gerrymandering on Hispanic-white diversity. 
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This suggests that variability in the effect of gerrymandering on segregation may be 
better explained by school-specific characteristics not captured in this analysis. However, 
regression analyses did capture some systematic variation in the effect of school 
attendance zone gerrymandering on segregation across geographic and demographic 
contexts. The unique relationship between the effect of school attendance zone 
gerrymandering on segregation and each of the explanatory geographic and demographic 
variables is discussed in detail below. 
Core-Based Statistical Area type. Table 11 reveals that, in addition to having 
more gerrymandered school attendance zones than metropolitan areas, micropolitan 
statistical areas have school attendance zones that are more gerrymandered to segregate 
than metropolitan statistical areas, holding. Holding other school geographic and 
demographic characteristics constant, across all three measures of diversity, school 
attendance zones in micropolitan statistical areas would experience larger increases in 
diversity if their boundaries were not gerrymandered than would attendance zones in 
metropolitan areas.  
Specifically, for multiracial and Hispanic-white diversity, attendance zones 
micropolitan areas are 5.1 and 5.6 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate 
than attendance zones in metropolitan areas. The effect was considerably stronger for 
black-white diversity – attendance zones in micropolitan areas are 25.7 percentage points 
more gerrymandered to segregate blacks from whites than attendance zones in 
metropolitan areas. Indeed, holding other school geographic and demographic factors 
constant, school attendance zones in micropolitan areas are nearly twice as 
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gerrymandered to segregate as school attendance zones in metropolitan areas (expected 
increase in black-white diversity of 24.0% for metropolitan areas vs. 49.2% for 
micropolitan areas). Thus, the role of gerrymandering in perpetuating black-white 
segregation is particularly concerning in smaller urbanized areas.   
Locality. Despite being less segregated than school attendance zones in other 
localities, Table 11 reveals that across all measures of diversity, school attendance zones 
in rural areas are significantly more gerrymandered to segregate than school attendance 
zones in other localities. Moreover, across all measures of diversity, school attendance 
zones in cities are least gerrymandered to segregate than school attendance zone in other 
localities.  
The most notable finding with regards to locality is the pronounced disparity 
between rural areas and other localities in terms of the effect of gerrymandering on black-
white diversity. Indeed, compared to school attendance zones in rural areas, school 
attendance zones in cities, suburbs, and towns are 21.7, 17.5, and 16.9 percentage points 
less gerrymandered to segregate, respectively. As such, the effect of school attendance 
zone boundary gerrymandering on black-white segregation―while problematic in all 
localities―constitutes a peculiar problem of rural areas.  
History of de jure segregation. The previous analysis found that school 
attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South are more gerrymandered than 
school attendance zones in the rest of the U.S. Table 11 demonstrates that while 
attendance zones in the South are more gerrymandered, they are slightly less 
gerrymandered to segregate in terms of multiracial diversity and equally gerrymandered 
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to segregate in terms of black-white and Hispanic-white diversity than school attendance 
zones in the rest of the U.S. Specifically, holding other school characteristics constant, 
schools in the South are 1.4 percentage points less gerrymandered to segregate than 
schools in the rest of the U.S. in terms of multiracial diversity. School attendance zones 
in the South and the rest of the U.S. do not differ in terms of the segregative effect of 
gerrymandering on black-white or Hispanic-white diversity.   
It should be emphasized that although results of this analysis suggest that school 
attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South are no more gerrymandered to 
segregate than attendance zones in the rest of the U.S., they are still gerrymandered to 
segregate. As such, findings fail to corroborate the notion that school attendance zones 
are affirmatively gerrymandered to integrate, as has been suggested by some anecdotal 
and historical accounts of district irregularity resulting from a legacy of busing efforts 
designed to combat residential segregation.  
Core student demographics. Across all measures of diversity, school attendance 
zones with more racially/ethnically homogeneous student populations in their “core” 
zone (i.e., students residing in the area of overlap between the actual school attendance 
zone and the equal land area circle zone) were more gerrymandered to segregate than 
school attendance zones with more diverse cores. This suggests that the extent to which 
school attendance zones “zone out” more racially and ethnically dissimilar students and 
“zone in” more similar students depends upon the level of racial and ethnic homogeneity 
in the core zone. School attendance zones that have more homogeneous cores exhibit 
patterns of student exchange that are more racialized and more segregative, resulting in 
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more racially identifiable schools. By contrast, the student exchange process perpetrated 
by school attendance zones with more heterogeneous cores tend to be less driven by race.  
The first column in Table 11 reveals that school attendance zones with more 
multiracially diverse core zones are less gerrymandered to multiracially segregate than 
school attendance zones with less diverse cores (b = -0.136, p < .001). For example, a 
school attendance zone with a core student population that is very multiracially 
homogeneous, defined as having a multiracial diversity index two standard deviations 
below the mean, would be 15.4 percentage points more diverse if its boundaries were not 
gerrymandered. By contrast, a school attendance zone with a core student population that 
is very multiracially diverse would be 4.4 percentage points more diverse if it was not 
gerrymandered. As such, on average, a school attendance zone with low multiracial 
diversity is 11.0 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate than a school 
attendance zone with high multiracial diversity.  
Likewise, the third column in the table reveals that school attendance zones with 
more Hispanic-white diverse core zones are less gerrymandered to segregate Hispanics 
from whites than school attendance zones with less diverse cores (b = -0.208, p < .001). 
For example, a school attendance zone with a core student population that is very 
Hispanic-white homogeneous, defined as having a Hispanic-white diversity index two 
standard deviations below the mean, would be 19.0 percentage points more diverse if its 
boundaries were not gerrymandered. By contrast, a school attendance zone with a core 
student population that is very Hispanic-white diverse would be 5.8 percentage points 
more diverse if it was not gerrymandered. As such, on average, a school attendance zone 
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with low Hispanic-white diversity is 13.2 percentage points more gerrymandered to 
segregate Hispanics from whites than a school attendance zone with high Hispanic-white 
diversity. 
Interestingly, the second column in the table demonstrates that while school 
attendance zones with more black-white diverse core zones are slightly less 
gerrymandered to segregate blacks from whites than school attendance zones with less 
diverse cores (b = -0.551, p < .001), the effect is considerably weaker than for multiracial 
or Hispanic-white diversity. For example, a school attendance zone with a core student 
population that is very black-white homogeneous, defined as having a black-white 
diversity index two standard deviations below the mean, would be 32.6 percentage points 
more diverse if its boundaries were not gerrymandered. By contrast, a school attendance 
zone with a core student population that is very black-white diverse would be 33.0 
percentage points more diverse if it was not gerrymandered. As such, on average, a 
school attendance zone with low black-white diversity is 0.4 percentage points more 
gerrymandered to segregate than a school attendance zone with high black-white 
diversity. 
Additional analyses, documented in final four lines of the table, were conducted 
examining the specific relationships between the proportion of students of each focal 
racial ethnic group and the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial, black-white and 
Hispanic-white diversity. Analyses revealed that the proportion of whites in the core zone 
was positively related to the segregative effect of gerrymandering on multiracial (b = 
0.027, p < .01) and black-white diversity (b = 0.231, p < .001). Specifically, high-white 
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school attendance zones are 35.4 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate 
blacks from whites than low-white attendance zones.  Moreover, the proportion of blacks 
and Hispanics in a school attendance zone’s core was negatively related to the 
segregative effect of gerrymandering on multiracial and black-white diversity. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that whiter school attendance zones are more 
gerrymandered to segregate while school attendance zones with more blacks and 
Hispanics are less gerrymandered to segregate, providing additional evidence that whites 
are the primary catalyst behind the process of student exchange perpetrated by 
gerrymandered boundaries.  
History of desegregation order. To directly investigate the relationship between 
federal desegregation oversight and the segregative or integrative effects of 
gerrymandering, the subsample of 1,286 school attendance zones for which federal 
district desegregation status information is available via the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights was selected for further analysis. Table 12 presents the results of the regression 
analyses examining the relationship between desegregation status and the effect of 
gerrymandering on segregation, controlling for all covariates above with the exception of 
de jure segregation status (because all districts were in states formerly subject to de jure 
segregation).  
The previous analysis found that school attendance zones in districts never subject 
to desegregation litigation are more gerrymandered than school attendance zones in 
district subject to desegregation orders. The table reveals that school attendance zones in 
districts never subject to desegregation litigation are also more gerrymandered to 
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segregate than school attendance zones in districts subject to desegregation orders, in 
terms of multiracial and black-white diversity.  
School attendance zones in districts never subject to desegregation litigation are 
6.2% and 7.9% less diverse, in terms of multiracial and black-white diversity, than their 
corresponding equal land area circles. However, school attendance zones in districts 
currently or formerly subject to desegregation orders are only 3.4% and 2.1% less diverse 
than their corresponding equal land area circles. On average, schools in districts subject 
to desegregation orders are 2.8 percentage points less gerrymandered to segregate in 
terms of multiracial diversity and 5.8 percentage points less gerrymandered to segregate 
in terms of black-white diversity than schools in districts never subject to federal 
desegregation oversight. This suggests that while schools subject to desegregation orders 
are not affirmatively gerrymandered to integrate, they are significantly less 
gerrymandered to segregate than schools in districts that were never litigated.  
Phase II Summary 
To address the second research question, regarding the segregative or integrative 
effects of gerrymandering on school racial/ethnic composition, the diversity of current 
school attendance zones were compared to the diversity of non-gerrymandered, “natural” 
school attendance zones. Analyses revealed that, on average, school attendance zones are 
more racially/ethnically homogeneous than their natural zones, meaning that the 
gerrymandering of public school attendance zones is largely segregative. Thus, 
irregularities in school attendance zone boundaries serve to facilitate a process of student 
exchange whereby more racially/ethnically similar students are “zoned in” and more 
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dissimilar students are “zoned out”. Although school attendance zone gerrymandering 
segregates students of all racial/ethnic groups from each other, irregularities in school 
attendance zone boundaries play a particularly important role in perpetuating segregation 
between black students and white students.  
The effects of school attendance zone gerrymandering on school diversity vary 
significantly across school geographic and demographic contexts. In addition to having 
attendance zones that are more gerrymandered than those in metropolitan areas, 
micropolitan areas have school attendance zone boundaries that are substantially more 
gerrymandered to segregate, especially blacks from whites. It is not clear why 
micropolitan areas have attendance zones that are more gerrymandered to segregate than 
metropolitan areas; it may be a function of differential levels of income and educational 
attainment between residents of metropolitan and micropolitan areas (Miller, 2009), or of 
the slower growth in micropolitan areas vis-à-vis metropolitan areas (Dunne & Fee, 
2011). Previous research has demonstrated that segregation is higher in micropolitan 
areas than metropolitan areas (Parisi, Lichter & Grice, 2007) – the gerrymandering of 
school attendance zone boundaries may be one important reason for this difference.  
Analyses of the effects of gerrymandering on segregation by locality revealed that 
school attendance zones in rural areas are significantly more gerrymandered to segregate 
than school attendance zones in all other localities. Moreover, the gerrymandering of 
school attendance zone boundaries in rural areas serves as a particularly strong 
mechanism of segregating blacks and whites. Although the finding that segregative 
school attendance zone gerrymandering is a particular problem of rural areas may be 
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somewhat counterintuitive, it should be emphasized that while these are school 
attendance zones in schools coded as a “rural” locality, they are still located within the 
confines of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. As such, they generally 
represent schools in fringe, exurban, and bedroom-developing areas, where new schools 
may be opening to accommodate continued outward migration of residents, especially 
non-whites, from central cities and inner suburbs. Thus, their boundaries may be in flux, 
and irregularities may reflect responses to rapidly changing demographics. Moreover, the 
boundaries of schools in outlying areas with more recent population booms, which were 
historically racially homogeneous, may not have been subject to as much scrutiny as 
older areas that are historically more diverse.   
Results indicate that school attendance zones in districts currently under 
desegregation order or formerly subject to desegregation order are substantially less 
gerrymandered overall and are less gerrymandered to segregate than school attendance 
zones that were never subject to federal desegregation litigation or oversight. In addition, 
although school attendance zones in the formerly de jure segregated South are more 
gerrymandered overall than attendance zones in the rest of the U.S., they are less 
gerrymandered to segregate than school attendance zones in the rest of the U.S. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the presence of desegregation orders and federal 
oversight has served to inhibit the gerrymandering in the South, resulting in more regular 
boundaries. Moreover, to the extent that boundaries in districts subject to desegregation 
orders have been manipulated to deviate from compactness, they have had a much 
smaller effect on racial/ethnic diversity, suggesting that desegregation orders may have 
147 
mitigated the segregative effects of gerrymandering on school racial/ethnic equity 
observed elsewhere in the U.S. 
Analyses also provided insight into the racial dynamics of exclusion manifest in 
gerrymandered school attendance zone boundaries. Findings reveal that more 
homogeneous attendance zones tend to be more gerrymandered to segregate, using 
gerrymandered boundaries to “zone out” more racially and ethnically dissimilar students 
and “zone in” similar students. As such, as a result of gerrymandering, schools become 
even more racially identifiable as schools with more whites become even whiter, and 
schools with more non-whites become even less white. While more diverse attendance 
zones are also gerrymandered to segregate, the effects are considerably weaker, 
exhibiting patterns of student exchange that are less driven by race. In addition, the 
finding that school attendance zones with higher proportions of whites are significantly 
more gerrymandered to segregate than school attendance zones with fewer whites, while 
school attendance zones with higher proportions of blacks and Hispanics are less 
gerrymandered to segregate suggests that white populations may be driving the process of 
gerrymandering.  
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CHAPTER 5: SCHOOL DISTRICT GERRYMANDERING 
In this chapter, I address the third and fourth research questions of the study, 
reporting the results of two phases of analysis on school district gerrymandering. In the 
first phase of analysis, I address the third research question, employing complementary 
measures of areal and perimeter compactness to document the severity and prevalence of 
the gerrymandering of public school districts. I compare measures of school district 
gerrymandering to measures of school attendance zone gerrymandering to evaluate the 
relative severity of and the association between school attendance zone and school 
district gerrymandering. In addition, I analyze how attendance zone boundary 
gerrymandering varies across school district geographic and demographic contexts.  
In the second phase of analysis, I address the fourth research question, comparing 
the diversity of current school district boundaries to the diversity of “natural”, non-
gerrymandered school districts to estimate the segregative or integrative effect of district 
gerrymandering on the racial/ethnic diversity of school districts. Based on this analysis, I 
estimate how much school district diversity would be enhanced or reduced via 
redistricting to minimize gerrymandering. In addition, I examine how the effect of 
gerrymandering on district diversity varies across school geographic and demographic 
contexts. In particular, I attend to how the racial and ethnic characteristics of students in a 
school district’s “core” (i.e., students residing in the portion of the actual school district 
that were not “zoned in” via gerrymandering) drive the process of student exchange. The 
results of both phases of analysis are presented below.  
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Phase I: How Gerrymandered are School Districts? 
To address the third research question, regarding the severity and prevalence of 
school district gerrymandering, measures of compactness were calculated for all 9,796 
school attendance zones in the analytic sample identified in Chapter 3. To ensure that 
examination of gerrymandering attended to irregularities in both perimeter and area, the 
analysis employed the complementary Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper indices, which 
quantify compactness in terms of irregularity of perimeter and area, respectively, which 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
The mean Schwartzberg index for school districts is 0.594, meaning that the 
perimeter of a school districts is, on average, 59.4% of the perimeter of a circular district 
with equal area. The mean Polsby-Popper index for school districts is 0.374, meaning that 
the area of a school district is, on average, 37.4% of the area of a circular district with 
equal perimeter. As with school attendance zones, Polsby-Popper and Schwartzberg 
indices for school district compactness were highly correlated (R = 0.983, p < .001).  
Because interpretation of these spatial summary indices is not intuitive, Figure 23 
below provides a frame of reference for interpretation, with examples of school districts 
with very low, low, average, high, and very high levels of compactness. Low and high 
compactness school districts were selected at approximately one standard deviation 
below and above the mean in terms of both areal and perimeter compactness, while very 
low and very high compactness school districts were selected at approximately two 
standard deviations below and above the mean. Because areal and perimeter compactness 
150 
were so highly correlated, only one school district was selected to illustrate each level of 
compactness. 
 
\ 
 
 
 
 
The Sweet Home School District 55 in Sweet Home, Oregon (center) represents 
an “average” school district, in terms of both its areal and perimeter compactness. As the 
figure reveals, Sweet Home’s district boundary fairly regular, with one major 
protuberance and some border irregularities, particularly on its western boundary. The 
Schwartzberg index for Sweet Home School district is 0.602, slightly higher than the 
national average of 0.594, meaning that the perimeter of the district 60.2% of the 
perimeter of a circular district with equal area. Likewise, the Polsby-Popper index for 
Sweet Home is 0.362, slightly lower than the national average of 0.374, meaning that the 
area of the district is 36.2% of the area of a circular district with equal perimeter.  
The West Windsor-Plainsboro Regional School District in New Jersey (second 
from left) represents a “high compactness” school district. While West Windsor-
Figure 23. Examples of school districts of very high, high, average, low, and very low compactness and 
their corresponding compactness values.  
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Plainsboro’s boundaries have a number of protuberances and concavities, they are 
relatively small, and the district’s perimeter is much smoother than Sweet Home’s. The 
Schwartzberg index for West Windsor-Plainsboro is 0.770, while its Polsby-Popper index 
is 0.592. Thus, West Windsor-Plainsboro Regional School District is 16.8 percentage 
points more compact in terms of perimeter and 23.0 percentage points more compact in 
terms of area than an average district, as represented by Sweet Home School District.   
The Auburn Public School District in Auburn, Massachusetts (left) represents a 
“very high compactness” school district. Auburn’s district shape is almost perfectly 
polygonal, with little elongation, no concavities, and no protuberance. The Schwartzberg 
index for Auburn is 0.931, while its Polsby-Popper index is 0.867. Thus, Auburn is 32.9 
percentage points more compact in terms of perimeter and 50.5 percentage points more 
compact in terms of area than an average district, as represented by Sweet Home School 
District. 
The Indianapolis Public Schools district (second from right) represents a “low 
compactness” district. Indianapolis’s district boundary is highly irregular, with numerous 
concavities, protuberances, and discontiguities. The Schwartzberg index for Indianapolis 
is 0.353, while its Polsby-Popper index is 0.125. Thus, the Indianapolis Public Schools 
district is 24.9 percentage points less compact in terms of perimeter and 23.7 percentage 
points less compact in terms of area than an average district, as represented by Sweet 
Home School District.  
The Birmingham City School District in Birmingham, Alabama (right) represents 
a “very low compactness” district. Birmingham’s district boundary is exceedingly 
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irregular, with a crenellated perimeter and narrow isthmuses connecting far-flung areas. 
Accordingly, the Schwartzberg index for Birmingham is an exceedingly low 0.094, while 
its Polsby-Popper index is 0.009. Thus, Birmingham is 50.8 percentage points less 
compact in terms of perimeter and 35.3 percentage points less compact in terms of area 
than an average district, as represented by Sweet Home School District.  
Readers may find it helpful to refer to this figure and the percentage-point 
differences in compactness between each of the example districts to assist in visualization 
and interpretation of the magnitude of each of the contextual effects discussed below.  
How Is School District Gerrymandering Related to School Attendance Zone 
Gerrymandering? 
Direct comparison of areal and perimeter measures of compactness for school 
attendance zone and school district gerrymandering reveals that, on average, school 
attendance zones are slightly more gerrymandered than school attendance zones. The 
mean Schwartzberg index for school districts is 0.594, while the mean for school 
attendance zones is 0.587. Thus, on average, school attendance zones are 0.7 percentage 
points less compact in terms of perimeter than school districts. Likewise, the Polsby-
Popper for school districts is 0.374, while the mean for school attendance zones is 0.363, 
meaning that, on average, school attendance zones are 1.1 percentage points less compact 
in terms of area than school districts.  
To provide a more direct comparison between the compactness of school 
attendance zones and the compactness of their containing districts, measures of 
compactness for each school attendance zone “normalized” by the compactness of their 
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containing district. Using the procedure outlined in Azavea (2010), school attendance 
zone compactness values were divided by their corresponding school district 
compactness values to yield the normalized compactness index. The normalized index 
takes a value of greater than one when school attendance zones are more compact than 
their containing school districts and a value of less than one when school attendance 
zones are less compact than their containing school districts. The index has a value of one 
for districts comprised of a single attendance zone; however, these districts were 
previously excluded from the analytic sample.  
Table 13 reveals that the mean of the normalized Schwartzberg index is 1.274, 
meaning that on average school attendance zones are 1.274 times more compact, in terms 
of area, than their containing school districts. Likewise, the mean of the normalized 
Polsby-Popper index is 2.070, meaning that on average school attendance zones are 2.070 
times more compact, in terms of perimeter, than their containing school districts. 
Moreover, the majority of school attendance zones are less gerrymandered than their 
containing district: Excluding the districts with only one school attendance zone, 37.8% 
school attendance zones (n = 3,075) are less compact (i.e., more gerrymandered) than 
their containing district, while 62.2% of school attendance zones (n = 5,068) are more 
compact (i.e., less gerrymandered) than their containing districts.  
To determine how the gerrymandering of boundaries at the district level is related 
the gerrymandering of boundaries at the school level, measures of school district 
compactness were correlated with measures of school attendance zone compactness 
(normalized to control for the effect of district boundaries). Analysis revealed that the 
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gerrymandering of school district boundaries is positively related to the gerrymandering 
of school attendance zone boundaries (Schwartzberg R = 0.341, p < .001; Polsby-Popper 
R = 0.191, p < .001). As such, more gerrymandered school districts have more 
gerrymandered school attendance zones, while more compact school districts have more 
compact school attendance zones. 
How Does School District Gerrymandering Vary Across Geographic and 
Demographic Contexts? 
To assess how school district gerrymandering varies across district geographic 
and demographic contexts, compactness indices were regressed on a variety of district 
characteristics. As with the school attendance zone analysis, six ordinary least squares 
regression models were estimated regressing the Schwartzberg (Models 1 through 3) and 
Polsby-Popper (Models 4 through 6) indices on a variety of explanatory variables 
capturing district geographic and demographic characteristics.  
Each model contained categorical geographic variables capturing core-based 
statistical area type and school district locality. In addition, each model contained 
continuous district-level demographic variables, including: student eligibility for free- 
and reduced-price lunch, student race/ethnicity, and a log-transformed measure of student 
population, used as a control variable. Because the proportion of whites in a district is a 
strong predictor of the proportion of students that are Hispanic (R = -0.733) and, to a 
lesser extent, black (R = -0.546), demographic predictors were multicollinear when added 
to regression models simultaneously. Indeed, regression analysis yielded VIF values 
greater than 5.0 for percent white and percent Hispanic predictors, exceeding the 
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recommended VIF value suggested by Rogerson (2001) (i.e., White VIF = 9.24, Hispanic 
VIF = 5.21). The VIF value of black segregation was also relatively high (Black VIF = 
3.58). As such, the effects of each racial/ethnic predictor were estimated via separate 
models to avoid statistical problems associated with multicollinearity. Models 1 and 4 
included the proportion of students that are white, while Models 2 and 5 included the 
proportion of students that are black, and Models 3 and 6 included the proportion of 
students that are Hispanic. Each model also contained a measure of log-transformed 
student population as a control variable. Table 14 reports the results of the regression 
models for school district compactness. 
As the penultimate row in each model reveals, the set of explanatory geographic 
and demographic variables explains a fairly small 4.3% to 5.1% of the variance in both 
the Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper indices of compactness. This means that less than 
5% of the irregularity in a school district’s boundaries (i.e., the extent to which each 
school district deviates from a circle) may be explained by the district’s core-based 
statistical area type, locality, history of de jure segregation, and student racial/ethnic and 
socioeconomic characteristics. The models containing the percent black demographic 
predictor explained significantly less variance than the models containing the percent 
white and Hispanic demographic predictors. Overall, the relatively small effect sizes for 
the models suggest that there is extreme variability in the gerrymandering of school 
districts that is not a function of the model predictors. As such, it may be better explained 
by other characteristics of the district, state, or region not captured in this analysis. 
However, regression analyses did capture some systematic variation in the 
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gerrymandering of school attendance zones across geographic and demographic contexts. 
The unique relationship between school district gerrymandering and each of the 
explanatory geographic and demographic variables is discussed in detail below. Unless 
otherwise noted, interpretation of contextual effects below is based on coefficients from 
Models 1 and 4, which contain the student percent white demographic predictor. 
Core-Based Statistical Area type. As with school attendance zones, school 
districts in more populous metropolitan statistical areas are slightly more compact on 
average than school districts in micropolitan statistical areas, holding other district 
geographic and demographic characteristics constant. On average, school districts in 
smaller micropolitan areas are more gerrymandered, in terms of both perimeter and areal 
indentation, than school districts in metropolitan areas, even after controlling for the size 
of the district population.  
Examination of the coefficients in the regression models reveals that the disparity 
in school district gerrymandering between metropolitan and micropolitan areas is 
relatively small. Specifically, an average micropolitan school district has a Schwartzberg 
index of 0.576, while average metropolitan school district has a Schwartzberg value of 
0.590. Thus, school districts in metropolitan areas are 1.4 percentage points more 
compact in terms of perimeter than districts in micropolitan areas. Likewise, an average 
micropolitan school district has a Polsby-Popper index of 0.355, while the average 
metropolitan school district has a Polsby-Popper value of 0.368. Thus, school districts in 
metropolitan areas are 1.3 percentage points more compact in terms of area than 
micropolitan school districts.  
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Locality. Table 14 demonstrates that school districts in suburbs are substantially 
more compact than school districts in all other localities, after controlling for other 
district geographic and demographic characteristics. Specifically, in terms of perimeter 
(i.e., Schwartzberg), school districts in suburbs are 3.8 percentage points more compact 
than those in rural areas, 5.3 percentage points more compact than those in towns, and 6.1 
percentage points more compact than those in cities. The disparity between suburbs and 
other localities is even more pronounced in terms of area (i.e., Polsby-Popper), school 
districts in suburbs are 4.7 percentage points more compact than those in rural areas and 
6.3 percentage points more compact than those in towns and cities. School districts in 
rural areas are less compact than suburbs, but slightly more compact than school districts 
in cities and towns. School districts in cities are slightly more gerrymandered than those 
towns in terms of perimeter, but do not differ significantly from school districts in towns 
in terms of area. Taken together, findings suggest a clear geographic division between 
suburbs and all other areas in terms of school district gerrymandering, whereby school 
districts in suburbs are uniquely more compact than districts in all other areas.  
 Free- and reduced-price lunch. Although school attendance zone compactness 
was found to be positively related to the proportion of students in a school that qualify for 
free- and reduced-price lunch, school district compactness is negatively related to the 
proportion of economically disadvantaged students in models controlling for the 
proportion of students in a district that are white (Schwartzberg b = -0.046, p < .001; 
Polsby-Popper b = -0.065, p < .001) and Hispanic (Schwartzberg b = -0.026, p < .001; 
Polsby-Popper b = -0.038, p < .001). School district compactness is unrelated to the 
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proportion of students in a district that qualify for free- and reduced-price lunch in the 
models controlling for the proportion of students that are black (Schwartzberg b = 0.002, 
ns; Polsby-Popper b = -0.012, ns). 
As such, after controlling for the proportion of students that are white and 
Hispanic, districts with higher proportions of economically disadvantaged students tend 
to be slightly less compact than more affluent districts. For example, affluent districts, 
defined as those with a proportion of students qualifying for free- or reduced-price lunch 
that is two standard deviations below the mean for the sample, would have an expected 
Polsby-Popper index that is 4 percentage points more compact, in terms of area, than a 
disadvantaged district. Likewise, affluent districts are 2.4 percentage points more 
compact, in terms of perimeter, than disadvantaged districts. Thus, although poorer 
school attendance zones are less gerrymandered than more affluent attendance zones, 
poorer school districts are more gerrymandered than more affluent districts. 
Student race/ethnicity. As with school attendance zones, school district 
compactness is negatively related to the proportion of whites in a district and positively 
related to the proportion of Hispanics, controlling for other district geographic and 
demographic characteristics. However, school district compactness is unrelated to the 
proportion of blacks in a district. Models 1 and 3 reveal that districts with higher 
proportions of whites tend to be less compact than districts with higher proportions of 
non-whites (Schwartzberg b = -0.066, p < .001; Polsby-Popper b = -0.079, p < .001). For 
example, a high-white district, defined as a district with a proportion of whites that is two 
standard deviations above the mean, would have an expected Schwartzberg index that is 
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7.4 percentage points less compact, in terms of perimeter, than a low-white district. 
Likewise, high-white districts are 8.8 percentage points less compact, in terms of area, 
than low-white districts.  
By contrast, Models 3 and 6 reveal that school district compactness is positively 
related to the proportion of Hispanics in a district, controlling for other district 
geographic and demographic characteristics (Schwartzberg b = 0.072, p < .001; Polsby-
Popper b = 0.079, p < .001).  Thus, districts with fewer Hispanic students tend to be more 
gerrymandered than districts with more Hispanics. For example, a high-Hispanic school 
district, defined as a district with a proportion of Hispanics that is two standard deviations 
above the mean, would have an expected Schwartzberg index that is 5.1 percentage 
points less compact in terms of perimeter than a low-Hispanic district. Likewise, high-
Hispanic districts are, on average, 5.6 percentage points less compact in terms of area 
than low-Hispanic districts. 
Phase I Summary 
Descriptive analyses documenting the severity and prevalence of school district 
gerrymandering revealed a high degree of variability in the gerrymandering of school 
districts. While some district boundaries are remarkably compact, others are exceedingly 
gerrymandered, exhibiting severe violations of both areal and perimeter compactness. On 
average, school districts have a perimeter that is 58.7% of the perimeter of a circular zone 
with equal area and an area that is 36.3% of the area of a circular zone with equal 
perimeter. The example of Sweet Home School District, which is somewhat regular, with 
one major protuberance and some border irregularities, represents an “average” 
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attendance zone for U.S. school districts. Analyses comparing the compactness of school 
district and school attendance zone boundaries reveal that school districts are slightly less 
gerrymandered overall than school attendance zones. In addition, school attendance zones 
are on average substantially more gerrymandered than the districts they comprise.  
School district gerrymandering is positively related to school attendance zone 
gerrymandering, such that more gerrymandered districts have more gerrymandered 
school attendance zones, and more compact school districts have more compact school 
attendance zones. This suggests that although processes for establishing and modifying 
school attendance zone and school district boundaries differ substantially―with the 
former subject to frequent periodic review and change under the authority of the district, 
and the latter more stable and subject to review at the state level―in practice, these 
different processes yield similar results (i.e., school districts and attendance zones with 
correlated levels of gerrymandering). Although it is unclear why this might be the case, it 
is possible that the establishment of school attendance zone and school district boundaries 
are both governed by state or other municipal statutes, policies, or practices that enforce 
similar standards of permissiveness with regards to boundary irregularity. However, it is 
also possible that the effect is a spurious artifact of the coterminity between school 
attendance zone boundaries and the boundaries of their containing districts. To the extent 
that the normalized measure of school attendance zone compactness does not adequately 
control for the compactness of school attendance zone boundaries, estimates of the 
association between school district and attendance zone gerrymandering may be inflated.  
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Analyses revealed systematic variation the gerrymandering of school districts 
across geographic contexts, although the magnitude of these effects is fairly small. As 
with attendance zones, gerrymandering of district boundaries is more severe in smaller, 
micropolitan areas than in more populous metropolitan areas. This may reflect long-
standing differences in the demographic characteristics and attitudes of residents of 
micropolitan areas which, as noted previously, tend to have lower levels of income and 
educational attainment than residents of metropolitan areas (Miller, 2009).  
Results also indicate a clear geographic division between suburbs and all other 
areas in terms of school district gerrymandering, whereby school districts in suburbs are 
uniquely more compact than districts in all other areas. Given the stability of district 
boundaries over time, it is possible that the relative compactness of suburban school 
districts may be attributable to the fact that many suburban districts were established in 
racially homogeneous white enclaves created by whites fleeing from urban cores in the 
post-World War II era. Because they were established in areas with little racial/ethnic 
diversity, meaning that there were few racially and ethnically dissimilar students to 
“exchange”, manipulation of district boundaries in suburban areas may have been 
minimal.  
In addition, analysis of the relationship between school district compactness and 
district demographic characteristics provides some insight into the racial dynamics of 
gerrymandering. Findings suggest that school districts with more whites tend to be more 
gerrymandered than school districts with more non-white students. Moreover, schools 
with higher proportions of Hispanic students tend to be less gerrymandered than schools 
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with fewer Hispanics. Although previous research has focused on how individuals sort 
themselves across district boundaries, the finding that district boundaries irregularity is 
related to district racial composition suggests that the irregularity of boundaries 
themselves plays a role in facilitating racial and ethnic homogeneity beyond Tiebout 
sorting, a proposition that will be more directly evaluated in the following analysis. 
Interestingly, while more affluent school attendance zones are more 
gerrymandered than school attendance zones with more economically disadvantaged 
students, more affluent school districts are less gerrymandered than school districts with 
more economically disadvantaged students. Moreover, it is especially surprising in light 
of the finding that school districts with higher proportions of whites are more 
gerrymandered than school districts with more non-whites. It is possible that the 
discrepant findings for socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity suggest that race/ethnicity 
is a stronger impetus for gerrymandering of school district boundaries than 
socioeconomic status. Alternately, it is possible that the discrepancy is a result of 
geographic differences in the distribution of affluence and disadvantage across localities. 
Indeed, it is conceivable that more affluent school districts tend to be located in areas 
with more compact districts, such as suburban areas, even as those areas have become 
more diverse over time. Conversely, less affluent school districts may be located in 
localities with more gerrymandered districts, such as rural areas, towns and cities, which 
have remained relatively racially/ethnically homogeneous.   
Evidence that district gerrymandering is related to school district demographics is 
consistent with the narrative of educational boundary gerrymandering as segregative. 
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However, such correlational evidence does not provide evidence of a causal relationship. 
Indeed, it is possible that, school districts with more whites simply happen to have more 
gerrymandered boundaries, but that districts would be equally or more segregated if their 
boundaries were less gerrymandered. As such, the following analysis was conducted to 
more directly assess the extent to which gerrymandered school district boundaries serve 
to segregate or integrate students by race/ethnicity.  
Phase II: Does School District Gerrymandering Segregate or Integrate? 
To address the third research question, the diversity of each current school district 
was compared to the diversity of its non-gerrymandered equal land area circle district to 
estimate the effect of gerrymandering on district diversity. Table 15 below presents the 
results of the analysis assessing the effects of school district gerrymandering on district 
diversity. The top panel reveals that, as with school attendance zones, school districts are 
significantly less diverse than their corresponding equal land area circle, suggesting that 
school district gerrymandering serves to segregate students by race/ethnicity. As such, 
school districts would experience increases across all three measures of multiracial 
segregation if gerrymandering were eliminated. As with school attendance zones, the 
disparity between the diversity of actual school districts and the non-gerrymandered 
equal land area circle districts is particularly large for black-white diversity. Thus, 
although the gerrymandering of school district boundaries serves to segregate students of 
all races and ethnicities, irregular boundaries are a particularly strong mechanism of 
segregating blacks and whites. As such, district racial/ethnic diversity, particularly 
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between blacks and whites, could be significantly improved through attendance re-zoning 
designed to minimize gerrymandering.  
Specifically, school districts are, on average, 3.1% less diverse than their 
corresponding equal land area districts in terms of multiracial diversity and 4.8% less 
diverse than their corresponding equal land area districts in terms of Hispanic-white 
diversity. As such, school districts would be 3.1% more multiracially diverse and 4.8% 
more Hispanic-white diverse if their boundaries were not gerrymandered. As with school 
attendance zones, school district gerrymandering has a particularly strong effect on black-
white diversity. Indeed, on average, school districts are 13.6% less black-white diverse 
than their corresponding equal land area districts. As such, school districts would be 
13.6% more black-white diverse if their boundaries were not gerrymandered.  
Example. Figure 24 below provides an example to illustrate how gerrymandering 
serves to decrease the diversity of a school district. In the figure, the focal school district 
(Whitesboro Central School District, New York) is outlined in blue, with the geographic 
centroid of the district indicated by a black star. The “natural” school district is outlined 
in red. In the left panel of the figure, the Census blocks in each area are shaded by the 
percentage of students that are white. In the right panel, the Census blocks are shaded by 
the percentage of students that are black.  
The actual school district (blue region) is fairly homogeneous: its student 
population is overwhelmingly white (90%), and only 3% black. Accordingly, the 
attendance zone has an extremely low black-white diversity value of 0.05, meaning that 
there is only a 1 in 20 chance that two randomly selected black or white students in this 
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district are of different racial/ethnic groups. The “natural” district (red circle), however, is 
much more heterogeneous. While it is still majority-white, it is only 52% white and 17% 
black. Accordingly, the natural district has a much higher diversity index of 0.37, 
meaning that there is a 37% chance that two randomly selected black or white students 
are of different racial-ethnic groups.  
The maps below illustrate how the gerrymandering of the school district boundary 
facilitates this racial/ethnic disparity. The left panel reveals that the areas “zoned into” the 
actual district have a high proportion of whites, while the areas “zoned out” have a much 
lower proportion of whites, especially in the smaller, more densely-populated blocks. 
Again, the exclusionary pattern of the gerrymandering is even more evident in the right 
panel, which reveals that blacks are concentrated in the southern areas “zoned out” of the 
school district. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Example of school district gerrymandered to reduce diversity (Whitesboro Central 
School District, New York). School district centroid indicated by black star. Actual school 
district boundary outlined in blue, “natural” school district outlined in red circle. Census 
blocks shaded by percentage of students in block that are white (left) and black (left).  
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Variability in effects. While the results above suggest that, on average, school 
district serves to segregate students by race/ethnicity, it should again be emphasized that 
these are average effects. Indeed, for a substantial number of school districts, existing 
gerrymandered boundaries are less diverse than their corresponding equal land area circle 
districts. While gerrymandering is associated with decreases in the multiracial diversity 
of 52.6% of school districts (4,426 of 8,421), it is associated with increases diversity for 
47.4% of school districts (3,995). Likewise, while gerrymandering is associated with 
reductions in black-white diversity for 53.0% of school districts (4,210), it facilitates 
integration for 47.0% of districts. Gerrymandering serves to decrease the Hispanic-white 
diversity of 54.4% of school districts, but is associated with higher levels of diversity in 
45.6% of districts.  
However, while school district gerrymandering is associated with higher levels of 
diversity for a large minority of school districts in the sample, examination of geographic 
variation reveals that, on average, gerrymandering is associated with reductions in 
diversity for the majority of states. As Table 16 and Maps 10 through 12 demonstrate, 
school district gerrymandering serves to reduce diversity in all states except Alaska (not 
shown), California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, 
Virginia, Washington and West Virginia. Moreover, only in Illinois, Nevada, Virginia, 
and Delaware (which only has two school districts) is gerrymandering associated with 
increases in all three measures of diversity. In Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Idaho, Oregon, Washington and West Virginia, school district gerrymandering is 
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associated with lower levels of diversity on one dimension (i.e., multiracial), but higher 
levels on another (e.g., Hispanic-white).  
Table 16 reveals that school district gerrymandering serves to reduce multiracial 
diversity most in Wyoming and Utah. Indeed, school districts in these states would be 
16.7% and 17.1% more diverse, respectively, on average if district boundaries were not 
gerrymandered. Gerrymandering has the largest impact on black-white diversity in 
Wisconsin. Indeed, on average, school districts in Wisconsin would be 73.3% more 
diverse, in terms of black-white diversity, if district boundaries were not gerrymandered. 
Gerrymandering serves to decrease Hispanic-white diversity most in Utah, where 
Hispanic-white diversity would be 27.6% higher in the absence of gerrymandering.  
How Does the Effect of School District Gerrymandering on Segregation Vary across 
Geographic and Demographic Contexts?  
To examine contextual variation in the effects of school district gerrymandering 
on school district diversity, three ordinary least squares regression models were 
estimated. In these models, the percentage increase in diversity that would be expected in 
the absence of gerrymandering was regressed on a variety of school district geographic 
and demographic characteristics. As with school attendance zones, three different 
measures of diversity were used to calculate the dependent variables for the analysis: 1) 
the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity (Model 1), 2) the effect of 
gerrymandering on black-white diversity (Model 2), and 3) the effect of gerrymandering 
on Hispanic-white diversity (Model 3). Model predictors included categorical geographic 
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variables capturing core-based statistical area type and locality code. In addition, each 
model included a measure of the size of the district student population.  
To examine how the racial/ethnic characteristics of students in the “core district” 
(i.e., the area of overlap between the actual school district and the equal land area district) 
are related to the segregative effect of gerrymandering, measures of student race/ethnicity 
in the core district were also included in the models. For the model predicting the effect 
of gerrymandering on multiracial diversity, a measure of the multiracial diversity of 
students in the core district was added to the model. For the models predicting the effect 
of gerrymandering on black-white and Hispanic-white diversity, measures of black-white 
and Hispanic-white diversity were included in the models. In addition, for each 
dependent variable, separate models were estimated to examine the relationship between 
the effect of gerrymandering and the proportion of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the 
core district. Again, because of multicollinearity between these racial/ethnic predictors, 
coefficients were obtained by running separate models. The results of each regression 
model are shown in Table 17. 
As the penultimate row in each model reveals, the set of explanatory geographic 
and demographic variables explains a very small proportion of the variance in the effect 
of school district gerrymandering on diversity. Indeed, the models explain less than 2% 
of the variance in the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial and Hispanic-white 
diversity and less than 1% of the variance in the effect of gerrymandering on black-white 
diversity. This suggests that variability in the effect of school district gerrymandering on 
segregation may be better explained at by district-specific characteristics not captured in 
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this analysis. However, regression analyses did capture some systematic variation in the 
effect of school district gerrymandering on segregation across geographic and 
demographic contexts. The unique relationship between the effect of school district 
gerrymandering on segregation and each of the explanatory geographic and demographic 
variables is discussed in detail below. 
Core-Based Statistical Area type. In addition to having school district 
boundaries that are more gerrymandered than metropolitan areas, micropolitan statistical 
areas have school districts that are more gerrymandered to segregate, in terms of 
multiracial and Hispanic-white diversity, than those in metropolitan statistical areas. 
Holding other school geographic and demographic characteristics constant, school 
districts in micropolitan areas are 6.6 percentage points less multiracially diverse than 
their corresponding equal land area circle districts. By contrast, school districts in 
metropolitan areas are 5.0 percentage points less multiracially diverse than their 
corresponding equal land area circle districts. Thus, on average, school districts in 
micropolitan areas are 1.6 percentage points more gerrymandered to multiracially 
segregate than districts in metropolitan areas. Likewise, in terms of Hispanic-white 
diversity, school districts in micropolitan areas are 9.4 percentage points less racially 
diverse than their corresponding equal land area circle districts; school districts in 
metropolitan areas are 7.1 percentage points less racially diverse than their corresponding 
equal land area circle districts. Thus, on average, school districts in micropolitan areas are 
2.3 percentage points more gerrymandered to multiracially segregate than districts in 
metropolitan areas.  
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Interestingly, attendance zones in micropolitan areas were significantly more 
gerrymandered to segregate blacks from whites than attendance zones in metropolitan 
areas, core-based statistical area status was unrelated to the effect of school district 
gerrymandering on black-white diversity. The finding that school district boundaries 
serve to perpetuate black-white segregation in both larger and smaller urban areas 
underscores the geographic universality of gerrymandering as a mechanism of 
segregating blacks from whites.   
Locality. As with school attendance zones, across all measures of diversity, 
school districts in rural areas are more gerrymandered to segregate than districts in other 
localities, despite having relatively compact boundaries. School districts in suburbs are 
slightly less gerrymandered to segregate than those in rural areas, while school districts in 
towns are in turn slightly less gerrymandered to segregate than those in suburbs. School 
districts in cities are least gerrymandered to segregate across all measures of diversity.  
For example, in terms of black-white diversity, school districts in rural areas are 
7.5 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate than school districts in suburbs, 
14.5 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate than school districts in towns, 
and 21.9 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate than school districts in 
cities. Thus, although school districts in suburbs were significantly less gerrymandered 
than school districts in other localities, to the extent that they are gerrymandered, they are 
remarkably effective in serving to segregate. 
Core student demographics. Across all measures of diversity, school districts 
with more racially/ethnically diverse student populations in their “core” district (i.e., 
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students residing in the area of overlap between the actual school district and the equal 
land area circle district) are more gerrymandered to segregate than school districts with 
more homogeneous cores. This suggests that the extent to which school district 
boundaries serve to “zone out” more racially and ethnically dissimilar students and “zone 
in” more similar students depends upon the level of racial and ethnic homogeneity in the 
core district. Contrary to patterns observed for school attendance zones, school districts 
that have more diverse cores exhibit patterns of student exchange that are more racialized 
and more segregative, resulting in more racially identifiable districts and facilitating 
between-district segregation. By contrast, the student exchange process perpetrated by 
school districts with more homogeneous cores tends to be less driven by race.  
The first column in Table 17 reveals that school districts with more multiracially 
diverse cores are more gerrymandered to multiracially segregate than school districts 
with less diverse cores (b = 0.183, p < .05). For example, a school district with a core 
student population that is very multiracially diverse, defined as having a multiracial 
diversity index two standard deviations below the mean, would be 13.6 percentage points 
more diverse if its boundaries were not gerrymandered. By contrast, a school district with 
a core student population that is very multiracially homogeneous would be 0.4 percentage 
points less diverse if it was not gerrymandered. As such, on average, a school district 
with high multiracial diversity is 14.0 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate 
than a school district with low multiracial diversity.  
Likewise, the second column in the table reveals that school districts with more 
black-white diverse cores are more gerrymandered to segregate blacks from whites than 
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school districts with less diverse cores (b = 0.236, p < .001). For example, a school 
district with a core student population that is very black-white diverse, defined as having 
a black-white diversity index two standard deviations below the mean, would be 40.8 
percentage points more diverse if its boundaries were not gerrymandered. By contrast, a 
school district with a core student population that is very black-white homogeneous 
would be 6.4 percentage points more diverse if it was not gerrymandered. As such, on 
average, a school district with high black-white diversity is 34.4 percentage points more 
gerrymandered to segregate than a school district with low black-white diversity.  
In addition, the third column in the table reveals that school districts with more 
Hispanic-white diverse cores are more gerrymandered to segregate Hispanics from whites 
than school districts with less diverse cores (b = 0.206, p < .001). For example, a school 
district with a core student population that is very Hispanic-white diverse, defined as 
having a Hispanic-white diversity index two standard deviations below the mean, would 
be 17.3 percentage points more diverse if its boundaries were not gerrymandered. By 
contrast, a school district with a core student population that is very Hispanic-white 
diverse homogeneous would be 1.5 percentage points more diverse if it was not 
gerrymandered. As such, on average, a school district with high Hispanic-white diversity 
is 15.9 percentage points more gerrymandered to segregate than a school district with low 
Hispanic-white diversity.  
Additional analyses, documented in final four lines of the table, were conducted 
examining the specific relationships between the proportion of students of each focal 
racial ethnic group and the effect of gerrymandering on multiracial, black-white and 
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Hispanic-white diversity. Again, analyses revealed the opposite effect of racial 
composition than was observed for school attendance zones. For school districts, the 
proportion of whites in the core district was negatively related to the segregative effect of 
gerrymandering on multiracial (b = -0.051, p < .001), black-white (b = -0.172, p < .001), 
and Hispanic-white diversity (b = -0.087), p < .001). For example, a high-white school 
district is on average 17.1 percentage points less gerrymandered to segregate blacks from 
whites than a low-white school district. Conversely, the proportion of blacks in a school 
district was positively related to the segregative effect of gerrymandering on multiracial, 
black-white, and Hispanic-white diversity. For example, a high black school district is on 
average 18.9 percentage points less gerrymandered to segregate blacks from whites than 
a low-black district.  
The finding that core homogeneity is associated with boundaries that are more 
gerrymandered to segregate for school attendance zones but with boundaries that are less 
gerrymandered to segregate for school districts reflects an interesting difference in the 
racial dynamics of gerrymandering by boundary type. One possible explanation for this 
difference that the segregative effects of school attendance zone boundary 
gerrymandering are inversely related to the segregative effects of their containing 
districts. Thus, for example, more homogeneous districts may have district boundaries 
that are less gerrymandered to segregate; however, within the district, segregation may be 
maintained through school attendance zone boundaries that serve to segregate. Likewise, 
more heterogeneous districts may have boundaries that are severely gerrymandered to 
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segregate; however, within the district, school attendance zones may be fairly regular or, 
to the extent that they are irregular, may be fairly race-neutral.  
To test the hypothesis that segregative gerrymandering at the school district level 
may suppress gerrymandering at the school level or neutral boundaries at the district level 
may prompt more gerrymandered school attendance zone boundaries, a supplemental 
diagnostic analysis was conducted examining the relationship between the segregative 
effects of school district and attendance zone gerrymandering. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
analysis revealed the effect of school attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity was 
positively related to the effect of school district gerrymandering on diversity (Multiracial 
R = 0.288, p < .001; Black-white R = 0.391, p < .001; Hispanic-white R = 0.272, p < 
.001). This suggests that, on average, districts that are more gerrymandered to segregate 
also have school attendance zone boundaries that are more gerrymandered to segregate. 
Phase II Summary 
To address the fourth research question, the diversity of current school district 
boundaries was compared to the diversity of non-gerrymandered, equal land area circle 
school districts. Analyses revealed that, on average, school districts are more 
racially/ethnically homogeneous than their “natural” districts, suggesting that the 
gerrymandering of school districts serves to segregate students by race and ethnicity. 
Although school district gerrymandering, like school attendance zone gerrymandering, 
segregates students of all racial/ethnic groups from each other, irregularities in district 
boundaries are particularly “effective” in segregating white students from black and, to a 
lesser extent, Hispanic students.  
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While the current analysis cannot be used to substantiate inferences about the 
discriminatory intent of district boundary gerrymandering, it can offer insight into the 
segregative effect of district boundaries. Indeed, this analysis establishes that, regardless 
of their original intent, irregularities in district boundaries currently serve to exacerbate 
segregation between districts. This is particularly important given the current emphasis 
on district boundaries as a mechanism of racial/ethnic segregation, in light of evidence 
that segregation between districts is now substantially higher than segregation within 
districts and accounts for a majority of all public school segregation (Reardon et al., 
2000; Richards & Stroub, 2011).  
The effects of school district boundary gerrymandering on district diversity also 
vary significantly by district geographic and demographic characteristics. In addition to 
having boundaries that are more gerrymandered than those in metropolitan areas, the 
gerrymandering of school district boundaries in micropolitan areas serves to segregate 
more than the gerrymandering of metropolitan school district boundaries, in terms of 
multiracial and Hispanic-white diversity. However, metropolitan and micropolitan areas 
did not differ in terms of the effect of gerrymandering on black-white diversity. The 
finding that school district boundaries serve to perpetuate black-white segregation in both 
larger and smaller urban areas underscores the geographic universality of gerrymandering 
as a mechanism of segregating blacks and whites. It is not clear why the gerrymandering 
of school district boundaries in micropolitan areas serves to segregate more than the 
gerrymandering of metropolitan school district. It is possible that the effect may also be a 
function of the lower levels of income and educational attainment in micropolitan areas 
176 
(Miller, 2009). Conversely, it is possible that the difference relates to different scales of 
segregation for urban areas of different sizes. For example, while residential segregation 
in larger metropolitan areas may be stronger at the macro-level, segregation in smaller 
micropolitan areas may be stronger at a micro-level. Coupled with the finding that 
segregation is higher in micropolitan areas than metropolitan areas (Parisi, Lichter & 
Grice, 2007), findings suggest that the gerrymandering of both school attendance zone 
and school district boundaries may be one factor contributing to high rates of segregation 
in micropolitan areas.  
Despite having relatively compact district boundaries, school districts in rural 
areas are more gerrymandered to segregate than districts in other localities, while school 
districts in cities are least gerrymandered to segregate across all measures of diversity. 
Again, this finding may be a function of the fact that the “rural” districts in the study 
represent districts in fringe, exurban, and bedroom-developing areas outside more 
populous metropolitan and micropolitan areas. Over the past decades, these areas have 
experienced rapid population growth and demographic change associated with the 
continued outward expansion and sprawl of metropolitan areas; as a result, new school 
districts may be created and existing district boundaries modified to accommodate these 
new populations. As such, the irregularities in these boundaries may reflect the tension 
created by the juxtaposition of older, more homogeneous resident populations and the 
newer, more racially/ethnically diverse populations.    
The racial dynamics of exclusion manifest in gerrymandered school district 
boundaries are particularly interesting when considered in light of findings for school 
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attendance zones. For school attendance zones, more diverse schools tend to be less 
gerrymandered to segregate than more homogeneous schools, while whiter schools tend 
to be more gerrymandered to segregate schools with fewer whites. This suggests that the 
gerrymandering of attendance zone boundaries is being perpetrated by whites to exclude 
non-whites and include whites. However, findings for school districts reveal the opposite 
phenomenon. More homogeneous districts are less gerrymandered to segregate than more 
diverse districts, while districts with more whites tend to be less gerrymandered to 
segregate than districts with more non-whites.  
Analyses reveal that the different patterns of exclusion for school attendance 
zones and school districts are not attributable to a compensatory effect of school 
attendance zone gerrymandering in non-gerrymandered school districts. Another possible 
explanation for the finding that school district diversity is positively related to segregative 
gerrymandering is that diverse district contexts may be “threatening” to certain parents 
who may be motivated to establish segregated boundaries than parents residing in more 
homogeneous areas, who feel less immediately threatened by these racial/ethnic 
minorities. Alternately, given that district boundaries are often subject to more careful 
scrutiny, it is possible that the segregative gerrymandering of boundaries has been 
inhibited in more homogeneous districts, which may be more closely monitored than 
more diverse districts.  
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Previous research on the impact of educational boundaries on racial/ethnic equity 
in schools has treated boundaries as neutral, focusing on the indirect role that boundaries 
play in facilitating segregation by informing the residential choices of individuals. In this 
study, I adopt a “student exchange” framework which refocuses attention on how 
educational institutions exacerbate segregation by deliberately choosing students through 
irregular, “gerrymandered” boundaries. According to this perspective, irregularities in the 
shapes of educational boundaries reflect an inclusionary and exclusionary process 
whereby schools and districts “zone in” more racially and ethnically similar students in 
outlying areas while “zoning out” dissimilar students nearby. The distortion of attendance 
zone and district boundaries therefore provides a mechanism by which schools and 
districts facilitate segregation beyond existing patterns of residential segregation.  
In this study, I provide initial empirical evidence on the gerrymandering of 
educational boundaries, employing geospatial methodological techniques 
operationalizing the study’s student exchange framework to directly examine the effects 
of gerrymandering on the racial/ethnic diversity of U.S. public schools and school 
districts. Consistent with the student exchange framework, findings reveal that the 
gerrymandering of school attendance zones and school districts is segregative, with 
whiter districts “zoning out” more non-white students and “zoning in” more white 
student, while districts with students of color “zoning out” whites and “zoning in” more 
students of color. As a result of this process of student exchange, schools and districts are 
significantly more racially and ethnically homogeneous than they would be in the 
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absence of gerrymandering (i.e., than their corresponding equal land area circle 
zones/districts or Voronoi polygonal zones). In particular, the gerrymandering of 
educational boundaries serves to exclude blacks and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics from 
predominantly white schools and districts, reinforcing the deep historical divisions 
between these groups. As a result of these dynamics, the gerrymandering of boundaries 
adds another pernicious layer of segregation to public education institutions, which are 
already highly segregated owing to residential patterns.  
The finding that educational institutions actively facilitate segregation and, 
thereby, unequal access to educational opportunity through irregular and inequitable 
boundaries is concerning. However, by refocusing attention to the role of educational 
institutions in perpetuating segregation, the findings of this study also offer grounds for 
cautious optimism. Although, on average, educational boundaries have generally been 
manipulated in ways that increase their racial/ethnic homogeneity and segregate students, 
a substantial proportion of educational boundaries are integrative, exchanging students in 
ways that increase the racial/ethnic diversity of schools. Moreover, whereas individual 
residential decisions fall outside the control of educational institutions, school and district 
boundaries are subject to manipulation, and thus may be modified to make them less 
inequitable. Indeed, establishing affirmative race-conscious boundaries designed to 
mitigate the effects of residential segregation was specifically endorsed by Justice 
Kennedy in the Parents Involved decision. Below I discuss specific implications of the 
study findings for educational policies at the school and district levels.  
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Policy Implications 
School Attendance Zones 
Although the finding that school attendance zones are gerrymandered to segregate 
is somewhat discouraging, it also means that school diversity could be significantly 
improved through re-zoning efforts designed to minimize gerrymandering, or through 
standards limiting attendance zone gerrymandering. Findings from Voronoi analyses, 
which represent a more feasible re-zoning alternative to circular attendance zones, reveal 
that, on average, the black-white diversity of school attendance zones could be improved 
by 19% under a Voronoi attendance zoning scheme. Likewise, Hispanic-white 
segregation could be improved by 7% under a Voronoi attendance zoning scheme. 
Moreover, in addition to being more equitable, Voronoi attendance zones would also be 
more efficient, since by their very definition, Voronoi zones minimize student travel 
distance to school. Thus, rezoning is appealing in that it could satisfy the convergent 
interests of equity and efficiency.  
In particular, the rezoning of attendance zones presents a particularly fruitful path 
for achieving equity in schools located in smaller, micropolitan urban areas, and in rural 
localities on the outskirts of major cities, areas which are undergoing rapid demographic 
changes and experiencing substantial increases in segregation (Parisi et al., 2007; Stroub 
& Richards, 2011). Moreover, attendance rezoning would be particularly effective in 
whiter, more homogeneous schools, which tend to use boundaries to further consolidate 
their homogeneity. Unfortunately, however, districts in which rezoning is likely to be 
successful (i.e., that are most gerrymandered to segregate) are perhaps the least likely to 
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pursue this option, owing to the same racial dynamics that caused them to be 
gerrymandered in the first place.  
The finding that school attendance zone boundaries are significantly less 
gerrymandered to segregate students in school districts subject to federal desegregation 
oversight suggests that desegregation orders have been, and continue to be, effective in 
suppressing the practice of segregative gerrymandering in the South. Although this 
analysis suggests that a history of federal oversight over desegregation orders may remain 
effective in suppressing gerrymandering even after unitary status is granted, it is unclear 
whether this effect will continue in the longer-term. Indeed, data from the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights indicates that the vast majority of school districts receiving 
declarations of unitary status have done so since the year 2000. As such, it is too soon to 
tell whether federal oversight will continue to inhibit segregative gerrymandering or 
whether boundaries will be gradually modified to segregate after the termination of 
desegregation orders. However, this finding suggests that more stringent oversight and 
monitoring of local zoning practices may be an important policy lever for suppressing 
discriminatory practices related to educational boundaries.  
In the absence of stronger state and federal oversight over local control of school 
attendance zone boundaries, the extent to which it is practical to modify school 
attendance zones may be strongly dependent on the commitment of district leadership to 
equitable boundaries. New school attendance zones are frequently established (i.e., 
whenever a new school is created), eliminated (i.e., whenever a school is closed down), 
and modified (i.e., to accommodate demographic changes, changes in facilities or school 
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capacity, or school openings and closures). While parental pressures certainly influence 
the school attendance zoning process, superintendents and district staff exert considerable 
control over the rezoning agenda by in proposing new boundaries, which are then subject 
to public review, modification, and, ultimately, approval by the local school board (e.g., 
Orange County Public Schools, 2007; Richards & Stroub, 2011). As such, creation of 
more equitable school attendance zones may be largely a function of the motivation and 
political will of district leadership, underscoring the important role that school leaders 
play in fostering equity in schools (Holme, Diem & Welton, forthcoming).   
Although, on average, school attendance zones are gerrymandered to segregate, it 
should be emphasized that a large proportion of school attendance zones are actually 
gerrymandered to integrate, in that they are more diverse than their “natural” attendance 
zones. For these attendance zones, re-zoning with the objective of increasing efficiency 
or to returning to “neighborhood schools” could pose a threat to racial and ethnic equity. 
As such, it is critical to ensure that rezoning processes carefully consider the potentially 
adverse consequences of any new attendance zone plans. In addition, because changes to 
one boundary necessarily mean changes to another, it is especially important to consider 
the impact of boundary changes to the complement of schools in a district.  
School Districts 
Although school district boundaries are generally subject to greater state oversight 
and more stringent regulations regarding the racial/ethnic impact of boundary changes, 
this study finds that school district boundaries are gerrymandered as severely as 
attendance zones. Moreover, the irregularities in district boundaries serve to exacerbate 
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segregation between districts. This suggests that gerrymandering is one factor 
contributing to the high rates of between-district segregation, which now accounts for the 
majority of all public school segregation (e.g., Reardon et al., 2000). However, it also 
indicates that between-district segregation, which has been rendered sacrosanct by 
Milliken, could be significantly improved by minimizing gerrymandering. Moreover, 
school redistricting initiatives designed to reduce school finance inequities and equalize 
educational opportunity may also have the ancillary benefit of increasing racial/ethnic 
equity.  
It should be emphasized that although the methodology employed in this study 
provides direct evidence of the current effect of school district gerrymandering on the 
racial/ethnic composition of school districts, it does not substantiate inferences about the 
intent of school district gerrymandering. While deviations from regularity suggest that 
boundaries were intentionally manipulated, it cannot be inferred from the demographic 
characteristics of current residents whether the boundaries were intentionally manipulated 
to segregate students by race/ethnicity. While school district boundaries do change over 
time, they are more stable than school attendance zone boundaries, reflecting their 
coterminity with other political boundaries and political and legal barriers to their 
modification. As such, current district boundaries were often established decades or even 
a century ago.  Thus, the demographic characteristics of students residing in and around 
school districts may have changed substantially since the boundaries were originally 
adopted. The current effect of gerrymandering on segregation, therefore, may not be the 
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result of the intentional manipulation of exclusionary boundaries, but of individual 
residential decisions reflected in Tiebout sorting across district boundaries. 
Moreover, because of the relative stability of district boundaries, the potential for 
redistricting as an instrument of integration is somewhat less promising than school 
rezoning. Indeed, relative to school attendance zones, school district boundaries are 
relatively fixed and are often tied to other jurisdictional boundaries. They are subject to 
more bureaucratic, formal state-imposed processes and require state and, in some cases, 
federal approval. Thus, changes in district boundaries require significantly more political 
will than school attendance zone changes. This should not be interpreted to suggest that 
redistricting is impossible, however; large-scale reorganization has been contemplated in 
some states, such as in Texas, where new districts have been proposed as a means of 
resolving school finance inequities. Moreover, continuing a trend that may be traced to 
the 1800s, school district boundaries are consolidating in rural areas (Bard & Gardener, 
2011), and may be fragmenting in others (Author), presenting opportunities to review 
boundaries. Thus, while change is often more incremental, district boundaries do change, 
providing some windows of opportunity to create more equitable boundaries.  
Because of these limitations, a more practical approach to obviating the effects of 
segregative gerrymandering of school district gerrymandering may be through policies 
governing changes to district boundaries. While many states contain measures preventing 
“discriminatory” district boundaries, the results of this study suggest that these measures 
have been too weak or insufficiently prescriptive to prevent gerrymandering that 
exacerbates segregation. For example, states may wish to consider imposing compactness 
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standards for school districts, particularly for any new districts or modifications to 
existing district boundaries. In practice, this standard may be similar to the 50% equal 
land area circle ratio standard proposed by Angel and Parent (2011) or an areal 
compactness standard as has been endorsed by Polsby and Popper (1991). Failure to meet 
a prescribed standard for compactness would trigger a more comprehensive review to 
ensure that irregularities do not have an adverse impact on equity, with the effect of 
gerrymandering on equity. This may be established empirically using a method similar to 
that used in this study, comparing the equity of the existing district to the equity of 
alternative redistricting schemes. 
It should be noted that even if gerrymandered school districts and school 
attendance zones were adjusted to be maximally compact, the long-term benefits of more 
equitable boundaries on the racial/ethnic diversity of schools and districts cannot be 
assured. Indeed, it is conceivable that individuals will respond to new school and district 
boundaries by Tiebout “voting with their feet” and re-sorting across school and district 
boundaries. Thus, in the long-term, levels of segregation may return to their current level. 
However, such processes take time, and should not overshadow the gains that may be 
achieved in the short term. Moreover, in the case of school attendance zones, boundaries 
may be re-adjusted more frequently to adapt to changing demographics.  
Study Limitations 
Although this study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on 
segregation in schools, a number of important limitations must be acknowledged. First, it 
should again be emphasized that this study cannot establish discriminatory or affirmative 
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intent on the part of educational agencies, although the basis for inferring intent is 
stronger for school attendance zone boundaries than for school district boundaries, for 
reasons discussed at length above. Rather, it establishes the segregative or integrative 
effect of gerrymandered boundaries, by determining the extent to which gerrymandered 
boundaries currently serve increase or decrease the diversity of schools or districts 
beyond what would be expected on the basis of existing patterns of residential 
segregation.  
In addition, it should be emphasized that the impetus for and effects of 
gerrymandering may not be exclusively racial. Indeed schools and districts may 
gerrymander their boundaries to include and exclude certain areas for a variety of 
reasons. In addition to race, socioeconomic status may play a particularly strong role in 
driving educational boundaries. Given the local nature of education finance, this may be 
particularly true for districts, which may gerrymander to “tax grab” resource-rich areas to 
increase district revenues. Likewise, the effects of gerrymandering may not be limited to 
racial/ethnic segregation, but may separate students according to other dimensions. 
Because this study is narrowly focused on the effects of gerrymandering on racial and 
ethnic equity in schools, it fails to capture the full spectrum of equity effects of 
educational boundaries that may be important to schools, such as socioeconomic 
diversity. For example, the gerrymandering of boundaries may serve to segregate 
students by socioeconomic status even when it facilitates integration by race. Alternately, 
gerrymandering may integrate students by socioeconomic status even as it segregates by 
race. 
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Unfortunately, because the Census does not report block-level data on the 
socioeconomic status (which were used to determine the characteristics of the actual and 
non-gerrymandered districts in the analysis), it is impossible to determine on the basis of 
this analysis the relative contributions of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status in 
driving student exchange via gerrymandered boundaries. However, it should again be 
emphasized that the effect of gerrymandering in perpetuating or ameliorating 
racial/ethnic segregation, which is the focus of this study, is independent of the original 
intent of the boundary manipulation. Thus, while it is possible that the intent of a 
boundary change is racially neutral, the impact of that change may be segregative or 
integrative.  
For the analysis of school district boundaries, the study analyzes the full 
population of U.S. school districts, obviating any problems with sample size or bias. The 
school attendance zone sample, however, reflects only a quarter of the population of U.S. 
school attendance zones. While the SABINS sample is fairly large (n = 9,717), because 
schools are not required to supply their attendance zone boundaries, it is a voluntary, non-
random sample and may not be representative of the population of school attendance 
zones as a whole. Comparison of the SABINS sample to the comparable population of 
U.S. public school districts revealed that they were remarkably similar in terms of 
demographic and geographic characteristics. However, the voluntary nature of the sample 
introduces the possibility of response bias. For example, schools with less gerrymandered 
and more equitable boundaries may have been more likely to report their boundaries than 
schools with less equitable boundaries. As such, the study’s estimates of the effect of 
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attendance zone gerrymandering on diversity and the amount by which diversity would 
be increased through rezoning to increase compactness may not be generalizable to all 
U.S. public schools. 
In documenting the severity and prevalence of gerrymandering and in estimating 
the effect of gerrymandering on diversity, this study relied exclusively on measures of 
compactness. Compactness was selected because it represents the single most important 
dimension of gerrymandering, and it facilitated alignment between both phases of the 
study. However, as the discussion in Chapter 2 reveals, the literature on gerrymandering 
has identified four dimensions of compactness. Although compactness is a flexible spatial 
measure that captures some violations of contiguity and embeddedness, it is less sensitive 
to violations of these principles. Moreover, this study focuses exclusively on spatial 
measures of gerrymandering, and fails to capture the effects of aspatial gerrymandering 
through population inequivalence. 
In addition, it is often difficult to disentangle deliberate gerrymandering from 
boundary irregularity resulting from adherence with other geographic boundaries (e.g., 
rivers, coastlines, mountains) or from coterminity with other jurisdictional boundaries 
(e.g., county). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, where possible, indices of 
gerrymandering were adjusted to reflect the unique effects of educational gerrymandering 
from the effects of other geographic or jurisdictional boundaries. However, it is possible 
that some of the instances of gerrymandering captured by the study do not reflect 
intentional manipulation, but merely adherence with other boundaries or manipulation for 
unique reasons not captured in the study (e.g., around tribal lands). To the extent that 
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educational boundaries are gerrymandered to segregate because they adhere to other 
jurisdictional boundaries that are also gerrymandered to segregate suggests that while 
educational agencies may not be culpable for the gerrymandering of other political 
institutions, they are failing to mitigate it.  
Future Research 
As the foregoing discussion has emphasized, perhaps the single most important 
limitation of this study is that it is limited to examining the effects of gerrymandering; it 
cannot assess the extent to which these boundaries were intentionally manipulated to 
segregate. This is primarily because the study relies on boundaries and residential 
characteristics measured at a single point in time (2010), and lacks data on the 
racial/ethnic composition of each area at the time the boundary was established. Future 
research using contemporaneous data on new school boundaries and residential 
racial/ethnic characteristics would permit stronger inferences about the intent of 
boundaries to segregate.  
The Census has disseminated boundary data on all U.S. school districts annually 
since 2006, and twice prior to 2006 (2000 and 1992). Paired with data on residential 
race/ethnicity from the decennial Census and American Community Survey, the sample 
of district boundaries that were established or modified in those years could be used to 
examine the extent to which boundaries were intentionally segregative. The SABINS 
database currently contains school attendance zone boundaries for a single year (2009-
10); however, Minnesota has released annual school attendance zone shapefiles since the 
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year 2000. This sample would permit analysis of the intent to segregate in the full sample 
of Minnesota attendance zones that have been created or changed over the past 12 years.    
In addition to establishing the intent of gerrymandering, future research should 
examine the causal mechanisms contributing to gerrymandering. For example, the results 
of this study have been interpreted to suggest that the gerrymandering of boundaries may 
be initiated in response to rapid demographic changes, particularly in rural areas. 
However, annual boundary and demographic data such as those described above could 
also provide insight into how boundaries are being manipulated in response to broader 
population dynamics.  
Another limitation of the current study is its singular focus on the racial dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion manifest in gerrymandered boundaries, which neglects other 
potentially important factors, such as socioeconomic status and, relatedly, tax capacity. 
Although the current study was focused on race for theoretical reasons as well as 
practical reasons – the decennial Census does not report socioeconomic data at the block 
level – future research could determine the relationship between gerrymandering and 
socioeconomic indicators using block group-level data. On average, however, block 
groups are 39 times more populous than blocks (U.S. Census, 2010), meaning that such 
an analysis would be more accurate in the context of larger districts and school 
attendance zones. Such research would contribute to the emerging literature on the 
shifting dynamics of exclusion based on class and race in American schools.  
Although this study constitutes a first effort to empirically study the 
gerrymandering of educational boundaries, it is limited to examining the severity and 
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consequences of violations of compactness. As such, further research is necessary to 
extend the literature on gerrymandering beyond compactness. This is particularly 
important because highly compact and regular boundaries may obfuscate some of the 
ways in which boundaries perpetuate exclusion. In particular, additional geospatial 
analyses should address how educational boundaries are gerrymandered through 
violations of contiguity and embeddedness. In particular, further research should examine 
how educational institutions, particularly school districts, gerrymander through 
inequinumerosity, and the relationship between population inequivalence and other 
spatial measures of segregation.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Measures of Compactness 
Measure/Author  Equation  Description 
Indentation     
Area to Perimeter Ratios     
Schwartzberg (1966),  
Attneave & Arnoult (1956)  ܥ ൌ
݌
2√ߨܽ 
Ratio of perimeter of district to perimeter of circle with equal area
Polsby‐Popper (1991),  
Cox (1927)  ܥ ൌ
4ߨܽ
݌ଶ  
Ratio of area of district to area of circle with equal perimeter
Convexity     
Simple Convexity  
(Taylor, 1973)  ܥ ൌ
ሺܰ െ ܴሻ
ሺܰ ൅ ܴሻ 
Proportion of angles in district polygon that are non‐reflexive (outward) vs. reflexive 
(inward)   
Chambers & Miller (2010)  ݏ௓௤ሺܭ, ݂ሻ ൌ ඵ൤
݀ሺݔ, ݕ; ܼሻ
݀ሺݔ, ݕ; ܭሻ൨
௤ ݂ሺݕሻ݂ሺݔሻ
ሺܨሺܭሻሻଶ ݀ݕ ݀ݔ 
Probability that a district contains the shortest 
path between a randomly‐selected pair of points 
Dispersion     
Length‐Width Displacement 
Harris (1964)  ܦ ൌ ܹܮ  
L is the longest axis of the district polygon and W is the maximum length 
perpendicular to L  
  ܦ ൌ ܮ െܹ
Reported in Niemi et al. (1990)  ܦ ൌ ܹܮ  
W and L are the width and length of the circumscribing rectangle with minimum 
perimeter 
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Young (1988)  ܦ ൌ ܹܮ  
W and L are the width and length of the rectangle enclosing the district and touching 
it on all four sides for which the ratio of length to width is maximized 
Reported in Niemi et al. (1990)  ܦ ൌ ܹܮ  
L is the longest axis and W and L are the width and length of a rectangle enclosing the 
district and touching it on all four sides 
Eig & Seitzinger (1981)  ܦ ൌ ܮ െܹ L and W are measured on the North‐South and East‐West axes, respectively
Frolov (1974)  ܥ ൌ ݀௠௜௡݀௠௔௫ 
Ratio of diameter of maximum inscribed circle to diameter of minimum 
circumscribing circle 
Morrill (1987)  ܥ ൌ ݀௠௜௡݀௠௔௫ 
Ratio of district’s minimum diameter to maximum diameter
Ratio of District Area to Area of Compact Figure  
Reock (1961)  Ratio of area of district to area of minimum circumscribing circle
Geisler (1985)  Ratio of area of district to area of minimum circumscribing regular hexagon
Reported in Niemi et al. (1991)  Ratio of area of district to area of minimum convex polygon/hull that completely contains the district
Horton (1932);  
Gibbs (1961) 
Ratio of area of district to area of circle with diameter equal to the district’s longest axis
Ehrenberg (1892), cited in Frolov (1974) Ratio of area of maximum inscribed circle to area of district polygon
Maximum‐Minimum Circle Ratio 
Flaherty & Crumplin (1992) 
Ratio of area of maximum inscribed circle to area of minimum circumscribing circle
Equal Land Area Circle Ratio 
Angel & Parent, 2011 
Ratio of area of district to area included in circle about the center of gravity of the district that has the 
same land area as district 
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Measure/Author  Equation  Description 
 
Moment of Inertia 
Schwartzberg (1966); Kaiser (1966) ܯ ൌ ܣඥ2∬ݎଶ݀ܦ 
Sum of squared distances of every point in shape to the moment of 
inertia or  areal “center of gravity” of the district 
Boyce & Clark (1964) 
ܯ ൌ෍ቤቆ ݎ௜∑௡ଵ ቇ ∗ 100 െ
100
݊ ቤ
௡
ଵ
 
Average distance from district’s areal center of gravity to 
point on the district perimeter reached by a set of equally 
spaced radial lines 
Note: Highlighted measures were used to assess gerrymandering in the current study. 
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Table 2 
Study Variables and Data Sources  
  Measure  Description Data Source Data Fields
PHASE I     
Dependent 
Variables 
SAZ Compactness  Schwartzberg 
 Polsby‐Popper 
SABINS 2009‐10 Elementary School Attendance 
Zones (Grade 1) 
School District 
Compactness 
 Schwartzberg 
 Polsby‐Popper 
Census TIGER/Line 2010
 
 Elementary School Districts – All 
states 
 Secondary School Districts – All 
states 
 Unified School Districts – All states 
Independent 
Variables (SAZ 
and District) 
Core‐Based Statistical 
Area Type 
 Metropolitan statistical area 
 Micropolitan statistical area 
(Reference category) 
NCES CCD LEA Universe 
Survey Data File 
METMIC: Indicates whether the 
CBSA is a metropolitan or 
micropolitan area 
Locality   Rural: Fringe, Distant, 
Remote (Reference category) 
 Town: Fringe, Distant, 
Remote 
 Suburb: Large, Medium, 
Small 
 City: Large, Medium, Small 
NCES CCD LEA Universe 
Survey  
ULOCAL: NCES urban‐centric locale 
code 
Free‐ and Reduced‐Price 
Lunch 
% Students qualifying for free‐
or reduced‐price lunch 
NCES CCD Public School 
Universe Survey 
TOTFRL: Total students qualifying for 
free‐ and reduced‐price lunch 
Student Race/Ethnicity  % Black 
 % Hispanic 
 % White 
NCES CCD Public School 
Universe Survey 
BLACK: Total black students
HISP: Total Hispanic/Latino students 
WHITE: Total white students 
Student Population Number of students in SAZ NCES CCD Public School 
Universe Survey 
MEMBER: Total reported student 
membership 
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  Measure  Description Data Source Data Fields
Independent 
Variables (SAZ 
Only) 
History of De Jure
Segregation  
 Located in 17 states formerly 
subject to de jure 
segregation  
Watras (1997)  Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,  
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia 
History of Desegregation 
Order 
 Granted Unitary Status/ 
Currently Under Court Order 
 Never Litigated  
U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights 
N/A
District compactness Compactness of containing 
district:  
 Schwartzberg 
 Polsby‐Popper 
Census TIGER/Line 2010  Elementary School Districts – All 
states 
 Secondary School Districts – All 
states 
 Unified School Districts – All states 
PHASE II 
Dependent 
Variables 
Effect of SAZ 
Gerrymandering on SAZ 
Diversity  
% difference in diversity 
between actual SAZ and 
natural SAZ 
 Census 2010 Summary 
File 1 demographic data, 
spatially linked to actual 
SAZ and natural SAZ 
boundaries 
 P9: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
 P11: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
for the Population 18 Years 
and Over  
Effect of District 
Gerrymandering on District 
Diversity  
% difference in diversity 
between actual district and 
natural district 
 Census 2010 Summary 
File 1, spatially linked to 
actual district and natural 
district boundaries 
 P9: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
 P11: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
for the Population 18 Years 
and Over 
 229 
  Measure  Description Data Source Data Fields
Independent 
Variables (SAZ and 
District) 
Core‐Based Statistical Area 
Type 
 Metropolitan statistical 
area 
 Micropolitan statistical 
area (Reference category) 
NCES CCD LEA Universe 
Survey Data File 
METMIC: Indicates whether the 
CBSA is a metropolitan or 
micropolitan area 
Locality   Rural: Fringe, Distant, 
Remote (Reference 
category) 
 Town: Fringe, Distant, 
Remote 
 Suburb: Large, Medium, 
Small 
 City: Large, Medium, Small 
NCES CCD LEA Universe 
Survey  
ULOCAL: NCES urban‐centric 
locale code 
Core Student 
Race/Ethnicity 
 % Black 
 % Hispanic 
 % White 
Census 2010 Summary File 
1, spatially linked to area of 
overlap between actual and 
natural boundaries 
 P9: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
 P11: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
for the Population 18 Years 
and Over 
Core Student Diversity  Multiracial diversity 
 Black‐white diversity 
 Hispanic‐white diversity 
Census 2010 Summary File 
1, spatially linked to area of 
overlap between actual and 
natural boundaries 
 P9: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
 P11: Hispanic or Latino, and 
Not Hispanic or Latino by Race 
for the Population 18 Years 
and Over 
Student Population Number of students in SAZ Census 2010 Summary File 
1, spatially linked actual 
school attendance zone and 
school district boundaries 
P11: Hispanic or Latino, and Not 
Hispanic or Latino by Race for 
the Population 18 Years and 
Over (TOTAL) 
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  Measure  Description Data Source Data Fields
Independent 
Variables (SAZ Only) 
History of De Jure
Segregation (SAZ only) 
 Located in 17 states 
formerly subject to de jure 
segregation  
Watras (1997) Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma,  South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia 
History of Desegregation 
Order (SAZ only) 
 Granted Unitary Status/ 
Currently Under Court 
Order 
 Never Litigated  
U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights 
N/A
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